The enemy quickly sent in fresh forces and tried several times to release those trapped. On the 26th and 28th March they attacked at intervals of two to four hours. The enemy counterattacks were conducted in narrow strips with forces of up to a battalion reinforced by ten to thirty tanks, but all attacks could be beaten back. Two battalions covered the tank-vulnerable directions with mine barriers, mobile blocking battalions being prepared in time. Thanks to the well organised reconnaissance and stable radio connections, the enemy tanks kept running up against our mobile blocking units. On the 26th and 28th March the enemy lost twenty-six tanks and about 200 men to the mines laid by the 1st Battalion.
On the evening of the 28th March the surrounded group was destroyed. From the large bridgehead thus formed, our troops would soon set out to storm the capital of Fascist Germany.
During the first days of April the destruction of the German groups in East Prussia was completed. The 1st Byelorussian Front was no longer threatened from the north. The 2nd Byelorussian Front destroyed the enemy near Gotenhafen and Danzig and began redeploying to the lower reaches of the Oder. The 47th and 61st Armies moved to the area south of Schwedt and went over to the defence. Our 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Motorised Guards Engineer Battalions that were included in the ranks of these armies went temporarily into reserve.
The enemy engaged in bitter attacks against the 1st Byelorussian Front’s bridgeheads. His desperate assaults broke on the staunchness of our soldiers. A contribution to this was made by the combatants of the 1st and 7th Motorised Guards Engineer Battalions commanded by Lieutenant-Colonels Frolov and Issaiev. The enemy lost forty tanks and more than 300 soldiers to the mines laid by them.
The temporary pause could not fool anyone. It was obvious that we would soon be striking out with the last and decisive blow. Our goal was Berlin.
In the woods were the thickly packed tanks and vehicles of the 2nd Guards Tank Army, mainly moving at night. Nevertheless such a mighty concentration of troops could not be kept secret from enemy reconnaissance.
That day the staff held a conference with the battalion commanders. Colonel Sokolov unfolded a large map made up of several pieces stuck together. On its left side was shown Berlin, the city that we had been marching towards for four long years. Numerous defensive rings were shown around Berlin.
‘Our troops have to break through a massive defence. Its general depth, including the fortifications in Berlin, is about 120 kilometres. Here on the Oder’, Colonel Sokolov indicated the river with his pointer, ‘begins the up to 10 kilometre deep main defensive lines, which consist of two or three positions with fully constructed rifle trenches. Numerous barbed wire obstacles have been erected before the front line and deep minefields laid. All barriers and obstacles are covered by numerous fire points.
‘The second line of defence lies 10 to 12 kilometres behind it, is up to 5 kilometres deep and includes at most three fully constructed lines of trenches. The strongest sector of the second line of defence is at the Seelow Heights. The third line of defence was built 20 to 40 kilometres beyond the Oder and consists of up to two lines of trenches. All villages have been carefully prepared for defence.
‘Then come the Berlin defences. They consist of three defensive zones: the outer barrier zone, the outermost defensive ring and the inner defensive zone. Apart from this the Berlin defence is divided into eight sectors, in the centre of which lies the special sector “Z”. In this sector is the Reichstag.
‘The outer defensive one begins 25 to 40 kilometres from the city centre and consists of strong-points with numerous barricades and street barriers. The outer defensive zone extends along the city boundary and consists of 3 to 5 lines of trenches for a depth of about 5 kilometres. The inner defensive ring follows the S-Bahn ring. The strongest fortified is sector “Z”, where every building is a small fortress. Now we know what to expect,’ ended Colonel Sokolov.
The stability of the enemy defence was significantly enhanced by the terrain. Even from a fleeting glimpse of the map one could make out the natural obstacles in the attacking strips: lakes, rivers, canals, woods and villages, whose massive buildings could be used for the defence. All this presented serious difficulties and demanded a careful preparation from us, military craftsmanship and great courage.
‘Yes, it won’t be easy,’ remarked a battalion commander quietly.
No loud words were spoken at this conference. No one doubted our victory. We had been convinced of this before Moscow, and in the difficult days of the retreat to the Volga, utterly convinced of a successful outcome to the war. But we also knew that not all present here would survive to that happy day.
In the discussion above all we talked about how we could best use the remaining time before the beginning of the attack in training for battle. The basic tasks for the brigade were clear. Firstly, gaps had to be made in the minefields in front of the enemy defences to ensure the passage of the second echelon and the tank army. Subsequently came the secure handling of the tank troops in depth. We knew these tasks well enough. On the other hand we were disturbed by the thoughts that our sappers would have to cooperate with the storm troops in the fighting in built-up areas. Such fighting had only been experienced by the 4th and 6th Battalions so far. All others would have to enter new territory. Consequently the officers of these two battalions were given the task of supporting the training and passing on their experiences.
Our troops near Küstrin received further reinforcements, ammunition, fuel and food. In order to handle this, the Front’s sappers erected several new bridges. For this construction work our 17th Battalion under Major Stessel was brought in. The task that the 5th Shock Army’s Chief Engineer, Major-General Fursa, had set was particularly significant. The sappers had to erect a flat water bridge with a weight capacity of 60 tons. This carrying capacity could only be for one reason: that the bridge was intended for the crossing of the heavy IS tank, the strongest fighting vehicle of the Second World War. However, as a rule this tank was only deployed on the main line of attack.
We had also General Fursa’s earlier orders to fulfil. At the front every task was important and answerable, and those received from him especially so. The general set high demands, was punctual to the minute, was an expert engineer and controlled everything himself. He often helped out at the front, always had a ready joke, and was always ready to help. Despite his not immediately impressive way of speaking, he was much liked by everyone.
Usually the Oder was about 250 metres wide but, due to the flooding in April 1945, we had to build a bridge almost 400 metres long. The conditions were complicated. The bridgehead at this point was no deeper than 2 kilometres and the enemy could overlook it from the heights on the west bank. Before the construction of the bridge could begin, Major Stessel made a reconnaissance of the actual building site and all its approaches with the battalion’s officers. The various parts of the bridge would be assembled in a little wood about 2 kilometres from the Oder. The crews of the diesel-driven pile-drivers prepared their equipment and practised the rapid assembly of ferries on the Warthe.
Construction began at dawn as the chemical warfare troops laid a thick smokescreen. Senior Lieutenant Melkumov’s sappers quickly assembled two ferries. Noiselessly they launched them from the river bank and they glided across the dark surface of the water. Everything was quiet on the enemy side. Then the diesel-driven pile-drivers roared as they hammered in the piles, the noise rumbling over the river. A few minutes later two shells exploded a good 200 metres from the working platforms. The enemy artillery had opened fire. But the sappers kept on working indefatigably. They were used to being under fire. They were more concerned about the piles, driving them only one and a quarter metres into the river bed instead of the usual one and a half metres.