185. In fact, from April 1941, the German deployments shifted to a qualitatively new level. Van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy, 150. Tupikov added: “If it happens that, in laying out these conclusions, I am pushing at an open door, this will in no way discourage me. If it happens that I am mistaken, you will correct me—and I shall be grateful.” Naumov, 1941 god, II: 113–8 (TsAMO, op. 7272, d. 1, l. 140–52); Lota, Sekretnyi front, 44, 189–97. Only on June 3, 1941, did Golikov instruct his subordinate Kuznetsov that it was necessary to answer Tupikov.
186. Schulenburg and his embassy secretary were back at the Hotel Adlon in less than an hour. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 330–2. It seems that Hans “Johnnie” Herwath, the anti-Nazi who had divulged the Pact’s secret protocols to the American ambassador in Moscow, had quit Germany’s Moscow embassy to join the Wehrmacht and through contacts had evidently gotten wind of the firm decision for an attack on the USSR. During a military leave in Berlin, he claims to have used the pretext of visiting his wife, Pussi, who was still working in Moscow, to travel back and inform ambassador Schulenburg that plans for an attack on the USSR were well under way. Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 182–4, 191; Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 328; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 203–17; Hinsley, British Intelligence, Abridged Version, 27–8. Stalin would get word of Schulenburg’s cold reception by the Führer from (Kegel) “X,” who pointed out that in 1939 Hitler had similarly lied to his ambassador to Poland, Hans-Adolf von Moltke.
187. Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 349 (Bernard Bracken). In March 1941, Moscow had ordered a secret police operative, Kyrill Novikov, to accompany Maisky to all official meetings. A telegram from Eden to Cripps (April 18, 1941) obtained by Soviet intelligence in London, inquired whether rapprochement with Moscow was still possible, but Soviet annexation of the Baltic states remained a stumbling block. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 474–5 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 8, d. 56, l. 903–6).
188. Stalin was sent the report the next day. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 130 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 349–51). “Elder” had asserted (April 17) that two groups existed, one, led by Göring, champing at the bit to attack the USSR, the other, led by Ribbentrop, dead-set against. This was likely true at the time. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 90 (TsA SVR RF, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 269–74). Hitler seems to have taken Ribbentrop into full confidence on Barbarossa only in April 1941. Weizsäcker would claim that he finally got Ribbentrop to admit it to him on April 21, in Vienna. Nonetheless, the foreign minister gave Weizsäcker approval to compose a memorandum, on April 28, stating that delivering a death blow to the Communist system was not in itself a necessary goal. “Only one thing is decisive: whether this undertaking would hasten the fall of England.” The memo further asserted that Britain was already close to collapse. “A German attack on Russia would only give a lift to English morale,” the memo predicted. “It would be evaluated there as German doubt of the success of our war against England. We would in this fashion not only admit that the war would still last a long time, but we could in this way actually lengthen instead of shorten it.” Weizsäcker, Memoirs, 246–7; Davidson, Trial of the Germans, 154–5.
189. Van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy. Hitler would also shift the main thrust, ordering that following the seizure of Belorussia, Army Group Center was to pause to take the Baltics, resuming the advance on Moscow only after Leningrad and Kronstadt had been captured. He argued that it was necessary to cut the Russians off from the Baltic Sea, to deny them imports, but he envisioned the creation of a Greater Finland as well. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 138.
190. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 129–30 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 352–5).
191. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 518.
192. Völkishcher Beobachter, May 5, 1941. A Russian translation of Hitler’s May 4 Reichstag speech was conveyed to Soviet front line military districts on June 10, 1941. TsAMO, f. 32, op. 11 306, d. 5 (Volkogonov papers, Hoover, container 7). Colonel Kuznetsov writes that when he reported to the deputy head of the tank forces in the general staff (Panfilov) on German force concentration, “Panfilov said to me that we are being subject to disinformation, adding that only a few minutes ago Comrade Stalin had phoned and said, ‘the Germans want to frighten us, at the current time they will not move against us, they themselves are afraid of the USSR.’” Naumov, 1941 god, II: 476 (note to CC department head Silin, Aug. 15, 1941).
193. “Mars” reported out of Budapest (May 1) that German forces were leaving Belgrade for Poland, and that German troops were talking about “the inevitability of war against the USSR in the nearest term.” Naumov, 1941 god, II: 150 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 4, l. 381); Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 613. On May 5, “Yeshenko” from Bucharest reported on conversations by “ABC” that German forces were being relocated from the Balkans to Romania and the Soviet frontier, as well as many other signs of impending war. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 612–4 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 1, l. 737–40, 744–5).
194. DGFP, series D, 723-5 (Ott, May 6). See also Sipols, Tainy, 392. On May 17, Weizsäcker misinformed Japanese ambassador Ōshima that “German-Russian relations were unchanged,” and that it was wrong to characterize them as “in a state of tension.” Sontag and Biddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 342. See also Trial of the Major War Criminals, XII: 165 (“The Ministries’ Case”).
195. In the same dispatch, forwarded by Merkulov to Stalin and Molotov, “Elder” reported that German officers had told him that Hitler had given a speech some days earlier at the Sports Palace during which he said “in the near future events will take place that will seem inexplicable to many. But the measures, which we will launch, are a state necessity, since the Red Menace has reared its ugly head over ‘Europe.’” Naumov, 1941 god, II: 152 (TsA SVR RF); Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 292–3 (TsA FSK); Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 65–6 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 56, l. 1157–8). On May 6, Admiral Kuznetsov wrote to Stalin that the Soviet naval attaché in Berlin (Vorontsov) reported that a Soviet inhabitant named Bozer (a Jew from Lithuania) told the naval attaché’s aide that according to one officer in Hitler’s HQ, the Germans were preparing to invade on May 14 through Finland, the Baltics, and Romania, but Kuznetsov added: “I suggest that this information is false and specially directed in this fashion to reach our government in order to test how the USSR would react.” Volkogonov papers, Hoover Institution Archives, container 18.
196. Pechenkin, “‘Sovremennaia armiia,’” 31n9 (no citation); Muratov, “Shest’ chasov,” 283; Nevezhin, Sindrom, 169–70; Nevezhin, Zastol’ia, 278–9. Sivkov was sacked from the military academy directorship. Nevezhin, Sindrom, 180 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1039, l. 32).
197. Kuztesova, “Nachalo voiny.”
198. Further, Stalin claimed that each division numbered 15,000 troops (twice the actual number in many cases). Pechenkin, “‘Sovremennaia armiia,’” 26. Zhukov would remind Stalin on June 15, 1941, that “even 8,000-men divisions are practically twice weaker than German ones.” Bezymenskii, Gitler i Stalin, 427–33.