304. Kuznetsov and Dhzoga, Pervye geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza, 54. Rychagov was succeeded by his deputy, the forty-one-year-old Pavel Zhigaryov. Rychagov had proven his mettle in Spain in 1936 and at Lake Khasan in 1938. During the Finnish War, his forces, the 8th Army, had been surrounded and practically annihilated. See also “Beseda s admiralom flota Sovetskogo Soiuza I. S. Isakovym [May 21, 1962],” in Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniiia, 372–9.
305. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 671–2 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 7237, d. 2, l. 120–1). The Germans were issuing knowingly false military radio reports, overheard by Soviet signals intelligence agents, about the movement of their troops into Romania and Hungary, as if they were preparing to strike Ukraine. Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 252, 296–7. See also Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 174, 178–82, 225–6.
306. The envoy was Anatoly Lavrentyev (b. 1904), who until 1939 had worked in the heavy industry commissariat. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe” (no. 2), 75: PA AA Bonn: Büro des Staatssekretär, Russland, Bd. 5 (R 29716), Bl. 081 (113485); Vishlev, Nakanune, 50. The Slovak envoy in Moscow, according to the Germans, surmised that Stalin would satisfy German demands for whatever goods its war economy needed, but would not consent to placing Soviet territories under German rule. Nekrich, Pariahs, 229 (citing Bundesarchiw-Militärarchiw. RMII/34: 238: German naval attaché to Berlin, May 21, 1941).
307. An NKGB agent traveled the border on the German side, finding it saturated with troops in full combat gear hiding in the forests, with special weapons depots and oil tanks stuffed, and bridges fortified and heavily guarded. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 276–7 (citing TsA SVR, d. 21616, t. 2, l. 372–5: Kobulov to Timoshenko, June 9, 1941).
308. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 148–50 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1841–5: June 9, 1941). See also Bezymenskii, Gitler i Stalin, 474.
309. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 212 (TsA FSK: June 9, 1941). A note with the published document states that “the Japanese shared intelligence about the USSR with the Swedish, Turkish, Bulgarian and other embassies.”
310. Kumanev, “‘22ogo’ na rassvete,” 3 (citing Timoshenko recollections, at the Institute of History, Feb. 19, 1967); Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 296–7; Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, 184 (no citation). Timoshenko’s recollections came after the Moscow showing of the film about Sorge. The Kremlin meeting could have happened on June 6, 1941. Vatutin evidently was also present. Gordetsky gives the date as June 18.
311. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 151 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1846: June 11, 1941); “Sovetskie organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti v gody Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny.” See also Hilger and Mayer, Incompatible Allies, 334–6.
312. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 219–20 (TsA FSK); Primakov, Ocherki, III: 486 (TsA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1853–55); “Nakanune voiny (1940–1941 gg.),” 216. The NKGB First Directorate summary of Kobulov’s report for the leadership altered the paragraph structure slightly, emphasizing the sentence: “Whether there will initially be some kind of demands presented to the Soviet Union is unknown.” Naumov, 1941 god, II: 342–3. Kobulov stressed that the recommendation of “Elder” to preempt the Germans was “straight from the heart,” not a “provocation.” Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 296 (citing TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 430–1). On June 9, 1941, border intelligence reported that as of May 28 the concentration of all troops against the USSR, including on the territory of the former Austria, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Greece, Romania, and Germany east of Berlin, reached approximately 4.5 million. “Furthermore, Major Wendel [the source at German HQ] said that this army is fully ready for war with the USSR.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 676–80 (TsAMO, f. 127, op. 12915, d. 16, l. 362–8).
313. Moritz, Fall Barbarossa, 192. All the German war updates for the USSR can be found in Whaley, Codeword, 251–6. Hitler had returned from the Berghof to Munich on June 11, 1941, and late the next day left for Berlin, arriving by train near noon on June 13. The next day, he delivered a final all-day briefing to his forty-five most senior commanders at the Reich chancellery. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 605–6; Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 455 (June 14, 1941), 456 (June 14). On June 17 Hitler and then the High Command confirmed the timetable. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VI: 1001; Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, 508.
314. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 151–3 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1857–50). See also Sinitsyn, Rezident svidetel’stvuet, 117–8 (referring to the agent “Monk,” who does not appear in the published intelligence materials); and Beshanov, Leningradskaia oborona, 28. The Soviet London station had reported on how Finland would join a German invasion of the USSR. TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 57, l. 1178–9 (May 4), l. 1220–1 (May 7), l. 1373–4 (May 16); Naumov, 1941 god, II: 177 (TsA SVR, f. 23078, t. 1, l. 366: May 7). The NKGB reported a partial Finnish mobilization on June 13. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 156–7 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1861–2).
315. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 309.
316. Beria added that from Oct. 1940 through June 10, the NKVD recorded 185 planes violating Soviet air space. He further reported that from Jan. 1 through June 10, more than 2,000 border violators from the German side had been detained. Many had grenades and portable radio stations. There were worries of biological warfare terror (vials with epidemic-inducing diseases). Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 220–1 (TsA FSK: June 12, 1941), 228 (TsA FSK).
317. On June 13, Dekanozov telegrammed Molotov about Soviet agents having observed a massive transport of troops and equipment toward the Soviet frontier: heavy artillery, tanks, trucks, planes. “Kanun voiny: preduprezhdeniia diplomatov,” 76. On June 14, Dekanozov added that the Swedish and Danish military attachés in Berlin no longer believed troop concentrations constituted a tactic to force concessions but instead amounted to “genuine preparation for a war against the Soviet Union.” Sipols, Tainy, 398–9. Dekanozov had met “Elder” and “Corsican” and was evidently persuaded by them that this was war, not an ultimatum. Sokolov, “Novye dannye.”
318. Vishlev, Nakanune, 163 (PA AA Bonn: Dienstelle Ribbentrop. Vertrauliche Berichte über Russland [Peter], 2/3 [R 27113], Bl. 462591–462594); Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 94–5. Hitler did not trust Berlings, and on June 18 ordered “close surveillance” on him and, after the onset of hostilities, his arrest. In fact, he would be sent to Sweden. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 74 (citing ADAP, XII/ii: doc. 639, 645). The Russian press frequently cites a report by Yankel “Jan” Chernyak (“Jean”) on June 12 that the attack would commence on June 22 at 3:30 a.m. This warning, if it occurred, has not been published in the various collections of intelligence documents.