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Soviet policy in Africa justified doing so by citing competition with China for leadership of revolutionary movements on that continent.[295] Together, the CCID and identity relations with China kept Soviet vanguard identity alive throughout the Cold War and pushed Moscow to a series of military interventions there to vindicate that identity.[296]

By 1962, economic activity between the two countries had been reduced to 5 per cent of 1959's level.[297] From September 1963 to July 1964, the CCP published a nine-part open letter in which it developed its case against the Soviet bourgeois deviant.[298] As Kulik put it, relations between the two were now based 'on generally accepted norms, [not] on the principles of socialist internationalism'.[299] From 1965 to 1973, the Soviets engaged in a sustained and massive military build-up in the Far East, punctuated by the armed clashes on the Amur River in 1969. From 1969 to 1973, Soviet manpower tripled to forty divisions, about 370,000 troops, most units of which were equipped with tactical nuclear missiles. ¹⁴¹

Only in 1978, with the ascension of Deng Xiaoping, and his reformist domestic policy, does the Stalinist Chinese Other disappear from Soviet identity politics. It is replaced within the CCID by a view of China as a revisionist socialist power and within the MFA as a less hostile threat.¹⁴² As Wishnick observes, Suslov, CC secretary in charge of ideology until 1982 and Oleg Rakhmanin, secretary in charge of relations with socialist countries until 1986, were the 'headquarters in opposition to any change in relations with China'. They were uniquely advantaged institutionally by their mandates and by the fact that 'they enjoyed a near monopoly over information and analysis on China'.¹⁴³

The introduction of a 'limited contingent' of Soviet armed forces into Afghanistan in 1979 was the final act of Soviet self-encirclement. Opposed to the coup that toppled Mohammed Daud and brought the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to power in April 1978, opposed to the PDPA's radical domestic programme, opposed to deploying Soviet troops to save an unpopular regime, Soviet leaders found themselves in a quagmire made oftheir own identity relations, institutional biases, deterrence fears and allied manipulation.

Andropov and Ponomarev told Taraki that a coup would not be welcome in Moscow. On 17 April 1978, the evening of the coup, both the MFA and KGB sent messages to the Soviet embassy in Kabul instructing them to stop it. But Taraki and Amin ignored them. When Ponomarev arrived in Kabul after the coup, Taraki boasted: 'Tell Ul'ianovskii, who always told me that we are a backward country not ready for revolution that I am now sitting in the presidential palace!'[300] While opposing the government's radicalism, the CCID saw a new country of socialist orientation, and Moscow as its vanguard.[301] Meanwhile, Soviet intelligence agencies were, only a bit prematurely, it turns out, reporting about US support for 'reactionary forces', the mujahedin based in

Pakistan.[302]

Soviet leaders knew that the Afghan government, despite incessant pleadings from Moscow, was doing little to elicit popular support.[303] At a March i979 Politburo meeting devoted to Afghanistan, there was unanimity on three things: the People's Republic of Afghanistan (PRA) had little popular support; the Soviet Union would not intervene militarily to support the PRA; the PRA government could not be allowed to fall. Kirilenko made the first point: 'We gave them everything. And what has come of it? Nothing of any value. They have executed innocent people for no reason and then told us that we also executed people under Lenin. What kind of Marxists have we found?'[304]Gromyko declared, 'I completely support Comrade Andropov's proposal to rule out deployment of our troops to Afghanistan.' He went on to point out that Afghanistan has not been subjected to any aggression. This is its internal affair', implying no Great Power conflict with the US yet.[305] But Kosygin made a commitment that went unchallenged: 'Naturally, we must preserve Afghanistan as an allied government.'[306]

Kosygin, in a Moscow meeting with Taraki, with Gromyko, Ustinov and Ponomarev present, told him that this was not Vietnam. 'Our mutual enemies are just waiting for Soviet forces to appear on Afghan territory. This would give them an excuse to deploy' their own forces there.[307] Taraki nonetheless begged for Soviet troops to defend Afghanistan against the enemies it was creating, even suggesting Uzbeks dress up like Afghans. In May 1979, the Soviet embassy in Kabul denied an Afghan request for poison gas.[308] From March to December 1979, Kabul requested Soviet military intervention eighteen times.[309] The professional military, represented by then Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov and his first deputy, Sergei Akhromeev, both opposed Soviet forces entering Afghanistan.[310]

The mood in Moscow began to turn in October 1979; the Great Power deterrent discourse began to penetrate. After Hafizullah Amin had Taraki murdered after the latter returned from a Moscow meeting with Brezhnev, the KGB began to talk about Amin 'doing a Sadat', turning Afghanistan into a base to replace what the US had lost in Iran.[311] In early December, Andropov sent Brezhnev a memo arguing that Amin might turn to the West to secure his power.[312] Meanwhile, typical of Soviet allied relationships, Moscow had preferred candidates to Amin waiting in the wings, in this case Babrak Karmal, a favourite of the CCID.[313] In this same memo, the consensus on no Soviet troops is preserved, with one exception: the promise of a short successful operation to install Karmal in power, if necessary.[314]

At the 8 December 1979 Politburo meeting, all the discursive pieces added up. Andropov and Ustinov argued that Afghanistan would fall to the US, where they might deploy Pershing II intermediate-range nuclear missiles. A short successful military engagement was the worst-case scenario. Karmal would pursue a more moderate socialist programme where the Soviet vanguard could guarantee success. On 12 December, the decision was taken.¹⁵⁹ Shortly thereafter, Dobrynin asked Gromyko why, as the Americans were now so riled up. Gromyko answered: It's only for a month; we will do it and then get out quickly.'¹⁶⁰

A week after the Christmas Eve intervention, Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov and Ponomarev reported to the Politburo that the new Karmal government intended to correct the revolutionary excesses of the previous regime.¹⁶¹ But by the first week of February, Ustinov speculated that Soviet troops would remain at least eighteen months. By the first week of March, Gromyko, Andropov and Ustinov reported to the Politburo that Karmal was not achieving the promised reforms.¹⁶² The war continued for nine years.