20. Later, Dekanozov would be accused of having edited reports to Moscow to downplay the attack warnings, at least through late May, but in June he began to try to reduce Soviet personnel (arrivals kept coming, however, including children and pregnant wives). On June 15, he summoned the courage to telegram Molotov: “The news is that now people do not speak about the concentration as Germany demonstration to compel concessions from the USSR. Now they affirm that this is for genuine preparation for war against the Soviet Union.” Berezhkov, History in the Making, 72; “Kanun voiny: preduprezhdeniia diplomatov,” Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR, 76–7. Lehmann (“Breitenbach”), in Gestapo counterintelligence, a Soviet source since 1929, evidently told his handler (now the young, inexperienced Boris Zhuravlyov) at a meeting in the outskirts of Berlin on the evening of June 19 that his Gestapo unit had received an order that Germany would invade the USSR on June 22 at 3:00 a.m. But no such communication has been published. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 348; Kolpakidi and Prokhorov, Vneshniaia razvedka Rossii, 454; Damaskin, Stalin i razvedka, 263–4. Beria supposedly erupted at Dekanozov (his former minion who now reported to Molotov and who sent the Lehmann message), writing to Stalin: “I again insist on the recall and punishment of our ambassador in Berlin, Dekanozov, who keeps on bombarding me with deza about a supposed Hitler attack on the USSR. . . . He reported that the attack commences tomorrow.” But this document has not been published. Ivashutin, “Dokladyvala tochno,” 57; Krasnaia zvezda, Feb. 2, 1991: 5 (Ivashutin interview); Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 283–4; Lota, Sekretnyi front, 46. See also Krasnaia zvezda, June 16 and 21, 2001; and Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 2001, no. 22: 7.
21. Mikoian, Tak bylo, 377.
22. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 694 (TsAMO f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 463); Naumov, 1941 god, II: 398–9 (TsAMO, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 463); Fesiun, Delo Rikhard Zorge, 121.
23. On June 21, Berlings (“Peter”) reported to his German handlers that Filippov, the TASS journalist-intelligence operative, told him: “We are firmly convinced that Hitler has ventured a colossal bluff. We do not believe that the war could begin tomorrow . . . It is clear that the Germans intend to exert pressure on us in the hope of attaining advantages, which Hitler needs for continuation of the war.” Vishlev, Nakanune, 61 (PA SS Bonn: Dienstelle Ribbentrop. Vertarauliche Berichte über Russland [Peter], 2/3 [R 27113], Bl. 462604–62605), 164; Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 96.
24. Hitler had shifted the date of attack (something that could have been expected). There were many contradictions among the reports. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 11–2, 17; “Predislovie,” in Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 6. Molotov complained that as 1941 progressed, he “spent half a day every day reading intelligence reports. What was not in them! What dates did they not name!” He added: “I think you cannot rely on intelligence officers. You have to listen to them, but you have to check up on them. Intelligence operatives can push you into such a dangerous position that you do not know where you are.” Chuev, Sto sorok, 31–2; Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 22. Hitler, according to an interview with Halder on June 19, 1958, had told him in Aug. 1938, “You will never learn what I am thinking. And those who boast most loudly that they know my thoughts, to such people I lie even more.” Deutsch, Conspiracy Against Hitler, 32.
25. Zhukov stated in 1965, “I well remember the words of Stalin, when we reported the suspicious actions of German forces: ‘Hitler and his generals are not such fools that they would fight simultaneously on two fronts, which broke their necks in World War I. . . . Hitler does not have the strength to fight on two fronts, and Hitler would not embark on a crazy escapade.’” Zhukov continued: “Who at that time could doubt Stalin, his political prognoses? . . . We all were accustomed to viewing Stalin as a farseeing and cautious state leader, the wise Supreme Leader of the party and Soviet people.” Anfilov, “‘Razgovor zakonchilsia ugrozoi Stalina’,” 39–46; Lota, Sekretnyi front, 15 (citing RGVA, f. 41107, op. 1, d. 48, l. 1–58).
26. Hilger got it right: “Everything indicated that he [Stalin] thought that Hitler was preparing for a game of extortion in which threatening military moves would be followed by sudden demands for an economic or even territorial concessions. He seems to have believed that he would be able to negotiate with Hitler over such demands when they were presented.” Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 330.
27. It is a half-truth that Soviet intelligence performed its function and warned of the attack. No document has come forward analyzing the likelihood, let alone the contents, of Germany’s systemic campaign of deception while it was taking place.
28. Dahlerus, Last Attempt.
29. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 266–7; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 383; Primakov, Ocherki, III: 366; Grechko et al., Istoriia vtoroi mirovoi voiny, III: 254, 335–8.
30. NKVD transport had reported on German movements from summer 1940 and, in May and June 1941, produced memos of more than twenty numbered paragraphs. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 135–6, 157, 174–6, 268–9, 324–6, 426–7, 462–5, 541–2, 545–9, 656–8, 681–3, 800–3, II: 279–82, 306–7; Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/i: 299, I/ii: 19–21, 56–60, 62–4, 79–80, 82–5, 85–7, 96–7, 108–10.
31. On May 17, 1941, Merkulov had reported to Stalin, Molotov, and Beria on mass arrests and deportations of anti-Soviet elements in the Baltic republics (some 40,000). On June 21, Merkulov reported 24,000 arrests and deportations in western Belarus. GARF, f. 9475, op. 1, d. 87, l. 121, in Volkogonov papers, Hoover Institution Archives, container 21. See also container 15.
32. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 297.