245. Hanak, “Sir Stafford Cripps,” 66 (citing TNA, FO 371/29464 1604: Oct. 22, 1940). “I think we have managed to avoid losing this war,” confided Harold Nicolson in a private letter of Nov. 8, 1940. “But when I think how on earth we are going to win it, my imagination quails.” Overy, Battle of Britain, 113, citing Nicolson, Diaries and Letters, 126 (to Vita Sackville).
246. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, I: 492–4.
247. Solodovnikov, “My byli molodye togda,” 209. Solodovnikov deemed the Bolshoi’s Yakov Leontyev, who served as impresario at the banquets in the St. George’s Hall for the Ten-Days, “a person of tremendous charm, with vast experience, deeply cultured” (207–8).
248. Osborn, Operation Pike, 210 (citing Cripps to Distribution B, nos. 985 and 986, Nov. 12, 1940, N7165/40/38 and N7166/40/38, FO 371/24848); Woodward, British Foreign Policy, I: 495–6; Hanak, “Sir Stafford Cripps,” 66.
249. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 329. Berezhkov recalled Amayak Kobulov as “the exact opposite of Bogdan, a repulsive, short, fat, and creepy character. Amayak—a tall, slim, handsome Caucasian, sprouting a well-trimmed little mustache and a shock of black hair, urbane, even charming—was the life of any party.” Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 196.
250. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 338–9, 420–1.
251. Beria wrote: “I heard that the leadership of intelligence is dissatisfied with Zakhar’s work and has simply washed its hands of him. Perhaps one should not pay attention to this chatter, but when it concerns responsible comrades with whom I personally maintain contact, such corridor conversations must not take place.” Primakov, Ocherki, III: 444.
252. Berlings first appeared in Soviet files in Aug. 1940, when Kobulov reported that through the Soviet intelligence operative posing as the TASS correspondent, Ivan Filippov (“the Philosopher”), he had met a young journalist for a Latvian newspaper and proposed paying him a retainer in German marks for secret information. Fitin warned Kobulov that because Berlings had yet to be verified, “we suggest you show reasonable caution in working with him and on no account put him into contact with any operatives of the station.” But Kobulov could bypass Fitin and report straight to Merkulov. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 74 (citing Bundesarchiw, Abt. Potsdam: Film 14467, Bl. 25091 ff.); Vishlev, Nakanune, 49 (PA AA Bonn: Dienstelle Ribbentrop. UdSSSR-RC, 7/1 (R27168, Bl. 25899–25902), 132. The SS officer Rudolf Likus, who was detailed to the Ribbentrop bureau, recruited and handled Berlings. In 1947, the Soviets would discover as a result of interrogations of the Gestapo officer Siegfried Müller that Berlings had been a plant, passing information that had been reviewed and approved by Hitler personally. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 441–51. See also Roewer, Die Rote Kapelle, 62.
253. Zamoiskii and Nezhnikov, “U rokovoi cherty.”
254. Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 9 (citing German Foreign Ministry Archives, Rudolf Likus, Confidential Report, November 22, 1940, microfilm T120, serial 36, frames 25933, 25938–9).
255. Stephan, Soviet Far East, 235.
256. Filippov, Zapiski, 142.
257. Schellenberg, Labyrinth, 137–8. Schellenberg—Heinrich Himmler’s personal aide (1939–1942)—was responsible for security and total surveillance over Molotov’s entourage during the Berlin visit.
258. Flannery, Assignment to Berlin, 37.
259. Schmidt, Statist, chapter 21.
260. Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 45.
261. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 356–61 at 357 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 21–30); DGFP, series D, XI: 533–41.
262. DGFP, series D, XI: 541–9; Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, 210–1. Schmidt did not speak Russian; he served as notetaker. Before meeting Molotov, recalled another confidant of the Führer, “Hitler totally underestimated him, declaring that he was a cipher, a typical bureaucrat.” Baur, Hitler’s Pilot, 122. The Germans had offered to send Hitler’s Condor to pick up Molotov, but the Soviets said their delegation was too large; they took the train.
263. Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizni, 108–9 (citing Molotov aide I. I. Lapshov).
264. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 226–34 (at 232), and DVP SSSR, XXIII/ii: 30–2 (APRF f. 56, op. 1, d. 1161, l. 147–55); Naumov, 1941 god, I: 361–6 (at 365) (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 31–41). See also Schmidt, Statist, 520–1.
265. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 224–5; Naumov, 1941 god, I: 356–61 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 21–30); the German record has also been translated into Russian: Fel’shtinskii, Oglasheniiu podlezhit, 251–301. See also Schmidt, Statist, 517–26; Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 15.
266. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 384–5 (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes. Bonn, Bestand Dienstelle Ribbentrop, R 27168, bl. 25933, 25934, 25940); Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 235 (no citation).
267. Berlings would pass on a supposed internal German assessment of Molotov’s visit to Berlin as marking the onset of “a new era.” Primakov, Ocherki, IV: 447–8 (interrogation of Müller).
268. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 369 (AVPRF, f. 59, op. 1, p. 338, d. 2314, l. 11–8). See also Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 323. On Nov. 12, Molotov had sent Stalin a brief cable after his first meeting with Ribbentrop, a two-hour-plus affair. Stalin replied with a correction of one of Molotov’s formulations. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 366–7 (AVPRF, f. 59, op. 1, p. 338, d. 2314, l. 5–6, 7–9).
269. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 384 (AVPRF, f. 059, op. 1, p. 338, d. 2314, l. 36). Molotov’s talks with Göring: Naumov, 1941 god, I: 370–3 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 84–92). Ribbentrop and Himmler were present when Göring received Molotov.
270. Eberle and Uhl, Hitler Book, 36–7.
271. Ullrich, Hitler: Ascent, 386. “I was expecting a thundering Jove in his castle and what I got was a simple, gentle, possibly shy man in his country home,” French ambassador Coulondre wrote of Hitler. “I had heard the rough, screaming, threatening, and demanding voice of the Führer on the radio. Now I became acquainted with a Hitler who had a warm, calm, friendly and understanding voice. Which one is the true Hitler? Or are they both true?”
272. In response to Molotov’s cable after the first meeting with Ribbentrop, Vyshinsky had called the Berlin embassy to read a message for Molotov correcting him—eliciting a Molotov apology—for having implied that the 1939 Pact had ceased to be in force [“ischerpan”]. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 367 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, p. 339. D. 2315, l. 16–7).
273. Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, 217.
274. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, VIII: 417–8 (Nov. 14, 1940).