7. Ibid., 237.
8. A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov, Imperiya GRU. Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi voennoi razvedki. Kniga 1 (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2000), 302–4 (in Russian).
9. Reinhard Spitzy, How We Squandered the Reich, translated from the German by G. T. Waddington (Wilby: Michael Russell, 1997), 298.
10. Abshagen, Canaris, 88.
11. Mueller, Canaris, 233.
12. Stolze’s testimony in the MGB, dated July 14, 1947. Quoted in Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale, 132.
13. S. T. Minakov, Za otvorotom marshal’skoi shineli (Oreclass="underline" Orelizdat, 1999), 83–94 (in Russian).
14. Kirill Aleksandrov, Armiya generala Vlasova (Moscow: Yauza-Eksmo, 2006), 246 (in Russian).
15. Details in Franz Kurowski, The Brandenburger Commands: Germany’s Elite Spies in World War II (Stackpole Books, 2005).
16. Details in N. N. Luzan (N. Abin), Lubyanka: Podvigi i tragedii (Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 2010), 218–358 (in Russian).
17. Michael R. D. Foot, SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive 1940–46 (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984).
18. Abshagen, Canaris, 86.
19. Andre Brissaud, Canaris: The Biography of Admiral Canaris, Chief of German Military intelligence in the Second World War, translated and edited by Ian Colvin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), 274.
20. Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head: The Story of Hitler’s SS, translated from the German by Richard Barry (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), 289–92.
21. Detailed biography in Reinhard R. Doerries, Hitler’s Intelligence Chief Walter Schellenberg (New York: Enigma Books, 2009).
22. Höhne, Canaris, 471.
23. Oscar Reile, Tainaya voina. Sekretnye operatsii Abvera na Zapade i Vostoke (1921-1945) (Moscow: Tsentropoligraf, 2002), 135–36 (in Russian, translated from the German).
24. I. L. Bunich, ‘Groza’. Krovavye igry diktatorov (Ct. Petersburg: Oblik, 1997), 297 (in Russian).
25. H. Buchheit, Abver: shchit i mech’ III reikha (Moscow: Eksmo, 2005), 247–8 (in Russian, translation from German).
26. Paul Leverkuehn, German Military Intelligence, translated from the German by R. H. Stevens and Constantine FitzGibbon (London: Weidensfeld and Nicolson, 1954), 156.
27. OO Directive No. 29670, dated May 25, 1941. Document No. 215 in Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, T. 1. Nakanune, Kn. 2 (Moscow: Kniga i bizness, 1995), 158–60 (in Russian).
28. Short descriptions of Stab Walli in Heinz Höhne and Hermann Zolling, The General Was a Spy: The Truth About General Gehlen and His Spy Ring, translated from the German by Richard Barry (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1971), 15–22; Heinz Höhne, Canaris, translated from the German by J. Maxwell Brownjohn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc, 1979), 436–59; Kahn, German Military Intelligence, 248–9.
29. P. P. Stefanovsky, Razvoroty sud’by: Avtobiograficheskaya povesti. T. 1. Abver–SMERSH (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo RUDN, 2002), 19 (in Russian).
30. Brissaud, Canaris, 235.
31. Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, 249.
32. Höhne and Zolling, The General Was a Spy, 18.
33. Page 208 in Arnold M. Silver, ‘Memories of Oberurseclass="underline" Questions, Questions, Questions,’ Intelligence and National Security 8, No. 2 (April 1993), 199–213.
34. In ‘Debriefing of Eric Waldman’ on September 30, 1969, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB146/doc09.pdf, retrieved September 6, 2011.
35. S. G. Chuev, Spetssluzhby III Reikha. Kniga 1 and II (St. Petersburg: Neva, 2003), 53–54 (in Russian).
36. E. H. Cookridge, Gehlen: Spy of the Century (New York: Random House, 1971), 54, 369.
37. Erwin Stolze’s testimony, quoted in Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale, 132.
38. Mader, Hitlers Spionegenerale, 259; Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scienticts, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 203.
39. Von Bentivegni’s testimony during the MGB investigation, in Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale, 259–61.
40. Reile, Tainaya voina, 158–62; Kahn, German Military Intelligence, 248–9.
41. E. G. Ioffe, Abver. Politsiya bezopasnosti i SD, tainaya polevaya politsiya, otdel ‘inostrannye armii–Vostok’ v zapadnykh oblastyakh SSSR. Strategiya i taktika. 1939-1945 (Minsk: Kharvest, 2007), 62, 78–79 (in Russian).
42. Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, 249.
43 Page 208 in Silver, ‘Memories of Oberursel.’
44. Abwehr I squads acquired numbers 101–106, and their groups, numbers 101–110, 114–115, 143–144, Abwehr II squads became 201–206 with groups 201–212, 214–215, 217–218, 220, and Abwehr III squads were provided with numbers 301–305, and the groups, with numbers 301-329. Details in Chuev, Spetssluznby, I, 56–163.
45. Mader, Hitlers Spionage Generale, 357–8.
46. Ioffe, Abver. Politsiya bezopasnosti, 56–84.
47. Höhne and Zolling, The General Was a Spy, 19.
48. Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale, 365.
49. Details in ibid., 368–89.
50.
Reile, Tainaya voina, 165–6; Höhne, Canaris, 462–3.
51. Richard Rhodes, Masters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgrupen and the Invention of the Holocaust (New York: Vantage Books, 2002), 61–63.
52. Details, for instance, in Alfred J. Rieder, ‘Civil Wars in the Soviet Union,’ Kritika: Explorations in Russian History, 4, No. 1 (Winter 2003), 129–62.
53. Chuev, Spetssluzhby, I, 295–8.
54. David Thomas, ‘Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941–45,’ Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 2 (1987), 261–301. From November 1938 to March 1942, Lieutenant Colonel Eberhard Kinzel headed the FHO, then General Franz Halder (March–April 1942), and finally, Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Reinhard Gehlen (April 1942–April 1945).
55. Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, 429.
56. Cited in Cookridge, Gehlen, 64. Chiefs of the German General Staff after Halder: Kurt Zeitzler (September 1942–June 1944), Adolf Heusinger (June 1944–July 1944), and Heinz Guderian (July 1944–March 1945).
57. Details in Thomas, ‘Foreign Armies East.’
58. Höhne and Zolling, The General Was a Spy, 21–23.
59. Höhne, Canaris, 467.
CHAPTER 14
Abwehr’s Failures and Successes
In fact, the real problem was the FHO’s poor evaluation of information received from Walli. Gehlen’s personal great reliance on ‘Max’ messages from ‘Klatt Bureau’ in Sofia (Bulgaria), and from 1943, from Budapest (Hungary) became a classic example of the Abwehr’s and Gehlen’s poor judgment.1