Unfortunately this did not involve our 1st Guards Tank Army. During the discussions on the 5th April the commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army, General Bogdanov, had persistently sought to point out that his army required more freedom of movement for a wide-sweeping circumvention of Berlin in the north. Marshal Zhukov had remarked: ‘Do you want to fight for Berlin or spend the whole time rolling to the north?’
Should the 2nd Guards Tank Army nevertheless have been able to make such an extensive and above all effective by-pass operation, the 1st Guards Tank Army would not have needed to have conducted any similar manoeuvre. Why? I will come back to this later.
On the evening of the 15th April the 1st Guards Tank Army left its concentration area and rolled under cover of darkness to the Oder. High above us droned the engines of enemy bombers. Here and there searchlights tore through the darkness.
Towards midnight our leading elements reached the Oder crossing points. Isolated shots coming from the bank showed that the enemy was nervous and was expecting our attack at any moment.
And then it happened! The night was lit up by signal rockets and muzzle flashes. The earth resounded and rocked. Howitzers crashed, shots from the Katyushas whistled overhead. Our mighty artillery and air preparation had begun. Holding their breath, the soldiers and officers listened to the din. Many of them had already experienced the bombardments of Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, but what was happening now put everything in the shade.
On the 16th April the 1st Byelorussian Front went into the attack from the bridgehead, breaking through the first defensive strip, and shortly afterwards reached the second one before the Seelow Heights. Here the troops were brought to a halt by the strong, concisely organised fire.
The Seelow Heights governed the whole Oder depression and were a serious obstacle on the way to Berlin. The 8th Guards Army – infantry, artillery and allocated armour – became jammed in front of the Heights and were unable to go further.
Already at the conference of the 5th April several generals had drawn the Front commander’s attention to the fact that the main enemy defensive position ran along the Seelow Heights, so the artillery fire and air attacks should be concentrated on these Heights. Unfortunately this advice was not taken.
‘When I now, after a long time, think back over the plans for Operation Berlin,’ wrote Zhukov, ‘I come to the conclusion that the smashing of the enemy’s Berlin group and the taking of the city of Berlin could have gone differently.’
The Front commander could see for himself, from his command post next to that of the 8th Guards Army, that our own forces were not in a position to break through the enemy defences in their whole tactical depth. As further delay put the success of the whole operation in question, he had the 1st Guards Tank Army enter the 8th Guards Army’s sector.
In the night leading to the 18th April, as the second defensive strip was breached and our troops pursued the attack, General G.I. Gerko appeared at my command post. He told me that I was to drive back immediately with him to Seelow to participate in a consultation with War Council Member Telegin.
‘Right now?’
‘Straight away!’
I reported my thoughts about leaving the troops during the attack, but found no listener. General Gerko only shook his shoulders and indicated, orders are orders.
We struggled along a badly damaged road to Seelow. There did not seem to be one stone left on another in the place. After a long search we came across a still undamaged building in which the consultation was to take place.
The weak illumination from some dim trench lights fell on the faces of the assembly. Telegin’s appearance gave the impression of strength, but he could not hide his dejection. I had known him since 1942. Even in complicated situations, Telegin remained for me an example of partiality and strong principles. His correctly stressed appearance reminded me always of the commissar of Tschapaiev’s division. And now this depression. Doubtless, he must have also heard something about the delay in front of the Seelow Heights.
Most of the assembly came from the tank troops. That looked almost as if they were responsible for the fact that their tanks had not had the necessary manoeuvrability in depth, I thought.
It was well past midnight when we received permission to return to our units. Silently we drove back as before to my command post. The head of the corps’ operations department, Colonel Lebediev, briefed us on the situation.
Slowly morning dawned. I was dead tired. I had been unable to close my eyes for almost three days. Lebediev advised me to take a nap, at least half an hour. It was already dawn. Daylight brought the growling of artillery, the clanking tracks of tanks going into the attack with the 8th Guards Army. The terrain made the massive tank attack more difficult. But what else could we do? Manoeuvring between lakes and strongpoints, our tanks and the infantry advanced.
Already during the first days of the Berlin operation the 1st Guards Tank Army had suffered considerable casualties. The fact that the introduction of tanks into the tactical zone of the enemy defences is seldom effective and always unwanted had once more been confirmed here. And it made no difference if Marshal Zhukov in his memoirs emphasised the prominent role of the 1st Byelorussian Front’s 1st Guards Tank Army.
Significantly more effective was the commitment of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies of Generals Rybalko and Leliushenko. In a brilliant manoeuvre these two armies attached to the 1st Ukrainian Front had covered great distances in the shortest time, thrust towards Berlin and enclosed the city from the south and south-west.
After some bitter fighting for the Seelow Heights, our troops reached the third line of defence in the Müncheberg–Diedersdorf sector.
With some of my corps’ officers I drove to the command post of General Schemenkov’s 29th Guards Rifle Corps to get agreement on the further operations. His staff had set themselves up in a manorial farm.[1] We went through several big rooms and came to the library. Books with expensive bindings occupied the shelves. A grey-haired lieutenant-colonel told us that this library was invaluable and he had come here from Leningrad especially to prevent them being destroyed.
We went through still more rooms and finally ended in the room in which the rifle corps’ staff operated. Immediately after our greeting, Schemenkov disclosed to me that he could not attack at 0800 as ordered and had put back the attack time to 0900 hours.
‘But it must be reported to Chuikov!’
But Schemenkov ignored my objection.
‘What do you mean, delayed?’ Chuikov exploded.
How the conversation continued, I am unable to say, as Katukov took me to one side and whispered: ‘There is nothing more for you to do here. Go back to your people as quickly as possible. The order must be fulfilled exactly as scheduled.’
Yes, orders are orders and the operative–tactical creativity of a commander cannot be opposed. That is the nature of the art of warfare.
I returned head over heels to my corps, gave the necessary orders and shortly afterwards the tanks opened fire. It did not take long before the defence line was broken and our tanks and the 29th Guards Rifle Corps stormed through. Colonel Gussakovski’s 44th Guards Tank Brigade and Colonel Fiodorvich’s 27th Guards Motorised Rifle Brigade developed the attack and reached the Berlin autobahn ring.
1
This was the big manor farm in the village of Diedersdorf, about 5 kilometres beyond Seelow on the Berlin highway.