128. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, 168.
129. Trial of the Major War Criminals, XXXIV: 277 (Raeder for Assmann, Jan. 30, 1944).
130. Churchill, Second World War, II: 200 (letter to Smuts).
131. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie; Martin, Friedensinitiativen und Machtpolitik.
132. Raeder explained on July 11 that “in her weakened state, Britain will seek the support of the United States, in whose interests it is to preserve England as a powerful European state. This will automatically make the United States Germany’s enemy. The two Anglo-Saxon powers will retain or rebuild their maritime resources in order to defend their empire and will thus become the next natural enemies of Germany to be dealt with.” The next day Hitler ordered redirection of armaments investment to the Luftwaffe and the navy, with highest priority to U-boats. None of that would be achieved quickly. On July 13, Hitler convened a military conference at the Berghof. “He sees the answer (as we do) in Britain’s hopes on Russia,” General Halder wrote in his diary. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, 147 (citing Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung, Teil A, July 11, 1940); Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 394 (citing BAMA RW19/164; and IWM EDS al 1492, Chef Wi Rue Amt, Aug. 20, 1940, Aktennotiz); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 504–6 (July 13, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 19–22.
133. Shirer, Berlin Diary, 355–6.
134. Churchill, Second World War, II: 230–1. Ciano, who met with Ribbentrop that day before the speech, recorded it as “a last appeal to Great Britain.” The next day, he met with Hitler and recorded: “He would like an understanding with Great Britain. He knows that war with the English will be hard and bloody, and knows also that people everywhere today are averse to blood.” Gibson, Ciano Diaries, 277 (July 19, 20, 1940).
135. “Telegramma I. F. Dergacheva I. I. Proskurovu,” 220 (June 6, 1940).
136. Dietrich, The Hitler I Knew, 124–5; Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 306–7; Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 107–8; Naumov, 1941 god, I: 91 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22434, d. 4, l. 261: “Meteor,” July 9, 1940).
137. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 440–1 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1305, l. 438s), 443–5 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 9171, d. 4, l. 61–9: July 20, 1940).
138. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 442 (RGVA, f. 29, op. 35, d. 98, l. 11ss–12ss: July 16, 1940).
139. Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I: 81; Wheatley, Operation Sea Lion, 43 (quoting naval staff diary, July 21, 1940).
140. Halder, as a result of hearing from Brauchitsch about the July 21 meeting, noted in his diary: “reasons for continuance of war by Britain: 1) Hope for a change in America . . . 2) Puts hope in Russia.” He added that “crossing the channel appears very hazardous to the Führer. On that account, invasion is to be undertaken only if no other means is left to come to terms with Britain. . . . Stalin is flirting with Britain to keep her in the war and tie us down, with a view to gain time and take what he wants. . . . Our attention must be turned to tackling the Russian problem and prepare planning.” Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 515–8 (July 22, 1940), I: 519 (July 24, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 30–4, 35–6.
141. By fall 1940, this would take the form of Germany declaring Japan’s “preeminence” in East Asia. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 396 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22425, d. 3, l. 668).
142. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 28; DGFP, series D, VIII: 631–3. Jodl’s original memorandum on the peripheral strategy dated to Jan. 1940. By the end of June, with France defeated, he fleshed it out. “England’s will must be broken,” he wrote, via “a) Warfare against the British isles. b) Extension of the war to the periphery.” Trial of the Major War Criminals, XXVII: 301. See also Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 109–10.
143. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 30–4.
144. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 294–337 (at 306).
145. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 112.
146. Leach, German Strategy, 63.
147. Halder noted in his diary: “Russia’s aspirations to the Straits and in the direction of the Persian Gulf need not bother us. On the Balkans, which falls within our economic sphere of interest, we could keep out of each other’s way. . . . We could deliver the British a decisive blow in the Mediterranean, shoulder them away from Asia, help the Italians in building their Mediterranean empire and, with the aid of Russia, consolidate the Reich which we have created in Western and Northern Europe. That much accomplished, we could confidently face war with Britain for years.” Brauchitsch agreed. Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 527–30 (July 30, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 46 (July 30, 1940); Leach, German Strategy, 60–71. Halder as well as Jodl could see that the navy was proposing a force inadequate to an invasion of Britain. Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 523–4 (July 28), I: 527–30 (July 30); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 39–40, 43–6.
148. Attendees were Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Brauchitsch, Halder, and Puttkamer (naval adjutant at Hitler’s headquarters). The Luftwaffe was not represented.
149. This represented a change: from “prepare a landing” (July 16) to “prepare the ground” for a landing. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 106–7; Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 510–2 (July 19, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 26–8.
150. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 47–8 (July 31, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 530–4. Fabry quotes a letter (Oct. 5, 1954) from Halder to the historian Hillgruber stating that neither Halder nor Brauchitsch had understood the July 31, 1940, conference as an “irrevocable decision” to invade the USSR, only as the “start gun for foreseeable possibilities.” Fabry, Der Hitler-Stalin Pakt, 498n272.
151. Keitel ordered planning for production of armaments for 180 divisions on Aug. 17; within four days planning was under way for 200 divisions. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 119.
152. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 120.
153. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 109–17; Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 111–4; DGFP, series D, X: 321; Vishlev, Nakanune, 11.
154. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 305–6.
155. Pravda, Aug. 11, 1940; Paletskis, V dvukh mirakh, 346.
156. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 451–4 (RGVA, f. 33988, op. 4, d. 35, l. 134ss–135ss, 138ss–141ss).
157. Leach, German Strategy, 80 (citing Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv N 22/7, Fedor von Bock, “Tagebuchnotizen,” Aug. 18, 1940). The Germans also now had confiscated French oil stocks.
158. Pavlov, Anastas Mikoian, 121–2 (citing RGASPI, f. 84, op. 1, d. 150, l. 1–5).
159. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 1592, l. 4–7. In July 1940, after the two sides had hashed out a new demarcation of the Mongolia-Manchukuo frontier, the Japanese had proposed a neutrality pact, but Molotov told Ambassador Tōgō that “the Japanese had committed serious violations, and as a result we cannot consider the [1905] Portsmouth Treaty to be valid in its entirety.” Molotov sought to terminate Japanese oil and coal concessions on Soviet-controlled Northern Sakhalin, and reclaim Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, restoring Russia’s pre-1905 position in the Far East. After Nov. 1940, the Japanese would propose a bilateral nonaggression pact, but Molotov remained adamant. Another five months of negotiations would ensue. Presseisen, Germany and Japan, 273–7.