63. Ibid., pp. 430–550.
64. For a more in-depth account, see Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953 (New York, 2004), pp. 79–89.
65. Khlevniuk et al., Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) i Sovet Ministrov SSSR, p. 67.
66. For an interpretation of the Leningrad Affair as Stalin’s response to the spread and strengthening of patron-client relations within the Soviet nomenklatura, see Benjamin Tromly, “The Leningrad Affair and Soviet Patronage Politics, 1949–1950,” Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 5 (July 2004): 707–729.
67. Cited in F. Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovym (Moscow, 1991), p. 475.
68. Voting was carried out by opros (polling); in other words, members voted remotely, not while they were seated together in a Politburo meeting. According to the tally compiled by Poskrebyshev, who handled most of the clerical aspects of Politburo resolutions, Stalin, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Voznesensky, Shvernik, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Andreev, Beria, Malenkov, and Kosygin voted in favor of expelling Zhemchuzhina from the party. “Com. Molotov abstained”; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1518, l. 162.
69. Ibid., l. 164; Khlevniuk et al., Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) i Sovet Ministrov SSSR, p. 313.
70. Joshua Rubenstein and Vladimir P. Naumov, eds., Stalin’s Secret Pogrom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (New Haven, 2001).
71. Cited in Vestnik arkhiva prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Voina 1941–1945 (Moscow, 2010), p. 333.
72. Letter from Gorbenko, a member of the military, dated 15 July 1945; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 863, ll. 79–86.
73. Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century (Princeton, 2004), p. 297.
74. Letter from military journalist S. A. Lifshits dated March 1949; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 876, l. 15; f. 17, op. 132, d. 118, ll. 1–3.
75. From the diary of People’s Commissar V. A. Malyshev, who was present at the meeting; cited in Istochnik, no. 5 (1997): 140–141.
76. This and subsequent excerpts from documents pertaining to preparations for Mao’s visit are quoted, with minor modifications, from Sergey Radchenko and David Wolff, “To the Summit via Proxy-Summits: New Evidence from Soviet and Chinese Archives on Mao’s Long March to Moscow, 1949,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no 16. (Spring 2008): 118–129.
77. A. M. Ledovskii, SSSR i Stalin v sud’bakh Kitaia. Dokumenty i svidetel’stva uchastnika sobytii. 1937–1952 (Moscow, 1999), p. 55.
78. Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into the Korean War,” Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 1 (June 1992), p. 19.
79. A. V. Pantsov, Mao Tzedun (Moscow, 2007), p. 47.
80. Cited in A. V. Pantsov, comp., Mao Tzedun. Avtobiografiia. Stikhi (Moscow, 2008), p. 166.
81. A. M. Ledovskii, “Stalin, Mao Tzedun i koreiskaia voina 1950–1953,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 5 (2005): 106.
82. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 329, ll. 10–17; Chen Jian et al., eds., “Stalin’s Conversations: Talks with Mao Zedong, December 1949–January 1950, and with Zhou Enlai, August–September 1952,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 6–7 (Winter 1995–1996): 5–7.
83. From the memoirs of Matyas Rakosi; cited in Istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 3 (1997): 142–143.
84. Odd Arne Westad, “Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 8–9 (Winter 1996–1997): 227–228; Dieter Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945–1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance (London, 2003), pp. 281–282, 286–289.
85. Ledovskii, SSSR i Stalin v sud’bakh Kitaia, p. 143.
86. Cited in N. Fedorenko, “Nochnye besedy,” Pravda, 23 October 1988, p. 4.
87. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 329, l. 51.
88. Fedorenko, “Nochnye besedy.”
89. For a detailed examination of Stalin’s role in the Soviet nuclear project, see David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven, 1996).
90. Letter written to the members of the Soviet leadership by Beria from prison, 1 July 1953; cited in Naumov and Sigachev, Lavrentii Beriia, p. 75.
91. Cited in A. V. Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina: Koreiskii konflikt 1950–1953 (Moscow, 2000), pp. 6–8.
92. Kathryn Weathersby, “To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War,” International History Project Bulletin, no 5. (Spring 1995): 7–8.
93. Ibid., p. 9; Chernobaev, Na prieme u Stalina, p. 533.
94. K. Vezersbi [Weathersby], “Sovetskie tseli v Koree, 1945–1950 gg.,” in Kholodnaia voina. Novye podkhody, novye dokumenty, ed. M. M. Narinskii (Moscow, 1995), p. 316.
95. In January 1950 the USSR was boycotting the United Nations, demanding that the new Communist government of China be allowed representation. Starting the war in Korea at a time when the Soviet representative to the Security Council was absent was a clear blunder by Stalin, one of which the United States took full advantage.
96. Cited in Kathryn Weathersby (introduction and translations), “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 6–7 (Winter 1995–1996): 40.
97. Cited in Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina, p. 97.
98. Cited in Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 6–7 (Winter 1995–1996): 118. (Bracketed insertion is Mansourov’s.)
99. Cited in Ledovskii, “Stalin, Mao Tzedun i koreiskaia voina,” p. 106.
100. From the memoirs of Matyas Rakosi; cited in Istoricheskii arkhiv, nos. 5–6 (1997): 7–8. The fact that this meeting took place is also confirmed by the defense minister of Czechoslovakia, Alexeje Čepička; Voprosy istorii, no. 10 (1999): 85–86.
101. Zaleski, Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, pp. 668–669.
102. Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE), f. 4372, op. 11, d. 677, ll. 9–10. Figures for military expenditures are for four ministries created after Stalin’s death: defense (which brought together the former defense and naval ministries), defense industry (an updated version of the former armaments ministry), the aviation industry, and medium-machine building. These ministries accounted for the lion’s share (although not all) of military spending.
103. N. S. Simonov, Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950-e gody (Moscow, 1996), pp. 210–266.
104. Council of Ministers resolutions dated 9 and 19 February 1953; A. A. Danilov and A. V. Pryzhikov, Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy. SSSR v pervye poslevoennye gody (Moscow, 2001), pp. 92–93.
105. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 329, ll. 66; Ledovskii, SSSR i Stalin v sud’bakh Kitaia, p. 160.
106. A. I. Kokurin and Iu. N. Morukov, Stalinskie stroiki GULAGA. 1930–1953 (Moscow, 2005).
107. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 11, d. 282, l. 66.
108. Narodnoe khoziastvo SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1956), p. 118.