285. This was partly based on having learned that transport of Far Eastern rubber to Germany via the Trans-Siberian Railroad was to be minimized. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 657–8 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 422); Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 119–20; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 303–4.
286. Whymant, citing Sorge’s testimony to his Japanese captors, surmises that some or all of the messages were not transmitted to Moscow. For ex., Sorge claims to have told Moscow: “Lieutenant General Scholl conveyed clearly to Ambassador Ott, in total secrecy, that Germany and the USSR were finally to go to war and he should take the necessary measures; and he told me various details about it.” Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, 164–5, citing Obi, Zoruge jiken, III: 183.
287. Sorge added: “Scholl avers that the most powerful strike will be struck by the left flank of the German army.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 658 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 424); Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 119–20; Novoe vremia, 1990, no. 26: 32 (photocopy of the radiogram). Golikov asked for clarification on the nature of the “tactical mistake” and on Scholl’s revelation about a left flank strike. By the time Sorge would able to reply, it was July 3, 1941. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 714 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 527–9). Scholl had been a deputy military attaché in Tokyo (1938–1940).
288. Vishlev, Nakanune, 53–5 (PA AA Bonn: Büro des Staatssekretar. Aufzeichunungen uber Diplomatenbesuche. Bd. 8 [R 29833], Bl. Ohne Nummer; Russland, Bd. 5 [R 29716], Bl. 035 [113439], 091 [113495], Bl. 087 [113491]).
289. Beria wrote: “In many places along the border the Germans have concentrated pontoons, wooden and inflatable boats. The greatest number of them can be found on the Brest-Lvov salient. Work continues on the mounting of defensive installations near the borders, mostly at night. Leaves for soldiers of German army units have been forbidden. Moreover, information has been received about the relocation of German troops from Budapest and Bucharest on an axis toward the borders of the USSR.” Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 202–3 (TsA FSK).
290. “Nakanune voiny (1941 g.),” 206; Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 200–1. Romania had accumulated excellent intelligence on Soviet forces in the south of the USSR, material that was passed to the head of German military intelligence Admiral Canaris during his visit in May.
291. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 206–7 (TsA FSK).
292. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 208–9 (TsA FSK: June 3, 1941).
293. Volkogonov papers, Hoover Institution Archives, container 6 (Blokhin and Samoilovich). Kuznetsov requested more funding in connection with shifting the navy to combat footing from July 1. Solonin, “Tri plana tovarishcha Stalina,” 57 (citing GARF, f. R-8418, op. 25, d. 481, l. 32–33: June 4). Further, on June 4, Kaiser Wilhelm II died peacefully in Dutch exile at age eighty-two; the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands laid a wreath in Hitler’s name. “There is no doubt that the Kaiser had the best intentions,” Goebbels instructed the Nazi press, “but . . . the decisive factor in history is not goodwill but great ability.” Boelcke, Secret Conferences, 172.
294. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 324–5. Beria (June 5) reported that “between June 1 and 5, the Romanian general staff had ordered all military personnel who are on leave as well as all reservists up to forty years of age on farming duty to report to their units.” Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 138–9 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 9, l. 68–9).
295. Omsk would not get equipment or shelving until late 1944 (around the time some materials would begin to be returned to Moscow). Vinogradov, “Istoriia formirovaniia arkhiva VChK,” 37. Large numbers of files are still there.
296. Boelcke, Secret Conferences, 174 (June 5, 1941).
297. Cripps arrived in London on June 11, by way of Stockholm, where the general director of the Swedish foreign ministry, taken aback at Cripps’s insistence on secret German-Soviet negotiations, shared details of Swedish intercepts of Wehrmacht orders to troops in Norway for an invasion of the USSR. The Swedish official stressed a coming attack in the week of June 20–25. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 304 (citing FO 371 29482 N2680/78/38, Mallet: June 8, and CAB 65/22/59 (41)2: June 12); Boheman, Pä Vakt, 154–5.
298. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, 197–8. Also on June 6, Stalin received a report that the USSR had 5.7 million wired radio receiver points, more than 80 percent of all its radio equipment, but that the wires were in disrepair, subject to interruption and breakdown. The other 20 percent, wireless radios, were deemed below international standard. Altogether, whereas the United States had 343 receivers (wireless and wired) for every 1,000 people, and Nazi Germany 159, the Soviet Union had just 36. Lovell, Russia in the Microphone Age, 41 (citing GARF, f. 6093, op. 1, d. 56, l. 10–2, 13–4, 19).
299. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 308. This was her last meeting with Zaitsev (“Bine”), who was recalled to Moscow; she was assigned a new handler, Anatoly Staritsky (“Tal”), a radio specialist, who was to teach her cipher codes and met with her on June 12.
300. Pavlov, “Ot ‘Iunkersa’ 1941 k Tsessne 1987”; Kuznetsov, “Krutye povoroty,” esp. no. 6 (1993): 79; Stepanov, “O masshtabakh repressii,” no. 5: 62; Medvedev, Let History Judge, 473.
301. Stalin arrested the family members of the military men he executed, but when one of his behind-the-lines saboteurs was killed in the line of duty, the despot awarded a 25,000-ruble cash award to the family and a pension to the widow of 500 rubles per month (the salary of the deceased). Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 261–2 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 4, d. 105, l. 205).
302. Timoshenko and Zhukov reported that in the first quarter of 1941, there had been 156 crashes killing 141 crew and destroying 138 aircraft. Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph, 375 (citing TsAMO, f. 75284, op. 1, d. 119, l. 18). From Sept. 1, 1939, through June 22, 1941, the Luftwaffe, in training at flight schools, lost 1,924 killed and another 1,439 injured. Additionally, units in combat in the same period, in accidents and disasters, lost 1,609 killed and 485 injured. On average, this was 248 people a month. Solonin, “Delo aviatorov.”
303. Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, 135, 381. Kulik had sidetracked the Soviets’ own superior F-34 tank gun, whose production had been initiated by others, and even got Stalin to cut production of the versatile 76-mm antitank gun. “Disorganized but with a high opinion of himself, Kulik thought all his actions infallible,” recalled his first deputy. “Holding his subordinates in a state of fear was what he considered to be the best way of working.” Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 163. See also Pospelov, Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, I: 414–6, 475–6; Zakharov, Nakanune velikikh ispytanii, reprinted in idem., General’nyi shtab, 391; “Nakanune voiny: iz postanovlenii vysshikh partiinykh i gosudarstvennykh organov (Mai 1940 g.—21 iiunia 1941 g.),” 201–3; Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 367; Vannikov, “Iz zapisok narkoma vooruzheniia”; Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 62–3. When Khrushchev overstepped his writ and questioned Kulik’s competence, Stalin exploded: “You don’t even know Kulik! I know him from the civil war when he commanded the artillery in Tsaritsyn. He knows artillery!” Khrushchev, Vospominaniia, I: 283–4.