Vladimir Putin—yes, he was an officer of the intelligence services, but he was not a KGB investigator, nor was he the head of a camp in the gulag. As for service in foreign intelligence, that is not a negative in any country—sometimes it even draws praise. George Bush Sr. was not much criticized for being the ex-head of the CIA, for example.11
Asked whether the Russian people had learned the lessons of their communist past, Solzhenitsyn responded optimistically, referring to the “great number of publications and movies” on the history of the twentieth century as “evidence of a growing demand” for greater knowledge of the recent past. He was particularly pleased that the state-owned television channel had recently aired a series based on the works of Varlam Shalamov, whose Kolyma Tales is a classic of Gulag literature. The television adaptation showed “the terrible, cruel truth about Stalin’s camps”, said Solzhenitsyn. “It was not watered down.”12
Solzhenitsyn also expressed pleasure at “the large-scale, heated and long-lasting discussions” that had followed in the wake of his own republished article on the February Revolution. “I was pleased to see the wide range of opinions, including those opposed to mine, since they demonstrate the eagerness to understand the past, without which there can be no meaningful future.”13
A large part of the interview was devoted to Solzhenitsyn’s perennial desire that Russia develop “local self-government” and his regret that power was too centralized under Putin’s leadership. He cited his personal experience of local democracy during his years in exile in Switzerland and Vermont and held such models of “highly effective local self-government” worthy of emulation in Russia. He also regretted that there was still no effective political opposition to Putin’s administration, stating that “an opposition is necessary and desirable for the healthy development of any country”.14
Asked what could be done about the huge gap between rich and poor in modern Russia, Solzhenitsyn answered in terms that placed subsidiarity at the heart of economic revitalization. Although vast fortunes were amassed during the “ransacking” of the economy under President Yeltsin, nothing would be gained by taking a socialist approach to the problem: “The only reasonable way to correct the situation today is not to go after big business—the present owners are trying to run them as effectively as they can—but to give breathing room to medium and small businesses. This means protecting citizens and small entrepreneurs from arbitrary rule and from corruption.”15
Discussing the cooling of relations between Russia and the West, Solzhenitsyn’s analysis of the history of the previous fifteen years highlighted the sharpness with which he viewed contemporary events. When he had returned to Russia, he had discovered that the West was “practically being worshipped”. This was caused “not so much by real knowledge or a conscious choice, but by the natural disgust with the Bolshevik regime and its anti-Western propaganda”. The positive view of many Russians toward the West began to sour following “the cruel NATO bombings of Serbia”: “It’s fair to say that all layers of Russian society were deeply and indelibly shocked by those bombings.” The situation worsened as NATO sought to widen its influence to the former Soviet republics. “So, the perception of the West as mostly a ‘knight of democracy has been replaced with the disappointed belief that pragmatism, often cynical and selfish, lies at the core of Western policies. For many Russians it was a grave disillusion, a crushing of ideals.”16
As for the West, it was “enjoying its victory after the exhausting Cold War” and was observing the anarchy in Russia under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. It seemed as though Russia was becoming “almost a Third World country and would remain so forever”. In consequence, the reemergence of Russia as a political power caused unease in the West, a panic “based on erstwhile fears”. It was “too bad” that the West was unable to distinguish between Russia and the Soviet Union.17
On a less gloomy note, Solzhenitsyn expressed his appreciation of German culture, particularly in the work of Schiller, Goethe, and Schelling, and his admiration for “the great German musical tradition”: “I can’t imagine my life without Bach, Beethoven and Schubert.” He was also passionate in his defense of the Russian Orthodox Church, defending it from the accusation that it was becoming “a state Church”:
On the contrary, we should be surprised that our Church has gained a somewhat independent position during the very few years since it was freed from total subjugation to the communist government. Do not forget what a horrible human toll the Russian Orthodox Church suffered throughout almost the entire twentieth century…. Our young post-Soviet state is just learning to respect the Church as an independent institution. The “Social Doctrine” of the Russian Orthodox Church, for example, goes much further than do government programs. Recently Metropolitan Kirill, a prominent expounder of the Church’s position, has made repeated calls for reforming the taxation system. His views are quite different from those of the government, yet he airs them in public, on national television…. As far as the past is concerned, our Church holds round-the-clock prayers for the repose of the victims of communist massacres in Butovo near Moscow, on the Solovetsky Islands and other places of mass burials.18
As the interview drew to a close, Solzhenitsyn was asked what faith meant to him. He replied that faith was “the foundation and support of one’s life”. He was then asked whether he was afraid of death. “No,” he replied, “I am not afraid of death any more…. I feel it is a natural, but by no means the final, milestone of one’s existence.”
“Anyhow,” his interviewers responded, “we wish you many years of creative life.”
“No, no”, Solzhenitsyn replied. “Don’t. It’s enough.”19
CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR
CONSUMMATUM EST
At the beginning of August 2007, barely a week after Der Spiegel published Solzhenitsyn’s reference to the Christian martyrs killed at the hands of the communists at the Butovo cemetery outside Moscow, the Russian Orthodox Church sponsored a commemoration of these very martyrs at the cemetery itself. President Putin and his government were conspicuous by their absence at the event, a fact for which they were roundly condemned in the Russian press. Three months later, in an apparent act of penance for his earlier sin of omission (if one can use such language about the motives and actions of politicians), President Putin visited Butovo and issued a statement about the evils of ideology and about the millions who had perished at the hands of the communist regime. On the same day, the Orthodox Church canonized hundreds of victims of communism.
On December 9, two days before his eighty-ninth birthday, Solzhenitsyn was interviewed on the “Vesti Nedeli” (News of the Week) program on Rossiya Television to mark the publication of a new edition of The Gulag Archipelago. Although Russia had “reasserted its influence in international relations, and regained its role in the world”, he cautioned that internally, “morally, we are far from what we wish and what we need to be”. Russia needed “spiritual development” that transcended politics.1
On March 31, 2008, A. N. Wilson once again emerged as Solzhenitsyn’s British champion, much as Bernard Levin and Malcolm Muggeridge had been his champions in the 1970s. Having waxed lyrical about Cancer Ward the previous year, Wilson now praised The First Circle: “I have been reading The First Circle, and for a week, nothing else has had much reality for me. It is not only the most devastating indictment of Stalinism; it is also a superb novel, all set within the space of three days.”2 Having discussed the literary merits and moral quality of the novel, Wilson turned his attention to Solzhenitsyn himself: