Two clusters of passes pierced the mountain chain—called the Eastern Dorsale—running north to south inland from the coast in eastern Tunisia. In the north, passes at Fondouk and Pichon debouched into the French sector. Roughly fifty miles south, the Faid and Maizila passes sent roads down to the American-held oasis of Sidi bou Zid. Von Arnim’s attacks in January had secured Pichon, Faid, and Maizila passes for the Germans.
The British Ultra code-breaking operation detected the German preparations for an offensive and alerted Allied headquarters in Algiers. Intelligence officers deduced from the traffic that the blow would fall at Fondouk, in the north.6 Lieutenant General Anderson, acting on the best information available to him, decided to keep the 1st Armored Division’s CCB behind Fondouk to deal with the threat.
To the south, II Corps’ own intelligence collectors—ignorant of the Ultra data—had pulled together a growing body of evidence that the Germans were preparing an attack at Faid Pass. Fredendall heeded the warning. He instructed 1st Armored Division CG MajGen Orlando Ward in excruciating and insulting detail on how he was to dispose of his forces in preparation.7
On 11 February, Eisenhower received his fourth star. Nonetheless, a worried rather than cheerful Eisenhower inspected the II Corps area on 13 and 14 February. Despite Fredendall’s awareness of a threat, Ike later recalled that he detected a certain complacency among the line units, illustrated by an unconscionable delay in preparing defensive positions. Eisenhower concluded that lack of training and experience among commanders was the chief cause of the problem. He also recognized that the 1st Armored Division had been too thinly spread to fight effectively.8
Two hill masses flank the road that runs from Faid Pass by Sidi bou Zid and thence to Sbeitla. To the north lies Djebel Lessouda and to the south Djebel Ksaira. In accordance with Fredendall’s orders, a battalion of the 168th Infantry Regiment, 34th Infantry Division, defended each hill. Local commanders had objected that this disposition risked having the battalions cut off and cut up because they could not support one another, but Fredendall and his staff had declined to take a personal look at the terrain. Lieutenant Colonel John Waters had been given control over the troops on Djebel Lessouda on 12 February. In addition to the 2/168th, Waters had at his disposal a company of light tanks, a battery of 105mm howitzers, and the 2d Platoon, A/701st Tank Destroyer Battalion.9
Waters’s job was to stop any attacking force long enough for LtCol Louis Hightower to launch a counterattack from Sidi bou Zid with his mobile reserve of some forty tanks from the 3d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment. The rest of A/701st and two artillery battalions supported Hightower’s force.10 Company A was the only line company in the TD battalion that had virtually no combat experience.
At 0400 hours on 14 February, Waters rose and went to the lookout position atop Djebel Lessouda. Before turning in the night before, he had called the commander of the 2d Battalion and told him to inform his company commanders to expect an attack. Peering toward Faid Pass, he could neither see nor hear anything. A windstorm was blowing through the pass, carrying an obscuring cloud of sand with it. Waters returned to his tent just as a call came in from Col Peter Hains, the deputy commander of CCA, who wanted to know what the shooting was all about. Waters was mystified but said he would check. He returned to the top of the hill. Now he heard the rumble of artillery through the wind.11
Two battle groups of the 10th Panzer Division, covered by artillery fire and led by the Tigers of the Schwere Panzer Abteilung 501, were erupting from the pass. Dismounted panzergrenadiers from the 21st Panzer Division supported the attack. To the south, mobile elements from the 21st Panzer Division were preparing to sweep through the thin American defenses in Maizila Pass.
A small covering force of American infantry and the tank destroyers of 2d Platoon barred the exit from Faid Pass. Lieutenant Armbruster ordered his green tank destroyer crews to open fire. Their 75s would cause no more harm to the advancing Tigers than would throwing rocks, though the men later said they had managed to knock out three or more panzers of some type. The German force quickly overran the American positions. Men broke in panic and pelted back toward Sidi bou Zid. “Tigers! The Tigers are coming!” men shouted as they reached Waters’ position. Two M3s and a few jeeps from A/701st joined the rout. These vehicles may have later fetched up with a combat group built around the 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry Regiment, which was deployed at Djebel Ksaira and at 1400 hours reported that it had been joined by some retreating tank destroyers.12
At 0650, Waters reported that he was under attack by infantry and armor. Waters ordered his light tank company forward. Armed with 37mm popguns, the light tanks stood even less chance than had the TDs and were quickly destroyed. At 0730, Hightower received orders to launch his planned attack to stabilize the situation. Climbing into his command Sherman, he instructed the forty-odd Shermans of Companies H and I, 3d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, and the eight tank destroyers of A/701st under the command of Captain Wray to advance.
About this time, Waters was able to count roughly sixty German tanks around his position, and there were more that he could not see. When Hightower saw the number of tanks that he faced, he radioed that the best he could do was to delay the enemy. He was not only outnumbered but outgunned.13
The tank destroyers deployed to the right flank of Company I. They drove to high ground east of the Lessouda-Sadguia road, advancing through a cactus patch over the rise. The crews were shocked to see about thirty Mark IV tanks heading west from the pass a mere two hundred yards distant. The Americans opened fire, including small arms in the heat of the moment. But a slugging match against so many panzers at short range was utterly hopeless. Three M3s and two M6s rocked and burst into flames as cannon shells struck home.
The outnumbered American tanks, meanwhile, were taking a pounding, especially from 88s, including those on a few Tiger tanks. Dust made identification of friend and foe extremely difficult.14 Four more tank destroyers were knocked out as the confused melee continued. Fortunately, elements of the 168th Infantry surrounded on Djebel Lessouda spotted a flanking movement by six Tigers and were able to reach the tankers and warn them, which prevented a potentially devastating surprise.15
Hightower knew it was time to go. He later told LtGen Omar Bradley that the TD men of Company A stuck it out to the bitter end and were utterly fearless.16 They had also earned the distinction of being the first Americans to knock out a Tiger tank by direct fire.17 As the attacking force withdrew, the remnants of the TD company turned and raced toward Sidi bou Zid. They linked up with the roughly twenty surviving tanks under Hightower, who ordered a withdrawal in the direction of Sbeitla. Just west of town, German fighters—which completely controlled the air during the initial onslaught—bombed and strafed the Americans, who were fleeing in no particular order across the plain. The air strike knocked out Company A’s last M3 and the maintenance trucks.