68. Voskresenskaia, Pod psevdonimom Irina, 48–9.
69. Korotkov was evidently recommended to move up from the maintenance department by Venyamin Gerson, Yagoda’s personal secretary, who had met him in the exercise room at the Dynamo sports club. In 1939 Korotkov was discharged for ties to Gerson, among others, but he fought back and got reinstated. For a time he was returned to Moscow over fears that his cover had been blown. He handled Lehman as well as Schulze-Boysen and Harnack. Petrov and Skorkin, Kto rukovodil NKVD, 491; Pavlov, Tragediia sovetskoi razvedki, 364; Gladkov, Korotkov. Korotkov might have been involved in assassinations abroad. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 48. The NKVD foreign department had 81 people; in 1940, 225. But central Soviet intelligence lost most of its Latvians, Poles, Jews, and other nationalities, who were replaced in almost every instance by Russians and Russified Ukrainians, with the usual notation “from the peasantry,” “from workers,” but often without foreign languages. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 24; Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 156–7.
70. “If Zakhar [Kobulov] is ever mentioned Sudoplatov and Zhuravlyov simply wave their hands,” read a note in Kobulov’s personnel file. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, 441n30 (TsA SVR, delo “Zakhar,” no. 15952, t. 1., l 41); Izvestiia, May 5, 1990.
71. Pavlov, Tragediia Sovetskoi razvedki, 353.
72. Höhne, Kennwort; Primakov, Ocherki, III: 414–32; Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, 77–80. Another member of the Soviet spy circle was Martha Dodd, daughter of the U.S. ambassador in Berlin.
73. Lehmann, head of Gestapo counterintelligence for Soviet espionage, was said to have transmitted to his Soviet handler the contents of a report by Himmler (June 10, 1941) that revealed that the Germans did not know the depth and breadth of Soviet spying. This report has not been published. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 340. Hitler supposedly intuited that Soviet intelligence services were “much more thorough and probably much more successful” than those of other states, such as the British. Walter Schellenberg, Labyrinth, 321.
74. The British also noted that Russian speakers were being recruited into the German army and Russian émigrés into German intelligence units. Hinsley, “British Intelligence and Barbarossa,” 52.
75. Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 593–601; Ivanov, Nachal’nyi period voiny, 191–96, 206, 209–13. In 1938, Goebbels’s wife, Magda, kicked up a fuss about his affair with the Czech actress Lida Baarova, and Hitler told Goebbels he would have to choose loyalty to the cause over his mistress. Hitler esteemed Goebbels’s propaganda wizardry, but not his political advice—a sore point for Goebbels, but also a spur for him to prove himself to the Führer. Hitler encouraged the rivalry between Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Longerich, Goebbels.
76. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I: 437–8, 446–7.
77. Kuznetsov, Nakanune, 288; Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs, 165; Vishlev, Nakanune, 38–40. The Soviets considered as possible the deployment of German troops to Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and a strike at the USSR from the south. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 207; Shtemenko, General’nyi shtab, 20. On May 9, TASS denied foreign news reports that the Soviet fleet was being fortified on the Black and Caspian Seas.
78. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 15.
79. Guderian, brought into confidence already in Nov. 1940, shortly after Molotov’s visit to Berlin, would recall surmising that the plan, which he deemed militarily inappropriate, could only be part of a bluff. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 142.
80. Sipols, Tainy, 393–4. Fitin, commenting on yet another report from Philby about a possible German attack, would write: “German planes are daily bombing London and other cities of Great Britain. Is a German invasion of the Soviet Union possible in these conditions or have England’s secret services deliberately chosen to deceive Moscow through Philby?” Antonov, “Na pol’skom napravlenii.”
81. The German High Command spelled out the disinformation themes in directives of Feb. 15, 1941, and May 12, 1941. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 661–4 (Deutsches Militärarchiv, Potsdam, W. 31.00/5, Bl. 114–7); II: 195–6 (Bl. 256–7); Whaley, Codeword, 247–51. See also Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 152–3.
82. Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 313–16, 342–3, 367, 377. See also Zakharov, Nakanune velikikh ispytanii, originally a limited circulation secret work, reprinted in Zakharov, General’nyi shtab, 420. “Recalling how we military men made demands of industry in the last months before the war,” Zhukov would admit, “I see that at times we did not take into account all the real economic possibilities of the country.” He would further note that in Feb. 1941, General Pavlov (head of the Western military district) sent a report to Stalin requesting many defense actions and that Timoshenko was told by Stalin that “notwithstanding the justice of his [Pavlov’s] demands we do not have the possibility today to satisfy his ‘fantastical’ suggestions.” Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 331–2.
83. Shakhurin, Krylia pobedy, 98–100.
84. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 149 (Feb. 20, 1941). Stalin had dressed down Golikov’s predecessor, Proskurov, exactly the same way, warning that a spy “should not believe in anyone.” Rzhevskii and Vehviläinen, Zimnaia voina, II: 206. German counterintelligence was well aware of the tensions between Soviet civilian and military intelligence. Schellenberg, Labyrinth, 143–4. The 18th party conference also sought to impart renewed impetus to the publishing of Stalin’s Collected Works. Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 526 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 905, l. 18–9: Mitin, Feb. 20, 1941).
85. Varga would recall Shcherbakov as “one of the worst representatives of the uncurbed bureaucracy.” Varga, “Vskryt’ cherez 25 let,” 157.
86. Beria was named a deputy chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, with oversight for the NKVD, NKGB, and the commissariats of timber, nonferrous metals, oil, and river fleet. Merkulov’s new first deputy was Ivan Serov; another deputy was M. V. Gribov (for personnel). Fitin headed the new NKGB First Directorate (foreign intelligence), and Fedotov headed the Second (counterintelligence). The guards department (Vlasik) fell under the NKGB. Beria’s new first deputy at the NKVD was Sergei Kruglov; other deputies were Abakumov, Chernyshov, Maslennikov, and B. P. Obruchnikov. The NKVD retained control of the border guards and the Gulag.
87. According to Sándor Radó (“Dora”), a Hungarian Communist and Soviet military intelligence officer in Geneva who posed as the owner of a cartographic enterprise and led an intelligence network encompassing 97 agents, the Swiss general staff estimated the number of German divisions in the East at an astonishing 150. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 676 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24122, d. 1, l. 49). See also Radó, Pod psevdonim “Dora.”
88. The document is only excerpted, and in the form presented shows Soviet military intelligence in a very good light. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 683 (TsAMO, op. 7279, d. 4, l. 30–1); Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 536–7. Stöbe (“Alta”) handed “Aryan” 30,000 German marks. She evidently disliked the aristocratic “Aryan,” because of his laments over his still unrealized grandiose diplomatic career and his thirst for money (she lived exceedingly frugally). “Aryan” informed “Alta” that he would also supply information to the British and the French. Around this time, she became ill and requested re-posting to a German spa town to undergo treatment; her request was denied (she was too valuable in Berlin). But as of Jan. 1941, she had lost her plum job in the German foreign ministry (press bureau), though she kept her six agents there. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 277–9, 305 (no citation).