Guided by forward observers, most of the TDs raced over the crests of the ridges and hills, fired, and backed out of sight, only to pop up and do the same again at another location. The German gunners never knew where a TD would appear next. Except, it seemed, for one crew, which found itself the object of heavy fire every time their M3 crested the rise. They finally realized that their radio antenna was standing proudly tall and revealed their approach every time. They lowered the aerial.
After Company A’s TDs had knocked out eight tanks, the German assault force withdrew and circled to reinforce the attack on the rest of the battalion’s line. The panzers penetrated to within one hundred yards of the Companies B and C TDs. Some of the M3s were no longer moving, and a few were burning. The Germans were so close that Sgt Bill Harper at one point thought the outfit was surrounded. Even as ammunition ran low, the battalion doggedly held its ground. At the height of the assault, some TDs were forced to abandon the duck-and-strike tactics; they stood and fired as fast as the guns could be loaded. The crews also had to beat back German infantry using small arms, machine guns, and 75mm HE shells.
The German tide receded about noon, leaving a litter of burning tanks on the slopes and approaches. The tanks withdrew into defilade positions among wadis and small hills on the northeast side of the valley.
The untested 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion was in mobile reserve near Gafsa when, at 0845, it received orders to move to El Guettar. German tanks had overrun a field artillery battalion, and the 601st had already lost most of its 75mm guns. Company B entered the valley to engage the Germans while Company C provided overwatch from the ridgeline to the west.
Second Lieutenant Gerald Coady’s platoon led the Company B charge through the gap into the valley. As the M10s rolled by to their first test against an enemy, LtCol Herschel Baker stood among his remaining Purple Heart boxes and shouted an unprintable but heartfelt welcome.
The Germans had skillfully selected their firing positions and—combined with an American minefield—they left Coady little room for maneuver. Coady tried to rush his force into covered positions to the north three times, and three times he fell back with losses. After two of his own TDs had been disabled, Coady saw that the platoon leader in the next platoon had been killed. He dismounted under heavy tank, antitank, artillery, and small-arms fire and organized the remnants of the two platoons to continue the battle.
Corporal Thomas Wilson commanded one of the Company B M10s. His destroyer received two direct hits and had two fires aboard. Wilson helped extinguish the fires while his gunner, T/5 Stephen Kurowski—who was wounded in both legs—continued firing his 3-inch gun at the Germans. Kurowski knocked out two emplacements, an artillery piece, and several machine guns before the M10 absorbed a third hit in the fuel tank, which started another fire. Wilson decided that he could not allow the Germans to capture their first M10 and directed his driver to a place where American forces would be able to recover the crippled vehicle.
At 1645 hours, the Germans struck again, supported by Stuka and fighter attacks. Infantry advanced first, overwatched by tanks and antitank guns. On the ridgeline, as the crews of C/899th watched the advance as if from an opera balcony seat, the gunners itched for something to come into range. The TDs of the 601st and 899th blazed away, and American artillery pounded the German troops. Thirty-eight panzers pressed the attack until almost 1900 hours but gave up after suffering further heavy losses.
The TDs and the artillery together had wreaked havoc during the day. Twenty-seven of the 601st’s thirty-six guns were knocked out and fourteen men had died, but its sharp-eyed gunners had destroyed thirty-seven German tanks and damaged an unknown number of others. The crews of the M10s claimed fifteen Mark IVs for a loss of five TDs and a halftrack.68
The battle at El Guettar had played out General Bruce’s dream scenario and doctrine to a tee. And, despite substantial American losses—concentrated among the antiquated M3s—the concept had worked. It would be nearly a year before the Tank Destroyer Force would have another opportunity to meet a large armored attack with a full TD battalion.
Almost as if to show for the record just once that he had read the official doctrine, 1st Armored Division CG Orlando Ward on 30 March issued an order to the commander of the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion that said, “You will place your battalion in a position of readiness in the vicinity of the high ground four miles northeast of Station de Sened…. You will reconnoiter positions and routes… and be prepared to move to these positions to block an enemy threat from the north and northeast…. Perform vigorous and continuous reconnaissance…. You will act aggressively against any enemy threat.”69
Nonetheless, as the Allies pressed relentlessly through tough opposition toward Tunis, experimentation produced another effective role for the tank destroyers. TDs were deployed before a tank attack to search out and destroy German antitank guns from long range. The results were little short of amazing. The tankers advanced without loss, and they later said that had they known how many guns had been there, they would have been scared stiff. The 1st Armored Division found the experience so compelling that it began to construct advances around the initial phase of TD suppressive fires. The TDs and tanks would then leapfrog from ridge to ridge, allowing the destroyers to work over the ground before the tanks advanced, and then to conduct overwatch in case they had missed any targets. The technique worked despite the fact that the two types of armor had incompatible radio equipment.70
During the night of 29 March, Patton organized a task force under the command of Col Clarence Benson, CO of the 13th Armored Regiment, to cut through German lines in the hills east of El Guettar and link up with Monty’s Eighth Army north of Gabes. The 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion formed part of the task force, which spent six days trying unsuccessfully to overcome stiff German and Italian resistance. Reconnaissance Company had been issued several light tanks for the assault, a field modification of the TO&E that gave the men—always at the bleeding edge—considerably more punch. Finally, at 0930 on 7 April, the entire battalion was ordered forward after a renewed tank attack showed signs of progress. The Americans broke through and, now freed, raced into the flat desert beyond. At 1600 hours, elements of the 899th established contact with the Eighth Army near Sobkret Sidi Mansour.71 There was now only one front in North Africa.
Lieutenant General Omar Bradley replaced Patton at the head of II Corps on 15 April so that the latter could return to overseeing the planning for the invasion of Sicily. Pinched out of the line by the steady shrinkage of the Axis perimeter, II Corps shifted behind the British lines and took on responsibility for the left flank along the coast. The new objective was Bizerte.
The tank-destroying days were basically over for the TD battalions in North Africa. The terrain was broken and poorly suited to the use of armor. Instead, the TD battalions usually occupied antitank defense positions to fend off hypothetical attacks. At times, they performed the roles of assault guns and artillery.72
American forces captured Bizerte on 7 May—Recon Company of the 894th claims to have entered the city first—and pushed onward as British units pounded toward Tunis. Resistance collapsed on 9 May and ended completely three days later. The Allies bagged 270,000 prisoners of war, veterans who would not be waiting for them when they invaded the shores of Europe.
The First Accounting
Some senior American officers judged that the North Africa campaign had tested the tank destroyer and found it wanting. Patton was among the critics; he concluded that the tank destroyer had proved unsuccessful in the conditions of the theater. Lieutenant General Jacob Devers went farther; he argued that “the separate tank destroyer arm is not a practical concept on the battlefield.”73