Stalin’s clampdown on personal accounts of experiences in the Second World War continued long after his death in 1953, and it was only in 1967 that that of Marshal Chuikov became to be the first to be published, even then intended as a snub to Zhukov, whose attempts to publish his own account had been repeatedly turned down.
Other accounts, including Zhukov’s at last in 1974, then followed, adding some light to the otherwise strictly Communist Party conformist theme.
Despite the length of this introduction, which I believe to be necessary for the overall comprehension of the reader, this book has been produced with a view to providing some interesting details and a wider view of the final battle for Berlin in 1945. It consists of the translations of six personal accounts taken from the East German editions of the original Soviet publications, omitting those of Marshals Chuikov, Koniev and Zhukov, whose autobiographies have long been available in the English language.
Chapter 1
Spearhead
By Marshal of Tank Troops Michael Yefimovitch Katukov
When Marshal Zhukov prepared his 1st Byelorussian Front for the battle of Berlin, Katukov was the colonel-general commanding the 1st Guards Tank Army. He already had considerable experience of armoured warfare, having been involved in the defence of Moscow, the battle of Kursk and the consequent clearance of the Ukraine, Poland and Eastern Pomerania.
Our army received new vehicles before the storming of Berlin. Apart from that the 11th Tank Corps under General Yushtchuk was attached to us, so that at the beginning of the Berlin operation we had over 854 fit for action. We had not had such a large number of tanks and self-propelled guns throughout the whole war.
As always when preparing for an important operation, the commanders of the brigades conducted daily exercises with officers and soldiers so that above all the cooperation between tanks and self-propelled guns with the infantry, artillery and engineers in attacks on individual strongpoints as well as in street fighting worked well. In this our previous experience was useful.
I worked on exact instructions for the commitment of assault detachments and groups in the streets of Berlin. Great help came from the topographers at Front Headquarters, who made several scale models of the city, of which we obtained one. All members of the assault team – tank troops, infantry and gunners – practised on this model. They pursued every step of their future progress in the streets of the German capital and detected the places where danger especially threatened. Additionally we concentrated on the radio communications and other factors of the forthcoming fighting in the suburbs and centre of Berlin.
The most burdened in the preparations for the Berlin operation were the army’s political organs, which above all had to deal with the new comrades. At meetings in all the detachments, veterans spoke to the young soldiers about the army’s outstanding traditions. We organised political education in the units, meetings for young soldiers with experienced fighters, masters of their skills. Political workers organised performances and speeches on Lenin’s 75th birthday.
On the 5th April the army’s commander-in-chief’s Front staff, the members of the Council of War, the artillery commanders as well as the corps commanders, met for a detailed report on the enemy and to allocate specific tasks to each unit.
While we were fighting in Pomerania, the Anglo-American troops had pushed east without forcing the sixty German divisions opposing them to resist. Although the western front of Fascist Germany had collapsed, the Fascists had not transferred a single division from the Soviet–German front. On the contrary, as our reconnaissance at the end of March/beginning of April had established, they had even transferred nine divisions from the western front to the east, so that now 214 German divisions were in action on the Soviet–German front.
For the defence of Berlin – connected with the Army Groups Weichsel and Mitte – were altogether 48 infantry, 4 Panzer and 10 motorised divisions, as well as a large number of independent brigades, regiments and various reinforcement elements. Altogether defending the approaches to Berlin and the capital were about 1,000,000 men with some 10,000 guns and mortars, 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns and 2,200 aircraft. The last battles would be severe.
Our troops facing Berlin had over 6,200 tanks and self-propelled guns, over 42,000 guns and mortars with calibres of 76 millimetres and over, and also more than 2.5 million men. 270 guns per kilometre were concentrated on the main line of attack.
A war game on maps and a model of Berlin made it clear to us that the terrain with its partly swampy rivers, brooks, canals and lakes would not only tie down the attacking troops but would wear them out.
There was yet another difficulty for the tank troops, for behind the swampy Oder depression rose the Seelow Heights, as well as a deeply cut railway line running from north to south, yet another serious obstacle.
The enemy had made this area suitable for the coming fighting with great expenditure on numerous concrete pillboxes or earth and wooden bunkers. The whole area and the city itself formed a thorough defensive zone. The enemy’s first defensive positions lay between the Oder and the Seelow Heights, against which we would have to attack the Seelow Heights with our main forces.
A glimpse at the model and the maps showed that in this terrain the variants of a deep breakthrough like those between the Vistula and the Oder could not be repeated. The conditions for a wide tank manoeuvre were lacking. We could only advance step by step to break through the enemy defences with desperate fighting. But the victories our troops had had in previous battles had given us much confidence. No one doubted that we would sweep aside all the fortifications on the way to Berlin.
At the conference that followed the war game Marshal Zhukov decorated me with my second star of ‘Hero of the Soviet Union’ for my participation in the Vistula–Oder Operation. At the Front Headquarters I discovered that Gussakovski had also become a ‘Hero of the Soviet Union’ for the second time. Colonel Semliakov and Lieutenant-Colonel Mussatov were awarded the same title for the first time for undertaking the thrust on Gotenhafen with their troops, thus ensuring the success of the 2nd Byelorussian Front’s operation.
In accordance with a directive of the Front’s Council of War of the 12th April we had to advance to the Küstrin bridgehead on the far side of the Oder and prepare ourselves for insertion into a breach made by Colonel-General Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army. North of us Bogdanov’s 2nd Guards Tank Army would attack in the area Kalenzig–Küstrin. The 5th Shock Army had first to break through the defences for them.
The Front Headquarters’ plan foresaw us using the breakthrough as soon as the 8th Guards Army reached the line Seelow–Dolgelin–Alt Mahlisch, developing the attack in a westerly direction and reaching the eastern suburbs of Berlin on the second day of the operation. Further, a thrust by the army to the southwest was planned to go round the German capital from the south and take its southern and south-westerly suburbs.
The total depth of the Front’s operation was about 160 kilometres; for the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies at most 80 to 90 kilometres each, with the taking of the southern and south-westerly suburbs their goal. The average speed of advance should be 35 to 37 kilometres a day.
According to the Front directive, the main task of the tank armies was clearly the battle for Berlin. With it the possibility of manoeuvre, especially for our army, was limited from the start. From our previous experience all attempts to use tanks in operational depth in built-up areas, particularly large ones, were a lost cause.