319. “These rumors,” the bulletin stated, “are the clumsy product of the propaganda of forces inimical to the USSR and Germany, forces interested in the extension of the war.” Also, the Soviet embassay on June 10 had reported word that Simon had begun secret negotiations with Hess on June 10. Rozanov, Stalin-Gitler, 203–4.
320. Izvestiia, June 14, 1941; Tisminets, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, IV: 555–6. See also Werth, Russia at War, 125–6; Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign, 207–8. “The affairs of the TASS communique was a last resort,” recalled Molotov late in life. “If we had been successful in delaying the war beyond the summer it would have been very difficult to start it in the autumn. So far, diplomacy had been very successful in delaying war, but no one could predict when it would fail.” Chuev, Sto sorok, 42–3.
321. Andreas-Friedrich, Berlin Underground, 67–8. Other rumors, however, indicated an impending attack that very month. Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich, VII: 3374, 2380, 2394.
322. Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 195.
323. Sontag and Biddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 345–46.
324. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 78 (citing PA AA Bonn: Dienstelle Ribbentrop, Vertaruliche Berichte über Russland [Peter], 2/3 [R 27113], Bl. 462597).
325. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 455–6 (June 14); Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 147.
326. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 76 (citing PA AA Bonn: Büro des Staatssekretär, Russland, Bd. 5 [R 29716], Bl. 051–054 [113455–113457], 066 [113470], 104–6 [113508–114510], 130–31 [113534–113535]; Jacobsen, Kreigestagebuch, I: 404.
327. Zhukov offers a colorful treatment of the call. Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 383; Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 367. For restrictions on measures to improve military readiness, see also Anfilov, Krushenie pokhoda Gitlera, 98ff. Some Soviet commanders viewed the TASS communique as an indication that on high, somehow, they were averting war, despite the colossal buildup. But the general staff was told the TASS bulletin bore no relation to ongoing Soviet military preparations. Ivanov, Shtab armeiskii, 40; Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizni, 108.
328. Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizni, 43. The western military districts were also ordered to field headquarters. Mobilized units from Eastern Siberia and Mongolia, ordered west on May 22, were due to arrive in Ukraine (Berdichev, Proskurov, Shepetovka) between June 17 and July 10.
329. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 376–81; Taylor, Goebbels Diaries, 414–6. See also Vishlev, Nakanune, 26–9, 151. Concerning Hitler’s “silence” after the TASS bulletin, Gafencu, the Romanian envoy, telegrammed Bucharest (June 16) that “the war of nerves is at full blast, worsened by the news from Finland and Romania about more and more significant military preparations.” Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 307. Köstring wrote to Berlin (June 18) that “gossip and rumors here have reached unfathomable magnitude. To transmit them would take whole volumes.” Teske, General Ernst Köstring, 320.
330. Golikov’s warnings were more balanced than many critics have asserted. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 87–9 (April 16, 1941), II: 119–20 (April 25, 1941), II: 213–5 (May 15, 1941), II: 324–5 (June 5, 1941), II: 333 (June 7, 1941); “Nakanune voiny (1940–1941 gg.),” 219–20; Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 136–7 (May 5, 1941). But Golikov clashed over assessments of German troop concentrations with Novobranets, acting head of the information (analytical) bureau of military intelligence. Golikov was said to have used a derogatory name for the Ukrainian Novobranets (khokhol). Novobranets quotes a document from Beria, supposedly prepared on June 21, 1941: “Lt.-General F. I. Golikov, the head of military intelligence (where the Berzin band recently reigned), complains about his Colonel Novobranets, who also lies, claiming that Hitler has concentrated 170 divisions against us on our western border. But I and my people, Iosif Vissarionovich, firmly remember your wise forecast: Hitler will not attack us in 1941!” Novobranets, “Nakanune voiny,” 176–8, 165; Krasnaia zvezda, Feb. 2 1991; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 46–7 (TsAMO, op. 7237, d. 2, l. 84–6: April 4, 1941).
331. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 88–9; Coox, “Japanese Foreknowledge,” 225; McNeal, Stalin, 237.
332. On May 20 Churchill told General Sikorski that a German attack on the USSR “does not seem to enter into consideration.” On May 23, a British Joint Intelligence Committee report, which the Soviets obtained, noted: “With her usual thoroughness Germany is making all preparations for an attack so as to make the threat convincing.” Antonov, “Anatolii Gorskii.”
333. On June 13, the British Joint Intelligence Committee concluded that Stalin would make the concessions necessary to escape war. That day, Eden summoned Maisky, telling him to come alone; Maisky had no choice but to bring his minder, Novikov, which irritated Eden. The British foreign secretary explained the intensity of the German buildup, indicating the information came from extremely reliable sources, and pledged British assistance if the USSR were attacked. Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 361; Haslam, Near and Distant Neighbors, 115 (citing JIC [41] 251 [Final]: FO 371/29484). By June 10, Enigma intercepts made clear that attack would not commence until after June 15. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I: 472 (citing FO 371/29481, N 2498/78/38), 474 (citing CX/JQ/S11), 477, 479; Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 617, 619–20.
334. Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 194–6 (citing PRO, PREM3/230/1).
335. Gorchakov, “Nakanune, ili tragediia Kassandry,” 21.
336. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 282–3, 305. Churchill wrote to his counterpart Smuts in South Africa (June 18), “According to all the information I have, Hitler is going to take what he wants from Russia, and the only question is whether Stalin will attempt a vain resistance.”
337. DGFP, series D, XII: 1030; Frölich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 373–76; Vishlev, Nakanune, 58; Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 328, 330, 334; Fel’shtinskii, Oglasheniiu podlezhit, 359.
338. Sorge added: “I saw a message to Germany that in the event a war arises between Germany and the Soviet Union, Japan will demand around six weeks before beginning an attack on the Soviet Far East, but the Germans think the Japanese will need more time, because that will be a war on land and sea . . .” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 692 (TsAMO f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 454); Naumov, 1941 god, II: 380; Fesiun, Delo Rikhard Zorge, 120–1; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 161 (photocopy of the original telegram). In a second message transmitted on June 17, Sorge clarified that his earlier message was indeed about nine full armies (150 divisions), not nine army corps. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 692 (TsAMO f. 23, op. 5840, d. 7, l. 88).