216. DGFP, series D, XI: 291–7 (Ribbentrop to Stalin, Oct. 13, 1940); Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 207–16; Naumov, 1941 god, I: 302–5 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 15, d. 157, l. 47–51), 305–10 (Russian version, APRF, f. 45, op. 1., d. 296, l. 9–20), 317–8 (Stalin’s reply, APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 1); “‘Ia pochtu za udovol’stvie vnov’ priekhat’ v Moskvu’: obmen poslaniiami mezhdu I. Ribbentropom i I. V. Staliym v oktiabre 1940 g.” 21), 141–5 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 296, l. 31–3: Ribbentrop, Oct. 21); DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 680–2 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 15, d. 1576, l. 47–51: Schulenburg-Molotov conversation); Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, III: 474–5; Hilger and Mayer, Incompatible Allies, 321; Carr, Poland to Pearl Harbor, 120.
217. DGFP, series D, XI: 508–10. Ribbentrop later quoted Hitler to the effect that “Ribbentrop, we have achieved many things together; perhaps we shall also pull this one off together.” Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 151.
218. Santa Olalla, at Himmler’s invitation, would lay plans for joint study of Visigoth tombs in Spain. Treglown, Franco’s Crypt, 246–7.
219. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 41. See also Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 124 (Aug. 3, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 538.
220. Preston, Franco, 392–400; DGFP, series D, IX: 311. The account of Hendaye by Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter, is fraudulent: Schmidt was not there. Pike, “Franco and the Axis Stigma,” 377–9.
221. The Germans were put off by the Guardists’ indiscipline. Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 59–63. Germany had inserted economic (not military) advisers into the Romanian state in spring 1939.
222. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 154 (Oct. 29, 1940), 158 (Nov. 1, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 641–2, 669–71; Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, II: 32–6; Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, 185–8, 193–9; van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 47 (citing German Foreign Ministry 1247/337515: H. von Etzdorf note, Oct. 28); Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini, 131–41; Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War, 199.
223. Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini, 137 (citing Ciano).
224. Schmidt, Statist, 516–7.
225. Schramm, Kriegstagebuch der Oberkommando, I: 148–9 (Nov. 1, 1940), 150–1 (Nov. 4, 1941), 152, 157, 158 (Nov. 7, 1940), 160 (Nov. 8, 1940), 182 (Nov. 19, 1940); Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s War Directives, 39–43.
226. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 163–4 (Nov. 4, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 672–5.
227. Seidl, Die Beziehungen, 239 (Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Oct. 19, 1940), 243 (Schulenburg to Dörnberg, Oct. 30), 243–4 (Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Oct. 31), 244–5 (Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Nov. 1).
228. Rossi, Deux ans, 173n3; Rossi [Tasca], Russo-German Alliance, 163.
229. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 62–5. Germany had become the number-one trading partner with southeastern Europe, accounting for between 30 and 60 percent of each country’s trade, paying above world market prices for agricultural goods, preferring the stable, long-term market access, which also did not require hard currency (they used clearing accounts). The Yugoslav and Romanian prime ministers understood this dependence on German markets, and refused to listen to French or British political pitches. Despite their racial condescension, the Germans did not view the Balkans through a Lebensraum prism. Gross, Export Empire. On Oct. 25, 1940, NKVD transport secretly reported the construction of border fortifications and a concentration of pontoon bridges on the frontier with Ukraine. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 324–6.
230. Berezhkov would meet Stalin in 1941. He would claim that in Berlin he observed “the same idolization of the ‘leader,’ the same mass rallies and parades . . . Very similar, ostentatious architecture, heroic themes depicted in art much like our socialist realism . . . massive ideological brainwashing,” but that he did not recognize this at the time (1940). Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 7, 72.
231. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 311–4 (AVPRF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 15, d. 157, l. 55–60), 316–7 (l. 61–2), 326–7 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 686, l. 120–4). Gorodetsky stresses the Balkan dimension: Grand Illusion, 67–75.
232. Bezymenskii, “Vizit V. M. Molotova v Berlin,” 125. Stalin, in the company of Molotov, had spent five full hours with the Turkish foreign minister, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, on Oct. 1, 1940, discussing a mutual assistance pact, which Turkey wanted, but only if Ankara was not obliged to act in the event of a Soviet conflict with Britain and France. DVP SSSR, XXII/i: 12, 49–51.
233. All this information emanated from the Latvian journalist Berlings. Internally, Nazi circles had discussed how Hitler would try to push Moscow out of Europe and toward a clash with British interests in India. Sipols, Tainy, 273–4 (citing ADAP, XII/i: 255, XI/i: 212–3).
234. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 248 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 342, l. 21).
235. Stalin also stated, “We are not prepared for the sort of air war being waged between Germany and England.” Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 131–4 (italics and ellipsis in the original). On Stalin feeling alone, especially with the weight of military matters, see also Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 273. See also Genkina, Bor’ba za Tsaritsyn; and Melikov, Geroicheskaia oborona Tsaritsyna, which was reissued in 1940.
236. Nevezhin, Zastol’ia, 291 (no citation); Nevezhin personal communication.
237. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 349–51 (APRF, f. 36, op. 1, d. 1161, l. 147–55); Bezymenskii, “Direktivy I. V. Stalina V. M. Molotovu pered poezdkoi.” See also “Poezdka Molotova v Berlin v noiabre 1940 g.”
238. Ehrenburg, Post-War Years, 276–8; Fischer, Life and Death of Stalin, 56; Phillips, Between the Revolution and the West, 166–7.
239. The rumor had been that Litvinov would be tried as a British-U.S. spy. Vaksberg, Alexandra Kollontai, 407; Gnedin, Katastrofa i votoroe rozhdenie, 148–51; Vaksberg, Hôtel Lux, 154–7.
240. Artizov et al., Reabilitatsiia: kak eto bylo, II: 499 (Beria’s Aug. 1953 interrogation).
241. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 121 (Nov. 7, 1939).
242. Cripps had continued to try to see Molotov and had finally done so on Aug. 7, 1940. But when Cripps had broached the possibility of a British-Soviet nonaggression pact, Molotov made no direct reply. Internally, Cripps continued to urge his own government to recognize Soviet annexations of the Baltic states. Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps in Moscow, 74–90.
243. Churchill, Second World War, I: 353 (Oct. 1, 1939).
244. Halifax wrote to A. V. Alexander, the First Sea Lord at this time: “If there were reason to think that immediate recognition would cause an appreciable change in Soviet policy towards us, I might have felt inclined to recommend a derogation in this case from the general principle that political changes produced during this war and as a consequence of the war situation should not be recognized pending the final peace settlement.” Hanak, “Sir Stafford Cripps,” 65.