39. S. Z. Sluch, “Stalin i Gitler, 1933–1941: Raschety i proschety Kremlia,” Otechestvennaia istoriia, no. 1 (2005): 98–119.
40. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 166, d. 592, l. 107.
41. Cited in G. Ia. Rudoi, comp., Otkroveniia i priznaniia. Natsistskaia verkhushka o voine “tret’ego reikha” protiv SSSR (Moscow, 1996), p. 65.
42. V. G. Komplektov et al., eds., Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR. 1939, vol. 22 (Moscow, 1992), vol. 1, p. 624; vol. 2, p. 585. This correspondence was also preserved in Stalin’s personal archive: RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 296, ll. 1–3.
43. Cited in S. Z. Sluch, “Rech’ Stalina, kotoroi ne bylo,” Otechestvennaia istoriia, no. 1 (2004): 114. In this article Sluch provides a detailed history of this alleged speech and persuasively argues that it was a fake.
44. Cited in G. M. Adibekov et al., eds., Politbiuro TsK RKP(b) VKP(b) i Komintern. 1919–1943. Dokumenty (Moscow, 2004), pp. 780–781.
45. Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski, eds., Katyn: A Crime without Punishment (New Haven and London, 2007).
46. Alfred Bilmanis, comp., Latvian-Russian Relations: Documents (Washington, D.C., 1944), pp. 196–197.
47. Cited in L. E. Reshin et al., comps., 1941 god, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1998), pp. 595–596.
48. Notation by Stalin on a coded message from Belarusian Central Committee secretary Ponomarenko to Stalin; dated 13 November 1939; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 66, l. 13.
49. O. A. Rzheshevskii and O. Vekhviliainen, eds., Zimniaia voina 1939–1940 (Moscow, 1999), vol. 1, pp. 324–325.
50. Sergei Khrushchev, ed., Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 1: Commissar (University Park, PA, 2004), p. 266.
51. Khlevniuk, History of the Gulag, p. 236.
52. Soviet transcripts of Molotov’s conversations with Hitler and von Ribbentrop on 13 November 1940 have been published in G. E. Mamedov et al., eds., Dokumenty vneshnei politiki (Moscow, 1998), vol. 23, bk. 2, pt. 1, pp. 63–78.
53. Ibid., pp. 135–137.
54. G. A. Kumanev, Riadom so Stalinym (Smolensk, 2001), pp. 463–470.
55. According to Chadaev in ibid., the chairman of Gosplan, Nikolai Voznesensky, was also at the meeting. At the time, Voznesensky was not yet a Politburo member.
56. A. A. Chernobaev, ed., Na prieme u Stalina. Tetradi (zhurnaly) zapisei lits, priniatykh I. V. Stalinym (1924–1953 gg.) (Moscow, 2008), pp. 317–318.
57. Aleksandr Sergeevich Shcherbakov (1901–1945) was a member of the post-revolutionary generation that Stalin placed in charge of propaganda within the Central Committee apparat. In 1938 he was made first secretary of Moscow’s party organization as well as a Central Committee secretary. Shcherbakov died at an early age.
58. Remarks by Stalin at a meeting on 17 January 1941 as recorded by V. A. Malyshev in his diary; cited in Istochnik, no. 5 (1997): 114.
59. Mikoian, Tak bylo, p. 346.
60. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 769, ll. 176–176ob.
61. Istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 5 (1994): 222.
62. Cited in Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, “Stalin and His Circle,” in The Cambridge History of Russia, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny, vol. 3 (Cambridge, 2006), p. 248.
63. Stalin actually spoke at this reception several times, but for simplicity’s sake, I will treat these remarks as a single speech. The stenographic record of Stalin’s remarks has not been preserved, but several witnesses describe him as saying essentially the same thing. See Nevezhin, Zastol’nye rechi Stalina, pp. 273–296.
64. Speech by Stalin at a meeting of Moscow and Leningrad propagandists; Istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 5 (1994): 13.
65. E. N. Kul’kov and O. A. Rzheshevskii, eds., Zimniaia voina 1939–1940 (Moscow, 1999), vol. 2, pp. 281–282.
66. Debate around this topic has become particularly active over the past twenty years. Overall, the numerous arguments in favor of the idea that Stalin was planning a preventive strike—some of which appear to be politically motivated—do not seem to warrant serious attention, but this theory has generated a number of works presenting interesting evidence and arguments. I make use of statistical data offered in a study by Mikhail Meltiukhov, although I am not convinced by his overall argument. See M. Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina. Sovetskii Soiuz i bor’ba za Evropu. 1939–1941 (Moscow, 2002).
67. Ibid., pp. 360, 392–393.
68. Davies, Harrison, and Wheatcroft, The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, p. 321.
69. Mel’tiukhov, Upushennyi shans Stalina, pp. 392, 393.
70. Cited in E. A. Osokina, Za fasadom “stalinskogo izobiliia” (Moscow, 2008), pp. 272–277.
71. Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 1 (1991): 17.
72. In September 1940, the government permitted such convicts to be sent to the Gulag to serve their prison terms, a violation of its own law (GARF, f. R-5446, op. 57, d. 79, l. 31). These prisoners suffered a terrible fate, and they were not always released after serving the short terms handed down by the courts.
73. From a 15 April 1942 conversation between Stalin and General Nikolai Biriukov, one of the heads of the Main Mechanized Directorate; N. Biriukov, Tanki–frontu. Zapiski sovetskogo generala (Smolensk, 2005), pp. 143–144.
74. Reshin et al., 1941 god, pp. 54–55.
75. Mel’tiukov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, p. 246; M. Iu. Mukhin, Aviapromyshlennost’ SSSR v 1921–1941 godakh (Moscow, 2006), pp. 154–155, 291–299.
76. David Murphy, who has made a careful study of all available Soviet intelligence reports on the eve of the war, gives Soviet espionage rather high marks. However, he notes an effort on the part of the leaders of Soviet intelligence to adapt their findings to Stalin’s preconceptions. In this regard, Murphy draws historical parallels: the reluctance of the conservative government of Great Britain in the 1930s to properly assess the Nazi threat and the myopic focus of U.S. intelligence on hunting down weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, while earlier administrations missed clues of an impending terrorist attack on U.S. soil. See David E. Murphy, What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa (New Haven and London, 2005), pp. xviii–xix.
77. Cited in Reshin et al., 1941 god, pp. 382–383.
Patient Number 1
1. Sergei Khrushchev, ed., Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 2: Reformer (University Park, PA, 2006), p. 148.
2. A. L. Miasnikov, Ia lechil Stalina (Moscow, 2011), pp. 294–295.
3. Ibid., p. 302.
4. B. S. Ilizarov, Tainaia zhizn’ Stalina (Moscow, 2002), p. 110.
5. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 4327, l. 1.
6. Ibid., op. 4, d. 619, ll. 172, 173.
7. Ilizarov, Tainaia zhizn’ Stalina, p. 110.
8. Letter from Stalin to Malinovsky, November 1913; cited in A. Ostrovskii, Kto stoial za spinoi Stalina? (Moscow, 2002), pp. 397–398.
9. Ilizarov, Tainaia zhizn’ Stalina, p. 110.
10. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 154, l. 2.
11. Ibid., d. 303, l. 5.
12. Svetlana Alliluyeva, Twenty Letters to a Friend trans. Priscilla Johnson McMillan (New York, 1967), p. 33.
13. No information has been found about Stalin’s travels in the south in 1924, although an August 1924 Politburo decision granted him a two-month vacation; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 459, l. 2.