I hurried to get to the commander of the 77th Rifle Corps, General Posniak. I found the corps commander in Gross Wuhbiser. He too was an old acquaintance of mine, as we had both taught at the Frunze Academy before the war. But there was no time now to recall those days. I had to familiarise myself with the terrain in which my army had to engage.
We began on the right wing near Alt Rüdnitz and gradually approached the Oder. The east bank, being higher than the west bank, enabled us to overlook the enemy defences to a depth of almost 5 kilometres. We defined the actual lines of the rifle and communications trenches on the maps, as well as the situation of the firing points and the minefields.
The Fascists had had enough time to construct their positions, having been here for about three months. The open flat countryside extended up to the Alte Oder and was cut through by numerous high water dykes and road embankments. The enemy had arranged a strong anti-tank defence here, and the Oder itself, which had over-flowed its banks for almost a kilometre, formed a serious obstacle.
Then we went to the Güstebiese area to General Pozniak’s observation point. The place was especially well selected. One could see the whole of the enemy defences. Even the bridgehead that our left-hand neighbour, the 47th Soviet Army, had formed on the western bank of the Oder was visible. What interested me most was that we too had to force the river.
‘What do you think?’ I asked Posniak. ‘Is the bridgehead adequate for the 47th, at least to take a Polish division in the northern part?’
‘I think so, yes,’ replied Posniak, convincingly.
I then went to see the commander-in-chief of the 47th Army, General Perchorovitch, but he was afraid that our troops would cramp his own regiments.
I was obliged to take my concern straight to Marshal Zhukov. Perchorovitch then showed himself agreeable. He said that he was ready to take not one but two Polish divisions in the bridgehead. Later other elements were also deployed there.
Hardly anyone doubted any more that approaching catastrophe awaited Fascist Germany. Even Hitler concerned himself with winning time in the hope of at least evolving a separate agreement with the Western Allies, so that the Anglo-American troops would occupy the greater part of Germany, including Berlin.
Influential Anglo-American circles did not balk at breaching the Yalta Conference agreements. Germany’s unconditional surrender and the shared occupation of its territory – especially Berlin – by the Red Army did not correspond with their political views. According to the decisions of the Yalta Conference, there was a demarcation line between the Soviet and Anglo-American troops. But on the 2nd February 1945 Churchill informed Eisenhower by telegram that ‘I regard it especially important that we meet as far east as possible.’ The British standpoint in this matter was emphasised by the English military historian Fuller with brazen openness as follows: ‘… for the Americans and British lies the only possibility of saving what remains of middle Europe by occupying Berlin before the eastern Allies can get there.’
The Fascist leaders did not neglect to exploit this convenient situation. In compliance with their hints, the German high command opened the central sector of their western front and concentrated all their efforts in the east on the defence of the Oder–Neisse River line.
I will not try to describe all the positions that the enemy erected on the Oder and Neisse Rivers. I only want to point out that this line consisted of three strongly constructed lines of defence. The enemy wanted to hold up the Soviet troops here long enough for the Anglo-Americans to be able to get to the capital of the Fascist Reich and negotiate a separate peace treaty. Altogether there were more than a million men defending the approaches to Berlin. They had more than 10,000 guns and mortars, over 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as 3,300 aircraft.
For once and for all to put an end to Fascist Germany and simultaneously finish the intrigues about Berlin, the Soviet high command decided to conduct the Berlin operation as quickly as possible.
Also participating was the 2nd Polish Army under Divisional-General Karol Swierczevski. With its five infantry divisions, an artillery division, a tank corps, two anti-tank brigades, two self-propelled artillery regiments, an independent heavy tank regiment as well as other elements, it was a powerful, well equipped operational formation. It would be superfluous to say that it was the Soviet Union that had equipped these troops with modern weapons. During the war the People’s Poland had the following equipment at its disposaclass="underline" 302,994 rifles and carbines, 106,531 machine-pistols, 18,799 light and heavy machine-guns, 6,768 anti-tank rifles, 4,806 mortars and 3,898 guns. 630 aircraft were handed over to the Air Force. A tank corps and two independent tank brigades were equipped for the Polish armed forces.
Up to the 9th April the 2nd Army was concentrated north of Bunzlau. It came under the 1st Ukrainian Front and took part in a thrust on Dresden.
Two German infantry divisions defended the strip to be attacked by the 1st Polish Army. One of them – the 5th Light Division – had been torn apart by us in Pomerania, but here it had been necessarily replenished. We first had to deal with the 606th Infantry Division. Apart from this, reconnaissance in the Wriezen area had established the presence of the 5th Motorised Infantry Division and a group of tanks. The gunners had discovered about eighteen enemy artillery and mortar batteries.
The 2nd and 3rd Divisions would lead the main thrust out of the bridgehead with the 47th Army. Alongside our 1st Infantry Division, which had to force the Oder in the Christiansaue area, they would drive forward via Neurüdnitz to the Alte Oder and take the river crossings.
The first reconnaissance in force was made by the 2nd Infantry Regiment in the Zäckerick area. However, it was badly prepared and ended in failure. Where the Oder had to be forced was a submerged high water dyke that the boats could not cross. Before this problem had been discovered, and a suitable position found, it was daylight. I had to reprimand the regimental commander, Sienicki, and got a deserved reproof from the Front commander-in-chief myself. But this reprimand applied to me as much as Bewziuk and Sienicki, for example. All had now understood that the crossing of the Oder had to be prepared much more carefully.
At this point the army’s sappers and bridge-building elements were operating with initiative. For the beginning of the offensive they had constructed 200 boats and arranged for the necessary equipment to be taken across the river. During the forcing of the Oder the sappers twice erected a pontoon bridge under fire, the first time south of Güstebiese and then – the same bridge again – 6 kilometres downstream. Apart from that they set up several ferry crossing points and a 200 metre long 30-ton bridge on piles. This bridge was the main traffic link for the Rear Services, not only of the 1st Polish Army, but also our right-hand neighbour, the 61st Soviet Army.
Two days remained before the attack was to begin, and during this time the idea arose of also moving the 4th Infantry Division into the bridgehead to create a stronger striking force. I consulted with Karakoz and Bordzilovski. They supported me, although the undertaking was naturally risky. If there was room for another division in the bridgehead, the density of troops would result in heavy casualties in an air attack. Colonel Romeyko assured us that his pilots would dependably cover our infantry.
So Kienevice moved his regiment to the west bank of the Oder by night, inserting them between the 2nd and 3rd Divisions. That concluded our preparations for the operation.
The War Council of the 1st Byelorussian Front addressed an appeal to the soldiers and officers of the 1st Polish Army in which was said among other things: ‘Through your famous victories you have won the right of participating in the attack on Berlin with your sweat and blood. Fulfil your fighting tasks, brave fighters, with your usual decisiveness and dexterity, with honour and fame. Upon you depends that with a mighty attack you will break through the last enemy defensive positions and destroy them. To Berlin!’