67. Quoted in Mlechin, KGB. Predsedateli organov bezopasnosti. Rassekrechennye sud’by (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2006), 290 (in Russian).
68. Aleksandr Petrushin, ‘Rozysk ili sysk,’ Tyumenskii kurier, no. 1444 (2041), October 24, 2006 (in Russian), http://www.a-pesni.golosa.info/ww2/oficial/tyumen/a-rozysk.htm, retrieved September 8, 2011.
69. Ignatiev’s handwritten report to Stalin, dated November 15, 1952, in Nikita Petrov, ‘Pytki ot Stalina: ‘Bit’ smertnym boem,’’ Novaya gazeta. ‘Pravda GULAGa,’ no. 9, October 16, 2008 (in Russian), http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2008/gulag09/00.html, retrieved September 8, 2011.
70. Valentin Kodachigov, ‘Smert’ shpionam,’ Nezavisimoe voennnoe obozrenie, no. 15, April 25, 2004 (in Russian), http://nvo.ng.ru/spforces/2003-04-25/7_smersh.html, retrieved September 8, 2011.
71. SMERSH. Istoricheskie ocherki, 167.
72. Ibid., 169.
73. Quoted in V. A. Bobrenev and V. B. Ryazantsev, Palachi i zhertvy (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1993), 297–9 (in Russian).
74. Ibid., 268–94.
75. Cited in ibid., 314.
76. Cited in Igor Kuznetsov, ‘Oplacheno krov’yu,’ Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta, no. 1440, June 29, 2004 (in Russian).
77. An instruction quoted in Vladimir Bogomolov, ‘Sram imut i zhivye, i mertvye, i Rossiya…’ Svobodnaya mysl’—XXI, no. 7 (1995), 79–103 (in Russian), http://vivovoco.rsl.ru/vv/papers/history/bogomolov.htm, retrieved September 8, 2011.
78. Rokossovsky’s order, dated January 27, 1945, cited in ibid.
79. Reports to Abakumov, dated October 30 and November 1, 1943, and Abakumov’s report to Stalin, dated November 1, 1943, in N. V. Gubernatorov, SMERSH protiv Bussarda (Reportazh z arkhiva tainoi voiny) (Moscow: Kuchkovo pole, 2005), 143–56 (in Russian).
CHAPTER 19
Against Our Own People
In addition to its new responsibilities, SMERSH remained in charge of spying and reporting on Soviet servicemen. In the field, SMERSH used all kinds of measures to prevent Red Army servicemen from changing sides. For instance, in July 1943 UKRs of the Bryansk and Central fronts conducted the operation ‘Pretense “The Treason of the Motherland”’ in preparation for the Battle of Kursk.1 Groups of SMERSH-trained soldiers came up close to the enemy trenches, pretending that they wanted to cross the lines, and then threw grenades into the trenches. SMERSH operatives hoped that after this the Germans would shoot at any Red Army serviceman who appeared near their trenches.
The number of servicemen sentenced as traitors by military tribunals increased considerably after the OOs became SMERSH: in 1941, the tribunals convicted 8,976 traitors; in 1942, 43,050; in 1943, 52,757; and in 1944, 69,895.2 The investigations conducted by SMERSH officers were usually unprofessional and cases were generally falsified. A 1943 incident sheds light on the quality of investigation in the SMERSH field branches.
A Report on SMERSH
In May 1943, Aleksandr Shcherbakov, deputy NKO Commissar and head of the Army’s Main Political Directorate (GlavPURKKA, a directorate of the Central Committee), reported to Stalin on his and Abakumov’s inspection of SMERSH activity within the 7th Independent Army at the Karelian Front not far from Leningrad.3 This inspection was prompted by a complaint from the army’s commander, Major General Aleksei Krutikov, who reported to Moscow that most of the espionage cases prepared by the SMERSH department of his army were fabricated.
Shcherbakov wrote that their inspection revealed many falsified cases. Several paragraphs of the letter demonstrate the common work methods of SMERSH field investigators:
During inspection it was found that in a number of cases the Special Departments [it was the time of SMERSH, but many still referred to the SMERSH units by their previous name] used unlawful methods and violated the law. In particular, the Special Departments used as cell informers individuals who had already been sentenced to VMN [death] for espionage… [Later] head of the Special Department of the [7th] Army, Colonel Com.[rade] Dobrovolsky, appealed to the Military Council of the Army asking that VMN be replaced by imprisonment for individuals who helped [the investigators] to incriminate others.4
Yakov Aizenstadt, a member of a military tribunal, also recalled this practice: ‘Soon I discovered that “nasedki” [stool pigeons] and “stukachi” [informants], charged with getting confessions from prisoners under investigation, were put in each cell… Each “nasedka” and “stukach” had his pseudonym or alias, and each secret report contained the cell number.’5 Interestingly, when referring to cell informants, Shcherbakov used the term ‘kamernyi svidetel’ (cell witness) instead of ‘vnutrikamernik’ (cell insider), which was common in NKVD–SMERSH jargon. Perhaps, Shcherbakov considered the last word too explicit—that is, clearly indicative of the fact that the ‘witnesses’ were planted.
Shcherbakov continued: ‘An additional practice was the presence of investigators of the Special Departments at the trial [to intimidate the defendants], which was not necessary.’6 In the 1930s, NKVD investigators routinely rehearsed defendants before the open court trials, telling them what they should say during the trial and threatening to beat them severely after the trial if they did not follow instructions. Obviously, SMERSH investigators used similar methods, and their presence at the military tribunal sessions was meant to remind the defendants of their threats. Shcherbakov also emphasized that ‘another defect in the work of the punishment organs of the 7th Army was the complete lack of supervision by the prosecutor during the investigation’.7
Stalin immediately reacted to these points in Shcherbakov’s report. On May 31, 1943, he signed Order of the NKO Commissar No. 0089ss, handing down various punishments for SMERSH officers and prosecutors of the 7th Independent Army.8 The head of the SMERSH Department, Dobrovolsky, and the Military Prosecutor of the army received strict Party reprimands, while one of the investigators was to be tried and sentenced to five years in the labor camps. Three other investigators were to be discharged and sent to a punishment battalion. Finally, the Deputy Prosecutor of the Army responsible for supervising SMERSH Department work was demoted in rank.
However, it is unlikely that these fairly mild measures affecting one army represented a serious attempt to change SMERSH’s conduct. Besides, Stalin’s order did not address the general conclusions Shcherbakov placed at the end of his letter: ‘There are many inexperienced and semiliterate officers in the Special (currently, SMERSH) Departments. This defect should be corrected by transferring a few thousand political officers to [military] counterintelligence.’9
The last recommendation was clearly Shcherbakov’s attempt to place his own people, political officers, in Abakumov’s SMERSH. Political officers constantly complained about SMERSH operatives and commanding officers.