49. The work was supposed to be completed by July 15, 1941. Zolotarev et al., Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia, XIII (II/i): 280–2 (RGVA, f. 4, op. 11, d. 62, l. 201–3, 204–5).
50. On the many local measures undertaken to bring Soviet forces to combat readiness, especially the initiatives in the Baltic region, and their countermanding under threat, see Sbornik boevykh dokumentov Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, XXXIV: 7–11 (f. 344, op. 2459ss, d. 11, l. 30–6), 21–4 (f. 221, op. 7833ss, d. 3, l. 17–21); Bialer, Stalin and His Generals, 199–200 (Colonel General Kuznetsov); Kuznetsov, “Voenno-Morskoi flot nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,” 72–3; Kuznetsov, Nakanune, 343–4; Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 175–8; Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 386–7; Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 82–3; Anfilov, “‘Razgovor zakonchilsia ugrozoi Stalina’,” 42. Zhdanov conspicuously departed Leningrad for holiday in Sochi on June 19; this had to be approved by the politburo.
51. Sudoplatov was not to allow “German provocateurs to stage actions like those against Poland in 1939.” He recalled that, at the office on the night of June 21, “I sensed the danger of military provocation or conflict but not the magnitude of the full-scale invasion that followed.” Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 123–5. See also Possony, “Hitlers Unternehmen ‘Barbarossa.’” Soviet intelligence was reporting that Ukrainian schools in German-occupied Poland were teaching the geography of a forthcoming independent Ukraine and that many Ukrainian nationalists, and even some Poles with eyes on Ukraine’s territory, were keen to stage provocations to provoke a German attack on the Soviet Union. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 135–6, 157, 174–6, 268–9, 324–6, 426–7, 462–5, 545–8, 656–8, 681–3; Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 172–87 (May 31, 1941).
52. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 266–7; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 383; Primakov, Ocherki, III: 366; Grechko et al., Istoriia vtoroi mirovoi voiny, III: 254, 335–8.
53. Kumanev, Riadom so Stalinym, 23–4 (Mikoyan); Na prieme, 337 (Mikoyan is listed as arriving at 8:15 p.m. and leaving four hours later). The Soviet navy reported that German engineers and specialists working in Leningrad on a battleship acquired from Germany had left, but in response, Molotov told Admiral Kuznetsov, “Only a fool would attack us!” Zhdanov similarly assured Kuznetsov that the Germans were concentrating forces as a means of exerting psychological pressure and would never open a two-front war. Kuznetsov, “Voenno-Morskoi flot nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,” 73; Bialer, Stalin and His Generals, 190–1 (Kuznetsov); Watson, Molotov, 187. Beria is not listed in the logbook for Stalin’s Kremlin office between appearances on June 10 and June 20.
54. They would be confiscated as war booty. Panteleev, Morskoi front, 36. By June 1941, Nazi Germany was heavily in debt to the Soviet Union.
55. This was the second time that day that Kegel had risked an in-person meeting with his handler. In June 1941 alone, he met his military intelligence handler Leontyev nine times in person. Separately, Beria was reporting to Stalin from his agents that the smoke from burning documents in German embassy inner courtyard could be seen from great distance; some thought it was a fire. Krasnaia zvezda, June 16 and 21, 2001; Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 2001, no. 22: 7. Leontyev (b. 1911) had not thought to arrange for contacts with Kegel after the predicted war broke out. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 443 (V. V. Bochkarev).
56. How Stalin reacted to Kegel’s information remains unknown. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 711–3; Lota, Sekretnyi front, 58–60; Kegel, V buriakh nashego veka (the German original was published in 1983). Kegel had spoken directly with Walter Schellenberg, the head of political intelligence for the SS, who had evidently visited the USSR under the cover of a chemical industry representative. Kiknadze, “Gerkhard Kegel,” 124; Vasil’evich and Sgibnev, “Podvig v teni eshafota,” 106.
57. “The Master in an agitated state just talked to Timoshenko . . . Apparently something is expected . . . you yourself could guess . . . the German attack,” Poskryobyshev supposedly said to Chadayev. “A German attack is possible.” Kumanev, Riadom so Stalinym, 410. In a draft decree, written in pencil by Malenkov with many crossouts, dated, in someone else’s hand, June 21, and not entered into the approved protocols, Tyulenev was to be appointed commander of the “southern front” with two armies. Meretskov was to be named commander of the northwestern front; Zhukov, of the southwestern front, where the main German attack was expected. Zaporozhets was to become his deputy, and in the latter’s place Mekhlis would be restored to head of the Red Army political directorate. “Nakanune voiny: iz postanovlenii vysshikh partiinykh i gosudarstvennykh organov (Mai 1940 g.–21 iiunia 1941 g.),” 209–10 (with facsimile); APRF, f. 3, op. 50, d. 125, l. 75–6.
58. Zhukov does not name the defector, and more than one crossed that night into Soviet territory (perhaps as many as four). Zhukov, Vospominania, I: 386–9. See also Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 105–6; and Khrushchev, Vospominania, I: 299–301. See also Fediuninskii, Podniatye po trevoge, 10–2; Bialer, Stalin and His Generals, 241–2 (Fediunsky). Sevastianov, Neman-Volga-Dunai, 5; and Naumov, 1941 god, II: 279–82 (TsA SVR RF, d. 21616, t. 2, l. 389–97: May 30, 1941).
59. Na prieme, 337. Budyonny had not been in Stalin’s office for two months, according to the logbook.
60. On the evening of June 21, Meretskov would later recall, Timoshenko told him, “Gain whatever time we can! A month, a month and a half, another week. It is possible the war will start tomorrow.” Meretskov, Na sluzhbe narodu (1984), 205; Meretskov, Na sluzhbe narodu, 209–10.
61. Simonov, “K biografii G. K. Zhukova,” 106.
62. Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 387. Zhukov recalls that his deputy Vatutin accompanied them. Vatutin does not appear in Stalin’s logbook. Timoshenko and Zhukov were in Stalin’s office at least nineteen times in the last three months, including six in June, but the despot did not receive them between June 11 and 18. In that interval only Vatutin was in the Little Corner, on June 17 for half an hour (Molotov and Kagnovich were there); on June 18 Stalin received the military men for four hours and thirty-five minutes. Na prieme, 336–7.
63. Goebbels continued: “Should have been made six months ago.” (In fact, seven months ago Molotov had been in Berlin.) Goebbels added: “I read a comprehensive report on Russian-Bolshevik radio propaganda. It will give us some real problems, because it is not so stupid as the English material. Probably written by Jews.” Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, 1, IX: 391–93 (June 21); Taylor, Goebbels Diaries, 420. A request for Molotov to meet Hitler on June 18 was also recorded by Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 458–9 (June 20); Halder, Halder Diaries, II: 960.