131. Schechtman M. 2004. Personality and Persistence: The Many Faces of Personal Survival // American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 41. № 2. P. 87–105.
132. Schechtman M. 2007. The Constitution of Selves. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
133. Schechtman M. 2011. The Narrative Self // S. Gallagher (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 394–416.
134. Schechtman M. 2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
135. Searle J. 1994. The Rediscovery of Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
136. Searle J. 1997. The Mystery of Consciousness. N.Y.: New York Review of Books.
137. Searle J. 1998. Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World. N.Y.: Basic Books.
138. Searle J. 1999. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
139. Searle J. 2003. Rationality in Action. Cambridge: Bradford Book.
140. Searle J. 2004. Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
141. Searle J. 2006. Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. N.Y.: Columbia University Press.
142. Searle J. 2007. Biological Naturalism // Max Velmans and Susan Schneider (eds.). The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. P. 325–334.
143. Searle J. 2008. Philosophy in a New Century: Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
144. Sellars W. 1991. Science, Perception and Reality. Atascadero: Ridgeview Pub. Co.
145. Shoemaker D. 2007. Moral Address, Moral Responsibility, and the Boundaries of The Moral Community // Ethics. Vol. 118. № 1. P. 70 – 108.
146. Shoemaker D. 2009. Responsibility and Disability // Metaphilosophy. Vol. 40. № 3–4. P. 438–461.
147. Shoemaker D. 2011a. Moral Responsibility and the Self // Gallagher S. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 487–518.
148. Shoemaker D. 2011b. Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility // Ethics. Vol. 121. № 3. P. 602–632.
149. Shoemaker D. 2013. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press.
150. Shoemaker D. 2016. Personal Identity and Ethics // The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/identity-ethics/>.
151. Shoemaker D., Tognazzini N. 2014. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Volume 2. New York: Oxford University Press.
152. Shoemaker S. 1970. Persons and Their Pasts // American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 7. № 4. P. 269–285.
153. Shoemaker S. 2001. Realization and Mental Causation // Gillett C. and Loewer B. (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. P. 74–98.
154. Shoemaker S. 2003. Identity, Cause, and Mind, Expanded Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
155. Smith A. 2012. Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: in Defense of a Unified Account // Ethics. Vol. 122. № 3. P. 575–589.
156. Sosa E. 1984. Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation // Midwest Studies in Philosophy. № 9. P. 271–281.
157. Sosa E. 1993. Davidson’s T inking Causes // Heil J. and Mele A. (eds.). Mental causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. P. 41–50.
158. Stoecker R. 2010. Davidson // O’Connor T. and Sandis C. (eds). A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford: Blackwell. P. 598 – 605.
159. Strawson G. 1994. The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility // Philosophical Studies. Vol. 75. № 1–2. P. 5–24.
160. Strawson G. 2005. Against Narrativity // Strawson G. (ed.). The Self? Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. P. 63–86.
161. Strawson P.F. 2008. Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. London: Routledge.
162. Swinburne R. 1991. Personal Identity: the Dualist Theory // S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne. Personal Identity. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. P. 1–65.
163. Swinburne R. 2013. Mind, Brain and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
164. Talbert M. 2008. Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy? // Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. № 89. P. 516–535.
165. Talbert M. 2012. Accountability, Aliens, and Psychopaths: A Reply to Shoemaker // Ethics. Vol. 122. № 3. P. 562–574.
166. Talbert M. 2014. The Significance of Psychopathic Wrongdoing // Schramme T. (ed.). Being Amoraclass="underline" Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity. Cambridge: MIT Press, P. 275–300.
167. Talbert M. 2016. Moral Responsibility: An Introduction (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge: Polity.
168. Taylor C. 1964. Explanation of Behavior. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
169. Taylor M. 1999. Imaginary Companions and the Children Who Create Them. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
170. Taylor M., Hodges S.D., Kohanyi A. 2002–2003. The Illusion of Independent Agency: Do Adult Fiction Writers Experience Their Characters as Having Minds of Their Own? // Imagination, Cognition, and Personality. Vol. 22. № 4. P. 361–380.
171. Timpe K. 2013. Free Will. Sourcehood and Its Alternatives. London, New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.
172. van Inwagen P. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
173. van Inwagen P. 2000. Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture // Noûs, Vol. 34, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives. Vol. 14. P. 1–19.
174. van Inwagen P. 2013. A Modal Argument for Incompatibilism // P. Russell and O. Deery (eds.).The Philosophy of Free Wilclass="underline" Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. P. 117–125.
175. Vargas M. 2012. Why the Luck Problem Isn’t // Philosophical Issues. Vol. 22. № 1. P. 419–436.
176. Vasilyev V. 2009. «The Hard Problem of Consciousness» and Two Arguments for Interactionism // Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 26. № 5. P. 514–526.
177. Velleman J.D. 1996. Self to Self // The Philosophical Review. Vol. 105. № 1. P. 39–76.
178. Vohs K., Schooler J. 2008. The Value of Believing in Free Wilclass="underline" Encouraging a Belief in Determinism Increases Cheating // Psychological Science. Vol. 19. № 1. P. 49–54.
179. Wallace R. 1998. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
180. Wallace R. 2011. Dispassionate Opprobrium: On Blame and the Reactive Sentiments // Wallace R.J., Kumar R., and Freeman S. (eds.). Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, P. 348–372.
181. Watson G. 1987. Free Action and Free Will // Mind. Vol. 96. № 382. P. 145–172.
182. Watson G. 1996. Two Faces of Responsibility // Philosophical Topics. Vol. 24. № 2. P. 227–248.
183. Watson G. 2004. Responsibility and the Limits of Eviclass="underline" Variations on a Strawsonian Theme // Watson G. Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 219–259.