Reflecting the abysmal level of defeatism signalled after the surrender was taken on 22 June, the egregious Jacques Duclos, leading the PCF on the ground in Paris, then made moves parallel to the capitulationism of Petain by attempting to secure Nazi co-operation for party publications and activities. Finally Moscow took fright and issued orders to desist. But it does indicate just how disoriented the entire international Communist movement had become in the face of Moscow's irresolution that the most important party in Western Europe should have descended to such depths.
Stalin's mind was, ofcourse, elsewhere and in some degree ofpanic. In mid- June he was talked into offering an olive branch to Britain, much against his own inclination. Andrew Rothstein, a leading Stalinist in the British Communist Party, informed the Foreign Office that the Russians wanted Prime Minister Churchill to meet Ambassador Ivan Maiskii for a 'frank discussion'. In passing on this request, Rothstein confessed that the fall of France came as 'something of a surprise, even to the Moscow realists'. He also noted that the takeover of the Baltic and the mobilisation of Soviet troops along the Polish frontier would not please Berlin. The time was ripe, he concluded, for an improvement in relations between London and Moscow.[165] But since Sir Stafford Cripps had already been sent to Moscow to improve relations but had yet to see Stalin, none of this really seemed at all convincing. Clearly something of a vacuum had opened up in Moscow, and Stalin was procrastinating, as he often did when faced with key decisions, allowing others to propose alternatives, until events finally forced a decision upon him.
Meanwhile, as a precautionary measure Russian troops speedily occupied the Baltic states from 17 to 21 June and on 26 June the Supreme Soviet prohibited citizens from leaving their jobs, and imposed a seven-day working week with an eight-hour working day. Then on 28-30 June Stalin took Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Romania by force, eventually setting up the bastard republic of Moldavia on 2 August. The Soviet Union now held the Baltic and had a toe-hold in the Balkans, much to Hitler's personal irritation (in reaction on 5 August he issued the first draft plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union).
The key issue, however, was whether Britain would hold out when Operation Sea Lion was launched by Hitler for the invasion of the home islands on 16 July. An article by Eugene Varga, head of the Institute of Global Economics and International Relations (IMEMO) caught the prevalent mood in Moscow:
We will not be so bold as to give a final prognosis; but it seems to us that from the point of view of purely military possibilities - with aid in only supplies from the USA - England could still continue the war. However, the political side to the question is decisive: is the English ruling class in actual fact determined to conduct the struggle to the end to win or perish?
Varga noted there were two camps in London - one for peace; the other for war: 'The scant information available to us now about what is going on in England does not enable us to judge which of these two tendencies is the stronger.'[166] Events answered that question when Churchill rebuffed Hitler's offer of negotiations. A further article that went to press on 24 October argued that the United States would enter the war.[167] The Kremlin was thus deluded, despite a raft of intelligence warnings, that it was safe while Britain remained undefeated. Hitler had in Mein Kampf criticised his predecessors for fighting simultaneously on two fronts and gave every indication that he would not repeat that fatal error. Furthermore, on returning from Moscow at the beginning of January 1941 the Soviet military attache in Paris indicated that 'it was no longer believed in Moscow that the Axis Powers could deliver a definitive victory against Great Britain. There is also scepticism ofthe possibility of a devastating victory by Great Britain ... The opinion most widespread in Moscow is that the war must end in a compromise peace acceptable to the British empire and limiting the advantages and the preponderance in Europe that the Reich has conquered.' The notion therefore was that the Soviet Union would not intervene until peace negotiations opened and then it would do so with military power to back up its position.[168] German disinformation conveyed to agents in Berlin trusted by the Russians also played its part. One instance was the dispatch from Berlin on 24 April indicating that the Germans had dropped the idea of going against Russia and were going to focus on pushing the British out of the Middle East.[169]
German troops entered Romania on 12 October 1940 and on 28 October the Italians invaded Greece. The Balkans were now engulfed in war. Molotov's visit to Berlin on 12 Novemberto sort out the state of relations with Hitlerpersonally gave the Russians the impression that the Germans were still committed to the defeat of Britain. Yet little more than a month later, on 18 December, Hitler signed Directive 21, Barbarossa, for the invasion of the Soviet Union. But Moscow continued firmly in the belief that any talk of Germany aiming to attack Russia was merely a smokescreen or an attempt to bluff the Kremlin into conceding some of its territorial gains. And the more the British attempted to persuade the Russians otherwise, the more firmly Stalin and Molotov clung to that conclusion. The signing of a Neutrality Pact with Japan on 13 April also indicated Soviet confidence, because the Russians had turned down a non- aggression pact that the Japanese had been seeking for over a year, evidently believing that no such agreement (which would foreshorten the option of war with Japan) was necessary.[170]
The flight to Britain of Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess made matters worse. Prior to his arrival and in some desperation, British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps recommended a strategy to London that ultimately proved disastrous, because the Russians were reading his mail. His attempts to persuade Stalin that a German invasion was inevitable had come to nothing. The only 'counterweight', he noted, 'is the fear that we may conclude a separate peace on the basis of a German withdrawal from occupied territories of Western Europe and a free hand for Hitler in the East...' 'I realise of course', he continued, 'that this is a most delicate matter to be handled through round about channels. Nevertheless I consider it our most valuable card in a very difficult hand and I trust some means may be found of playing it. Soviet talent for acquiring information through illicit channels might surely for once be turned to our account.'[171]
165
G. Gorodetsky,
168
Report dated 3 June 1941: France,
169
A. P. Belozerov et al. (eds.),
171
Cripps (Moscow) to London, 23 Apr. 1941: