On the morning of the next day, it could have been either 4 or 5 May 1945, we joined a column moving towards the Elbe bridge. Far from the bridge the column became stuck and did not move on for a long time. Using my boy-scout experience, I made a reconnaissance of the place with Bert Fink, and when we reached the Elbe bridge we saw the reason for the hold-up. The bridge had collapsed in the middle as a result of demolition, and a plank spanned the gap between the two sections of the bridge sticking up from the water, allowing only a single file of soldiers to pass. As we were so near to our long-desired goal, we tagged on to the head of the column. We were soon across on the other side in Tangermünde, and once more we had made it!
The American soldiers standing on the roadway received us in friendly fashion. They were interested in our watches and cameras but didn’t force us to give them up. I had to hand over my pistol. After a rest in the station area, the march to Stendal was the next stage to prisoner of war camp.[2]
Wenck sent Lieutenant-General Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Edelsheim, commander of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, to negotiate the surrender to the American Ninth Army, as the Ninth Army Chief of Staff, Major General James E. Moore reported to his commander, Lieutenant General William L. Simpson, in the following memorandum on 7 May (with original spelling errors):
1. On 4 May 1945, in compliance with your verbal instructions, I proceeded to the Command Post of the 102d Division and, accompanied by Major General Keating, Division Commander, and Brigadier General Fox, Assistant Division Commander, I went to Stendal, for the purpose of interviewing General of the Armored Forces Baron von Edelsheim, representing the Commander-in-Chief of German armies at the Elbe and the Havel. Colonel Loren Williams, Regimental Commander in that sector was also present.
2. General von Edelsheim had previous presented to Brigadier General Fox a request on the part of the German Commander for the surrender of his forces and evacuation of civilians as indicated on the attached inclosure. This formed the basis of our discussion.
3. General von Edelsheim informed me that the forces which he represented were the Twelfth German Army and remnants of the Ninth German Army which had been fighting on the Eastern Front. He stated that the strength of the force was approximately 25,000 unarmed soldiers, 40,000 men in battle formations and 6,000 wounded. He also stated that there were approximately 100,000 civilians in the area which he wished to evacuate to the west bank of the Elbe. He stated that they had a considerable amount of transport and about a week’s supply of food in army stores, plus that which was carried on the individual soldier. He also stated that they had adequate field hospitals and medical personnel to care for their wounded.
4. General von Edelsheim gave his order of battle, the following units:
- XX ARMY CORPS
- Division Scharnhorst
- Division Koenei
- Division Schill
- Division Hulten
- 48th PANZER CORPS
- KG Radtke
- KG Koehler
- KG Rugner
- MISCELLANEOUS CORPS UNITS
- 39th PANZER CORPS
- Division Berlin
- KG Brandenburg
- KG Ratenow
- 41st PANZER CORPS
- KG Havelberg
- KG Jahn
- NINTH ARMY REMNANTS OF TWO DIVISIONS
5. General von Edelsheim stated that his army had been directed to move to the north and they had started the movement of their service elements, but the Russian drive which made contact with our left flank, had cut off the combat elements of the army from the service troops. He stated that the [American] prisoners (company patrols from the 102d Division), which he had, had been evacuated to the rear and were probably now in Russian hands.
6. General von Edelsheim was told that the Russians were our Allies and fighting against the Germans with us – that we had all the German prisoners that we wanted and more too. He was told, however, that if Germans appeared on the west bank of the Elbe River with their hands up, or under a white flag, under custom of war they would be accepted as prisoners and they would not be fired on while they were crossing the river. It was made clear, however, that we accepted no responsibility for any action on the part of the Russian forces opposing him and, if they cut him off from the river or fired on his troops while they were crossing, that he would have to meet that problem as best he could. He was told that the means for crossing the river would have to be provided by the German forces.
7. The critical food situation with respect to the Germans in our area was outlined to General von Edelsheim and he was told to bring maximum food stocks, kitchens and individual mess equipment with his troops. He was also told that we would put his forces in a wired-in enclosure upon their arrival, and that we would expect them to come over by companies or battalions, properly organized and controlled by their own officers. In view of the shortage of housing, he was also told that all men should bring their shelter halves with them.
8. With respect to the wounded, General von Edelsheim stated that he had adequate medical personnel and installations to care for them and requested that he be allowed to bring over all his wounded. He was told that if he brought medical personnel and installations over first, and that it was determined by our forces that they were adequate, he would be allowed to bring his wounded across the river. It was explained to him, however, that at that time it was doubtful if any shelter other than that provided by the German army could be provided.
9. The method of crossing the river was to be over the Tangermunde Bridge which, though partially destroyed, could then be used as a foot bridge. It was also expected that floats or rafts would be used to move kitchens, hospital units, etc., and that some of the men would probably swim the river.
10. General von Edelsheim was told that there would be no movement of civilians from east to west bank of the Elbe River.
11. General von Edelsheim agreed to all the foregoing, thanked me, and stated that he would immediately establish liaison with Colonel Williams in order to control his troops as they came over the river.[3]
The decision to refuse to receive any refugees was presumably based on the problems of feeding, but would have resulted in their involuntary abandonment to the vengeance of the pursuing Soviet forces east of the Elbe had not the Soviets themselves intervened.
Heinz Küster, an aircrew candidate drafted to a parachute convalescent battalion in the defence of Brandenburg, described the scene on the east bank of the Elbe on the afternoon of 6 May:
The Elbe was in full flood and dangerous, sweeping everything along in its depths. Opposite us the river formed a big bend and was about 350 metres wide. About 250,000–300,000 soldiers and a vast number of refugees were on the meadows between the Elbe dyke and the river. I reckon there were also some 2,000–3,000 horses.
As time went by, the Russians increased their pressure, firing indiscriminately with mortars, field and anti-tank guns. There must have also been some large-calibre tank guns, for horses and people were being blown apart.
Panic caught hold and there were screams from the wounded and men and animals being torn apart. It was hell. The cries of fear from the horses were frightful. Thousands of people were torn away that afternoon and night by the racing, swirling river. We could hear the endless cries for help and see the raised arms of those trying to swim across the Elbe.
At about 1600 hours that afternoon an inflatable boat came across from the American side. Everyone streamed down to the riverbank and the boat was overloaded. But no one wanted to sit on the side and take a paddle. I took my Luftwaffe comrade by the collar and pulled him on the boat, then jumped on the side and took a paddle.