312. Fabry, Die Sowjetunion und das Dritte Reich, 243.
313. For Göring’s objections to an attack on the Soviet Union (at least in Nov. 1940) on economic grounds, see Irving, Hitler’s War, 181–2; Irving, Göring, 307–9. “The Führer is still inclined towards a showdown with Russia. The Commander in Chief, Navy, recommends postponing this until after victory over Britain, since demands on German forces would be too great, and an end to hostilities could not be foreseen.” Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, II: 41 (Nov. 14, 1940). “There are serious doubts as to the advisability of operation ‘Barbarossa’ before the overthrow of Britain” [the Navy’s responsibility]. Fuehrer Conferences, II: 70–1 (Dec. 27, 1940).
314. Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 691–3 (Nov. 16, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 182–3. Similar sentiments remained in the foreign ministry (Weizsäcker noted to himself on Nov. 28, “War against Russia is impossible as long as we are busy with England, and afterward it will be unnecessary”). Hill, Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, 227. See also ibid., 226 (Nov. 17, 1940).
315. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 184–8 (Nov. 18, 1940).
316. DGFP, series D, XI: 606–10 (Nov. 19, 1940), 63–43 (Nov. 20). Ciano would observe that “I will immediately state that after Molotov’s visit we speak very little of Russia, and in a somewhat different tone than that used by Ribbentrop during my recent visit. . . . Russia is once again a country not to be trusted.” Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 213n74 (citing Ciano, L’Europa verso la catastrofe, 616).
317. Schramm, Kriegstagebuch der Oberkommando, I: 179.
318. DGFP, series D, XI: 632–6 (Nov. 26, 1940).
319. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 82. Martin Bormann would later state that, in Feb. 1945, Hitler had told him, “my decision was made immediately after the departure of Molotov . . . I decided . . . to settle accounts with the Russians.” Trevor-Roper, Le Testament politique de Hitler, 95–6.
320. The Soviet Union’s modern technology was highly concentrated in just a few sectors. The railways remained steam-powered, not incorporating electricity on a mass scale, and the construction industry still used bricks and timber, not reinforced concrete. Above all, Soviet factories had far more workers, and lower productivity per worker, than their American or German prototypes, suffering from gigantomania and the lack of legal market mechanisms. The Soviets failed to exercise their option to purchase the Ford Co.’s V-8 engine, and Soviet trucks (the GAZ model) remained relatively primitive. Lewis, “Technology and the Transformation of the Soviet Economy,” 190. The number of women working outside the home between 1928 and 1940 increased from 2.8 million to 13.2 million and constituted 39 percent of the labor force in 1940. Drobizhev, Industrializatsiia i izmeneniia, 4–5. Nearly 20 million peasants had relocated to towns and industrial construction sites over the past decade.
321. Ganson, “Food Supply, Rationing and Living Standards,” 70.
322. Nekrich, Pariahs, 203; Weinberg, World at Arms, 201. Stalin again was privy to the German strategy in bilateral economic negotiations, thanks to Gerhard Kegel (“X”). Naumov, 1941 god, I: 334–9 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 437, l. 1–12: Nov. 2, 1940).
323. Iakovlev, Tsel’ zhizni (6th ed.), 179, 188; Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 75–106. See also Sobolev and Khazanov, Nemetskii sled. Goring had again interceded to get Krupp to treat contracts with the Soviet Union as equivalent to those with the German military and to accelerate a Soviet deal for six battleship turrets and 38-cm guns, giving the impression that the overall bilateral relationship could be salvaged. Von Strandmann, “Appeasement and Counter-Appeasement,” 168–9 (citing HA Krupp, WA 40, B 381, October 4, 1940; WA 4, 2925, Oct. 8, 1940, Nov. 31, 1940).
324. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 374–5 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, p. 339, d. 2315, l. 35, 35 a, 36, 38, 39).
325. This was a far cry from Ribbentrop’s statement in the Pact negotiations that Germany was “politically disinterested” in southeastern Europe. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 155–63. See also Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 298–9. It must be said that by 1940, some in the Nazi regime feared that the Soviets could not be contained in the role of junior partner because of their leverage in being the key repository of raw materials. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 20–14.
326. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 252–4; DGFP, series D, XI: 562–70. Hitler appears not to have informed Ribbentrop about his intentions at this point. Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 151–2; Waddington, “Ribbentrop and the Soviet Union,” 25–6.
327. “Two things became clear in the discussions: Hitler’s intention to push the Soviet Union in the direction of the Persian Gulf, and his unwillingness to acknowledge any Soviet interest in Europe.” Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 324.
328. Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher, XXXIV: 469 (Hitler. Jan. 20, 1941); Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 343. In 1940, Greater Germany produced only a quarter of the oil it consumed. By mid-1941, Germany’s oil resources would total 10 million tons; of these, 500,000 were produced by Germany proper, 800,000 by countries occupied by Germany, and 8.7 million tons by Germany’s allies, primarily Romania.
329. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 332. Jold evidently told Wehrmacht High Command planners on Dec. 5, 1940, following a “Führer Conference”: “The Führer is determined to carry through this operation in the East since the Army will never again be as strong as it is at this moment and Soviet Russia has recently given one more proof that she will always, whenever possible, stand in Germany’s path.” Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 137.
330. Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 152.
331. Trial of the Major War Criminals, X: 291, 314–5 (Ribbentrop).
332. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 80–1.
333. Nekrich, Pariahs, 229–30 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 913, l. 62, 65–6, l. 119). See also Nekrich, “Dynamism of the Past,” 232–3.
334. Mueller-Hildebrand, Sukhoputnaia armiia Germanii, 596 (Nov. 15, 1940). Reports of heavy German troop concentrations in Romania as of Nov. 1940 turned out to be fictitious, possibly part of a disinformation campaign. The actual stationing order was issued only on Dec. 13, 1940. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 492–4 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 9181, d. 6, l. 17–9).
335. Trial of the Major War Criminals, VII: 254 (Paulus); Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 137. Between May 1939 and Dec. 1940, Soviet military intelligence received more than two dozen warnings from its agents of German invasion planning; during the same period, military intelligence prepared more than one dozen summaries for the top brass and political leadership (Stalin and Molotov). Lota, Sekretnyi front, 129.
336. Gor’kov, Kreml’, 30–5.
337. Similarly, electricity consumption in 1932 badly missed its target—13.4 instead of 22 billion kilowatt-hours—but by 1940 was reported at 48.6 billion. Coal extraction, which had been 35. 4 million tons in 1927–28, rose to a reported 140.5 million in 1940. Nove, Economic History of the USSR (1989), 183, 217; Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR za 70 let, 161, 163–4; Stone, Hammer and Rifle, 108–9.