222. This was forwarded by Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov, and Beria on May 14, and included additional detail about Romania’s preparations for war. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 180–1 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 388–90); Primakov, Ocherki, III: 480–1 (TsA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 57, l. 1277–80). See also Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, 89 (citing FSB archives).
223. Hilger speculated that Hitler perceived Soviet weakness, fear. Hilger and Mayer, Incompatible Allies, 327.
224. Naumov, 1941 god, II; 181–4 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 162–8). See also Sipols, Tainy, 403.
225. Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 243–4 (no citation); Khlevniuk, Stalin: Zhizn’, 251–2 (citing GARF, vospominaniia Ia. E. Chadaeva). On May 8, Stalin received Khrushchev, alone, for thirty minutes; nearly four hours later, he received Beria, alone, for five minutes. Those were the only people he saw that day. Na prieme, 333. As of May 10, Molotov was back in the customary position, entering the Little Corner before any other visitors. Na prieme, 333.
226. Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich, VII: 3374, 2380, 2394.
227. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 305.
228. Whether it was noticed in Moscow remains uncertain.
229. DVP SSSR, XXIII/ii: 654–7, 664–7, 675–9; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 193 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 174: Molotov instructions to Dekanozov, May 12), II: 193–5 (l. 169–73: Dekanozov notes); DGFP, series D, XII: 734–5 (May 7, 1941); Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 218–21 (citing APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 169–73: Dekanozov notes on May 12 breakfast); Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 351. There is nonsense, from Mikoyan and Kumanev, that Schulenburg had warned Dekanozov, in the presence of Hilger and Pavlov, of the forthcoming invasion. Kumanev, “‘22ogo’ na rassvete,” 3. “He didn’t warn,” Molotov stated of Schulenburg, “he just hinted at it.” Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 29.
230. Na prieme, 332–3.
231. Hess’s flight likely was unassisted by German electronic systems. Deighton, “Hess the Aviator,” 121–38. One of the Luftwaffe’s best pilots would claim, after the war, that on May 10, 1941, Göring had called and ordered him to intercept Hess, who was already in the air. Adolph Galland, the pilot, would also claim that he implemented the order only perfunctorily, having no idea how to find Hess’s Messcherschmitt Bf 110 amid all the others in the sky at that time. Tolliver and Constable, Fighter General.
232. Fox, “Propaganda,” 88 (citing FO 1093/10: Medical Research Council report); Rees et al., Case of Rudolf Hess, 16; Pick, Pursuit of the Nazi Mind, 42. See also Hess, Prisoner of Peace, 31–8.
233. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 246–9 (citing WO 199/3288/A: May 11, 1941, and FO 1093/11 fols. 152–5).
234. Heiden, “Hitler’s Better Half.”
235. Schellenberg, Schellenberg Memoirs, 201. Churchill would later assert that Hess denied Germany was planning an invasion and asserted that Germany had certain demands the USSR would have to satisfy—i.e., the ultimatum. Churchill, Second World War, II: 46.
236. Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 103 (May 11, 1941); Schmidt, Statist, 549; Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 372, citing Heinz Linge, “Kronzuege Linge: der kammerdiener des ‘Führers,’” Revue, Munich, Nov. 1955–March 1956, 60; Halder, Halder Diaries, II: 117–8 (May 15, 1941); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 412–5. Hess left four letters: the others were for his wife, Ilse, Willy Messerschmitt (whose plane he took), and Helmut Kaden (whose flight suit he took).
237. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 372–3.
238. Fest, Face, 292; Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 375–6.
239. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 372. When Hitler summoned Mussolini on June 2, 1941, to the Brenner Pass they talked, among other matters, about Hess. The Führer was said to have had tears in his eyes. Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini, 174.
240. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 309–10 (May 13, 1941). See also Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 274. The next day the Germans issued a fuller statement, calling Hess’s mission a result of “mental confusion” that would change nothing in German-British relations. Goebbels had objected, to no avail (“It’s rightly being asked how such an idiot could be the second man after the Führer”). Domarus, Hitler: Reden, IV: 1716; Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 311 (May 14). See also Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, IV: 532 (Leipzig SD report, May 17, 1941).
241. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 375; Gamm, Der Flüsterwitz, 36; Vassiltchikov, Berlin Diaries, 51 (May 18, 1941).
242. The British interrogator (Ivone Kirkpatrick) concluded: “Hess does not seem . . . to be in the near counsels of the German government as regards operations; and he is not likely to possess more secret information that he could glean in the course of his conversations with Hitler and others.” See also Schmidt, “Der Hess-Flug,” 14. Goebbels (May 15) intuited that the British had chosen to “let the lies run free” and became gleeful that the British had failed to play this trump card properly, and said the German people were comparing the incident to “a razor cut on the face” that would heal quickly and be forgotten. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 317–9 (May 17, 1941); Boelcke, Secret Conferences, 165 (May 19).
243. Tsarev, “Poslednii polet,” III: 433–40. On May 18, Philby, after a conversation with a foreign office press department contact, reported that Hess had not given away any valuable information, remained loyal to Hitler, and called the German-British war a crime. Tsarev, “Poslednii polet,” III: 435–7; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 200–1 (May 14, 1941).
244. Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 272; Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 116. The Soviets also believed the British secret services had been involved in luring Hess. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive, 157; and Erickson, “Rudolf Hess.” Roosevelt doubted the official British story as well, and feared there was substance to the rumors of a substantive peace mission. Kimball, “Hess Distraction”; Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, I: 184–6; Pick, Pursuit of the Nazi Mind, 45 (citing PPF3716, letters from John Coar and Ambassador William Dodd). Dekanozov sent Molotov a comprehensive analysis (May 21, 1941) of the Hess mission, based on the German press and hearsay in Berlin, asserting that it proved the existence of divisions within the German leadership and a tendency toward an agreement with Britain. It was forwarded to Stalin on May 26. Nauomv, 1941 god, II: 261–6 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 689, l. 64–74).