Dr Carroll Quigley[351] described the post-war situation leading to the Cold War, stating that the immediate policy of the USA rested on free trade and aid via the Marshall Plan, which would have included assistance for economic recovery to the Soviet bloc. However Stalin saw this as a means for the USA to establish its pre-eminence in the post war era. Quigley, a liberal globalist who saw the ‘hope’ of the world being through a world government and the ‘tragedy’ being its rejection,[352] wrote:
On the whole, if blame must be allotted, it may be placed at the door of Stalin’s office in the Kremlin. American willingness to co-operate continued until 1947, as is evident from the fact that the Marshall Plan offer of American aid for a co-operative Europe recovery effort was opened to the Soviet Union, but it now seems clear that Stalin had decided to close the door on co-operation and adopted a unilateral policy of limited aggression about February or March of 1946. The beginning of the Cold War may be placed at the date of this inferred decision or may be placed at the later and more obvious date of the Soviet refusal to accept Marshall Aid in July 1947.[353]
Quigley refers to the American initiative for atomic energy ‘internationalisation’ and how Stalin again scotched this strategy for US world domination:
The most critical example of the Soviet refusal to co-operate and of its insistence on relapsing into isolation, secrecy, and terrorism is to be found in its refusal to join in American efforts to harness the dangerous powers of nuclear fission.[354]
A US State Department committee under Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson and Dr David Lilienthal, in conjunction with a ‘second committee of citizens’, led by the international banker and perennial presidential adviser Bernard Baruch, were convened in 1946 to draft a plan for ‘some system of international control of nuclear energy’. Baruch presented the plan to the UN General Assembly on June 14 1946.[355]
Under this plan, the UN would own, control, or licence all uranium from the mine through processing and use, with operation of its own nuclear facilities throughout the world, inspection of all other such facilities, absolute prohibition of all nuclear bombs or diversion of nuclear materials to non-peaceful purposes, and punishment for evasion or violation of its regulations free from the Great Power veto which operated in the UN Security Council.[356]
This was therefore a method of trying to bypass the problem of veto that had been insisted upon by the USSR to ensure its sovereignty, which had from the start rendered the UN impotent as a world-governing authority. Quigley laments that this ‘generous offer’ by the USA, ‘…was brusquely rejected by Andrei Gromyko on behalf of the Soviet Union within five days…’[357] Quigley pointed out that one of the main points the USSR raised in rejecting the Baruch Plan[358] was that there must be no tampering with the Great Power veto at the UN Security Council. Gromyko recalling his time as Soviet representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission, states of the Baruch Plan:
The actual intention was to be camouflaged by the creation of an international body to monitor the use of nuclear energy. However, Washington did not even try to hide that it intended to take the leading part in this body, to keep in its own hands everything to do with the production and storage of fissionable material and, under the guise of the need for international inspection, to interfere in the internal affairs of the sovereign nations.[359]
Baruch told Gromyko that experts would inspect all industries dealing with fissionable material. Gromyko remarked: ‘Inevitably at that time they would all be Americans’.
Quigley’s moral indignation at the USSR’s rejection notwithstanding, we are now in a position of hindsight, considering recent world events, to understand Soviet suspicions. The moral choice is not as clear-cut as Quigley supposed. Japan had been A-bombed whilst seeking peace terms, their only real condition being the sanctity of their Emperor. America’s position was unconditional, and of course it can be assumed that the Administration knew the Japanese could not accede to anything that would compromise Hirohito or the imperial house. Allen Dulles, who became head of the CIA, related in an interview in 1963 that he had been in contact with Japanese factions that were in a position to sue for peace,[360] and that the sole Japanese concern was that the Emperor would be left alone. ‘Just weeks later… Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed’.[361] The Americans in bombing Japan sought to impress upon Stalin the need to continue their wartime alliance into the post-war world, with the USSR as a junior partner at best.
Veteran journalist Robert Fisk comments on the bombing of Japan:
Stalin was finally impressed by the effect of Truman’s new weapon at Hiroshima. He very much wanted the bomb for Russia. When US proposals to limit the bomb to America alone were uncompromising, Stalin’s scientists accelerated their work.[362]
Even Britain was concerned at US intentions, Prime Minister Clement Atlee explaining:
We had to hold up our position vis-à-vis the Americans. We couldn’t allow ourselves to be wholly in their hands… We had worked from the start for international control of the bomb… We could not agree that only America should have atomic energy…[363]
Were both the USSR and Britain being selfish, as implied indignantly by Quigley? Bernard Baruch himself stated:
The gains of our scientists, our engineers, our industrialists, produced the supreme weapon of all time◦– the atomic bomb. That we shall never give away, until and unless security for us, for the world, is established. Until that time comes, the US will remain the guardian of safety. We can be trusted….[364]
The rhetoric by Baruch about the USA being the ‘trusted guardian’ of world peace and freedom is the same mantra the world has heard from President Woodrow Wilson to President Obama: Trust the US to act as the world’s policeman.
Pacifist guru Bertrand Russell wrote in 1946 in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, expressing the type of hatred widely felt by globalists for the USSR after World War II, because of the Soviet rejection of a one world government. Russell, who was to play a key role along with many other eminent liberals and leftists as Stalin-hating Cold Warriors in the CIA founded Congress for Cultural Freedom,[365] makes it plain that the atomic bomb represented the ace card to the forcible establishment of a one world state:
The American and British governments… should make it clear that genuine international co-operation is what they most desire. But although peace should be their goal, they should not let it appear that they are for peace at any price. At a certain stage, when their plans for an international government are ripe, they should offer them to the world… If Russia acquiesced willingly, all would be well. If not, it would be necessary to bring pressure to bear, even to the extent of risking war.[366]
Russell proposed what was clearly the intention of the US Administration and other globalists in assuring that atomic energy would be monopolised by an ‘international agency’ with power to act against any state reticent about being subjected to a one world state:
351
Quigley was an eminent historian and governmental adviser, and taught at Foreign Services School, Georgetown University, Harvard and Princeton universities. President Clinton spoke of Quigley as his adviser when at Harvard.
352
Hence the title of Quigley’s magnum opus, Tragedy and Hope (New York: Macmillan Co., 1966).
358
Bernard Baruch, The Baruch Plan, 1946. http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml
361
‘Ladies of the Press’, panel-interview programme, WOR-TV, New York, January 19, 1963. http://www.greenwych.ca/dulles.htm
362
Bob Fisk, “The Decision to Bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” II, 1983. The article can be found at: http://www.greenwych.ca/hiro2bmb.htm
366
Bertrand Russell, ‘The Atomic Bomb and the Prevention of War’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, October 1, 1946, 5.