43. The Nuremberg Trial, Vol. 6, 72, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/01-23-46.asp, retrieved February 20, 2011.
44. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary, 163–4.
45. The Nuremberg Trial, Vol. 17, 202, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/06-28-46.asp, retrieved September 9, 2011.
46. Ibid., 203.
47. Ibid., 215.
48. Ibid., 215–6.
49. Ibid., 231.
50. Nikitchenko’s speech, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/juddiss.asp, retrieved September 9, 2011.
51. Ingeborg Kalnoky and Ilona Herisko, The Witness House (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1974), 228–9.
52. Ellensburg Daily Record, September 26, 1953, 14.
53. Quoted in Abarinov, ‘V kuluarakh.’
54. Grishaev and Solovov, ‘Domyslami nel’zya snyat’ ‘khrestomatiinyi glyanets’, 41.
55. Quoted in Abarinov, ‘V kuluarakh,’ 68–69, and discussed in Francine Hirsch, ‘The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, and the Making of the Postwar Order,’ The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (June 2008), 701–30.
56. Arkadii Vaksberg, ‘Zasluzhennyi deyatel,’ Literaturnaya Gazeta, March 13 (1989), 13 (in Russian).
57. I. F. Finyaev, ‘General-feldmarshal F. Paulus svidetel’stvuet,’ VIZh, no. 5 (1990), 52–54 (in Russian).
58. Report by Vyshinsky and Kruglov with an attached draft of Decision of the USSR Council of Ministers, dated March 29, 1950. Cited in Arkhiv noveishei istorii Rossii. T. 1.’Osobaya papka’ I. V. Stalina, edited by V. A. Kozlov and S. V. Mironenkom 307 (Moscow: Blagovest, 1994) (in Russian).
59. Anatrolii Tereshchenko, SMERSH v boyu (Moscow: Yuza-Eksmo, 2010), 187 (in Russian).
60. Fitin’s report, dated December 8, 1945. GARF, Fond R-9401, Opis’ 2 (Molotov’s NKVD/MVD Special Folder), Delo 105, L. 354–5.
61. Quoted in Abarinov, ‘V kuluarakh.’
62. Drafts (LX-1 and LX-2) and the final version of the report ‘General Observations on the Soviet Intelligence Mission in Nuremberg’ dated October 16, 1946 (February 1—June 15, 1946). NARA (Washington), RG 226, Entry 213, Box 2.
63. Richard W. Cutler, Counterspy: Memoirs of a Counterintelligence Officer in World War II and the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 2004), 125—31.
64. The final report, NARA, RG 226, Entry 213, Box 2.
65. Report LX-1 dated February 1–June 15, 1946, NARA, RG 226, Entry 213, Box 2.
66. Ibid.
67. Vaksberg, Stalin’s Prosecutor, 232–3.
68. Boris Yefimov, Desyat’ desyatiletii. O tom, chto videl, perezhil, zapomnil (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), 416–7, 428 (in Russian).
69. Pravda, December 12, 1945.
70. Abarinov, ‘V kuluarakh,’ 69–70.
71. Details in Zorya, ‘Prokurorskaya diplomatiya,’ 279–82.
72. The Nuremberg Trial, Vol. 10, 310–4, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/04-01-46.asp; Vol. 14, 285, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/05-21-46.asp, retrieved September 9, 2011.
73. Alfred Seidl, Der Fall Rudolf Hess 1941—1987: Dokumentation des Verteidigers (München: Universitas, 1988), 170.
74. Krystyna Kurczab-Redlich, ‘Doklad Zori,’ Russkii Zhurnal, November 24, 2000 (in Russian), http://old.russ.ru/ist_sovr/other_lang/20001124.html, retrieved September 9, 2011.
75. Application of Dr. Otto Stahmer on March 8, 1946, in The Nuremberg Trial, Vol. 9, 2–3, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/03-08-46.asp, retrieved September 9, 2011.
76. Ibid., Vol. 17, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/07-01-46.asp; http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/07-02-46.asp, retrieved September 9, 2011. More information in Taylor, The Anatomy of Nuremberg, 466–72.
77. T. S. Stupnikova, ‘…Nichego, krome pravdy…’ Nurnberg—Moskva: Vospominaniya (Moscow: Russkie slovari, 1998), 104 (in Russian).
78. Transcript of the meeting on March 21, 1946. Document No. 222 in Katyn. Mart 1940 g.—sentyabr’ 2000 g. Rasstrel. Sud’by zhivykh. Ekho Katyni. Dokumenty, edited by N. S. Lebedeva, N. A. Petrasova, B. Voshchinski, et al. (Moscow: Ves’ Mir, 2001), 555–6 (in Russian).
79. An interview with the historian Nataliya Lebedeva, in Yekaterina Latartseva, ‘Nepriyatnaya pravda Nyurnberg’, Trud, no. 149, August 31, 2011 (in Russian), http://luke.trud.ru/index.php/article/31-08-2011/267017_neprijatnaja_pravda_njurnberga.html, retrieved September 9, 2011.
80. Stupnikova, ‘…Nichego krome pravdy…’ 104.
81. Persico, Nuremberg, 343–4.
82. A letter of D. M. Reznichenko to Yu. N. Zorya, quoted in Abarinov, ‘V kuluarakh,’ page 68.
83. Sheinin’s testimony quoted in Aleksandr Zvyagintsev and Yurii Orlov, Prokurory dvukh epokh. Abdrei Vyshinsky i Roman Rudenko (Moscow:Olma-Press), 215 (in Russian).
84. Grishaev and Solovov, ‘Domyslami nel’zya snyat.’
85. SMERSH. Istoricheskie ocherki, 324.
EPILOGUE
The Road to the Top: Abakumov Becomes a Minister
With the end of the war, the necessity for SMERSH as a separate military counterintelligence organization disappeared and in spring of 1946, Stalin began restructuring the security services. By March, Viktor Abakumov reached the peak of his career, being appointed State Security (MGB) Minister. Many of SMERSH’s high-ranking officers received key positions in the MGB, while GUKR SMERSH became the 3rd Main Directorate of the MGB. As usual, this process was a result of Stalin’s planning and Politburo decisions. Here is how it happened.
On September 4, 1945, the GKO was disbanded and the Politburo returned to its routine work.1 A month later, at the Politburo’s suggestion, Stalin went on vacation to the Caucasus—his first holiday in nine years. On December 17, 1945, he was back in Moscow, and that evening he met in the Kremlin with Viktor Abakumov, who was still head of SMERSH. Also present were Nikolai Bulganin, former member of the GKO and Deputy Defense Commissar, Aleksei Antonov, head of the General Staff, and Sergei Shtemenko, head of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. At 8:15 p.m., Abakumov left Stalin’s office, while the other generals remained with Stalin for the next 40 minutes.2 Most probably, Stalin discussed with the military leaders the changes he planned to make in the structure of the defense and state security commissariats.
On December 29, 1945, the Politburo approved Lavrentii Beria’s request to be dismissed from his post as NKVD Commissar.3 Stalin personally edited the draft of the decision and wrote the reason for the dismissaclass="underline" ‘Because he [Beria] is too overwhelmed with work at his other central position.’ Apparently, Beria’s appointment as head of the Atomic Project was so secret that Stalin did not want to mention it even in an internal Politburo document. Beria’s first deputy, the colorless but dependable Sergei Kruglov (whose organization of security during the Yalta, Potsdam, and San Francisco conferences had impressed the British and American leaders), was appointed as NKVD Commissar and on January 10, 1946, he started his new job.