Major General Orlando Ward, CG of 1st Armored Division, on 22 February assumed command of all operations in Kasserine, Thala, and Haidra. That day, the Germans were reported to be burning some of their vehicles, but Rommel nevertheless threw one more jab at CCB; more tough fighting was required to restore the line.
The next day, 1st Armored Division elements advanced against little resistance. Rommel, worried about Monty’s Eighth Army at his back, had decided to end his offensive.53 By 25 February, German forces had withdrawn to the line Faid–Djebel Sidi Aich–Gafsa, and the following day the battered 1st Armored Division went into corps reserve.54 Eisenhower deemed the Kasserine line stabilized as of 26 February.55
The first major American battle with German forces had cost the U.S. Army more than six thousand casualties, including three hundred dead, and two-thirds of the tank strength of the 1st Armored Division.56 Some of the tank destroyer men realized for the first time why the British, saddled with inferior equipment, might feel proud of a successful evacuation.57
Ward concluded in a letter to Armored Force chief LtGen Jacob Devers written a few days later, “I now have a veteran division. Its losses have been great, but I hope before long to have it better than ever, based on past experiences.”58 His words doubtless applied to the tank destroyer units fighting as part of his command.
The troops were quickly losing faith in their equipment. Tank killers nicknamed their M3 the “Purple Heart Box.”59 The vehicle had no more punch than a Sherman and offered much less protection. After the fighting at Feriana and Kasserine, SSgt John Spence, of the 805th, realized that one had to move quickly in the M3, because if the halftrack were hit by a German tank round, “it was like lighting a match.”60 Indeed, the halftrack in general was getting a very bad name. One soldier, when asked by an officer if German aircraft bullets would go through the halftrack, replied, “No, sir. They only come through one wall and then they rattle around.”61
Word had gotten all the way back to TD men training at Camp Hood. When the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion shipped out for North Africa in January 1943, the men all hoped that they would not have to fight in the M3. They were elated when they were issued the first M10s in North Africa upon their arrival at Casablanca.62
By March 1943, official U.S. Army observers concluded that the 37mm gun was ineffective against German Mark III and Mark IV tanks. Only a side or rear shot had much chance of achieving a kill, and effective German coordination of tanks and infantry made this difficult to do in battle.63 There were now enough M3s in North Africa to replace all of the M6s.64 Company B of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion gleefully got rid of its M6s, which it judged “utterly worthless.” Reconnaissance Company got stuck with some of them, however.
On to Victory
Eisenhower reacted to the debacle at Kasserine Pass by reorganizing his command. British General Sir Harold Alexander took control of all ground forces. The British—who viewed the American performance as incompetent—would play the lead role in the next phase of operations. Major General George Patton Jr. assumed command of II Corps and started to beat it into shape. Two fresh British divisions arrived, and the Americans and French rearmed. And the Allies finally deployed enough fighters to contest control of the air. With that, the Allies took the offensive.65
On 13 March, the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the 1st Armored Division, paving the way for the detachment three days later of the 701st.66 A partnership that had seen the toughest times of the North Africa campaign came to an end until renewed in Italy. The newly arrived battalion, equipped with M10s, deployed near Maknassy, where the men almost immediately experienced their first German dive-bombing.
The first mission for the 776th was to act as lead element for the 1st Armored Division in II Corps’ mid-March advance through Gafsa. Doctrine remained firmly tucked away in the field manual. The battalion CO concluded, however, that TD battalions were actually a logical choice for such work. They had organic antiaircraft protection, scouts, de facto infantry in their security sections, and the ability to destroy any German tank on the battlefield. The only real downside, he judged, was that his men had never fired a shot in anger.67
American forces recaptured Gafsa on 17 March, five days later passed through Maknassy, and advanced into the hills beyond.
The Perfect Test: Action at El Guettar
On 23 March, the Germans threw one last major armored punch at the Americans. Von Arnim counterattacked II Corps’ 1st Infantry Division with the 10th Panzer Division just east of El Guettar. At about 0500 hours, the Germans advanced slowly in a hollow-square formation of tanks and self-propelled guns interspersed with infantry carriers. Additional infantry followed in trucks.
Sergeant Bill Harper, an M3 commander in Company C of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, watched the advancing force with concern from the crest of the ridge above the pass to El Guettar. Harper counted seventy-five German tanks, and one platoon leader thought he spotted at least one hundred. These guesses were not bad, as the 10th Panzer Division had fifty-seven tanks and about the same number of armored cars and halftracks. The outnumbered TD battalion—on that day fielding thirty-one M3s and five M6s—was filling a two-and-a-half mile gap in the American lines.
The tank killers had expected trouble. Recon, which had established a picket line across the valley early that morning, spotted the advancing steel storm. After a brief exchange of fire, the recon jeeps, accompanied by a few TDs, raced back ahead of the foe. The lieutenant in charge of one group kept repeating over his radio, “Let the first three [vehicles] through, and then give ‘em hell!”
The battalion’s TDs were arrayed on the reverse slopes of the ridgeline and nearby hills. Companies B and C held positions in front of the 1st Infantry Division artillery, while Company A guarded the pass to El Guettar. The German formation split into three prongs and overran some American positions. Lieutenant Fred Miner in Company A reminded his men that the Americans had fled from the panzers in Ousseltia Valley and at Sbeitla; he told them that this time they would stand and shoot it out no matter what the odds.
In the weak light of early morning, the TD crews engaged the Germans as they came into range. Sergeant Raymond, of Company B, spotted a giant Tiger moving past and maneuvered to put six shots (probably from the flank) into the panzer, four of which ricocheted but two of which did the job. Raymond next set a Mark IV alight. German rounds found Raymond’s M3, and three hits set the halftrack on fire.