As early as Operation Avalanche, elements of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion had been incorporated into an ad hoc team, with B/751st Tank Battalion actually attached to the TD command.61 By October, the tank killers from the 601st worked routinely with the tankers from the 751st; the reconnaissance company at times provided the infantry element to the team. Infantry commanders were usually new at combined-arms fighting and unfamiliar with the capabilities of the 3-inch gun, however, and typically told the TDs not only at what to shoot but also from where to do so. They tended to think in terms of direct fire, which placed TDs in exposed positions that invited rapid counter-battery fire from the Germans. The TD crews much preferred to shoot indirectly from defiladed positions.62
Indeed, TD battalions that were primarily engaged in close-support roles fired numerous indirect artillery missions, as well. Company A of the 645th, for example, conducted a fire mission on 19 October against a German battery at 13,300 yards under the control of an artillery observer. During November, the battalion fired 8,899 rounds of HE in its artillery role and only 360 rounds of AP. On one occasion, the new CO of the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Maj Edward Austin (a field artillery officer himself), complained that the infantry was using TDs for fire missions that could have been conducted by organic artillery with less risk of counter-battery fire.63 But the big artillery was plenty busy. Up to forty battalions at once were used to saturate German-occupied hills while the doughs moved in to storm the positions with rifles and grenades.64
The TDs worked well with field artillery units, but they were stepchildren. Supported units at times failed to inform all concerned when a TD battalion moved into position and began firing missions. The 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion recorded that its M10s drew friendly counter-battery fire several times.65
The 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion made a specialty of artillery support. On 10 October, the 776th’s firing companies were attached to the field artillery to conduct joint fire missions with the 125th, 151st, and 175th Field Artillery battalions. The men found that the months of summer training in Algeria adapting and perfecting coordination with the artillery paid off handsomely. The battalion adopted a provisional internal organization that divided each company into two six-gun batteries, and each company was normally attached to a light artillery battalion. (Other battalions also used this system at times when conducting indirect fire missions.66) Some reconnaissance and security personnel were cross-trained to help man company-level fire direction centers.67
The 3-inch gun proved to be particularly effective in certain artillery roles. It was best at long-range missions because of the gun’s great range and the round’s flat trajectory, which would endanger friendly troops if fired at targets too close to the front lines. The 3-inch gun was better than the 105mm howitzer for shelling roads over which American troops planned to advance because the former left almost no crater but had a similar burst radius to the bigger round. The M10s could also turn to new missions by merely rotating their turrets rather than having to reposition guns.68 One drawback was that crews lacked a good white phosphorous round similar to the ones used by artillery to register their guns.69
Company A of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, which had been firing artillery missions, was hunkered down under an enemy barrage one rainy morning in late November. A shell struck one of the M10s and damaged the gun. The crew was ordered not to fire until Ordnance had checked the weapon. In due course, a lieutenant from Ordnance appeared and examined the vehicle, but he offered no opinion as to the extent of the damage. When the next fire order reached the platoon, the crew opened up, too. A radio repairman from Battalion was working in the turret when the order came. When the gun fired, the concussion blew the barrel off and knocked everyone in the M10 to the deck. The repairman got to his feet and sadly observed, “I don’t know how you guys can do this all day long.”70
Recon companies, meanwhile, continued to perform a dizzying array of jobs, as needed. German demolitions frequently prevented the M10s from advancing until division or corps engineers could repair blown bridges. The terrain off the roads made jeep reconnaissance impossible, so the recon companies often turned to foot scouting to spot well-concealed German strongpoints.71 Mine clearing also became common labor. Most recon troops had received little training on mines but a lot on explosives, which evidently was viewed as close enough.72 TD recon OPs provided fire control for battalion indirect fire missions—and occasionally for artillery units up to corps level.73
The 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion debarked at Naples on 2 November. The outfit had reorganized as a towed gun battalion in October after the North Africa fighting ended, at which time it received thirty-six new 3-inch guns. On 15 November, the men received a foretaste of what awaited them as the only towed TD battalion in Italy. The crews were ordered to conduct service practice against a mountainside. The weather was by now not only rainy but, in the words of VI Corps CG MajGen John Lucas, “cold as hell,” particularly at higher elevations.74 The 3-inch gun M5 weighed 4,875 pounds with its carriage and thus confronted the crew with a wrestling match even under optimal conditions.75 Company C had to winch its guns into position, lost all rounds fired in clouds or crevices, and then had to winch the guns back out.
The battalion advanced to a bivouac in what its operations report described as “alluvial mud” on the west bank of the Volturno river by 19 November. The 805th’s operations officer was initially informed that there was not even room for additional guns firing indirect fire missions, but on 26 November the outfit was attached to the 18th Field Artillery Brigade, whose artillery battalions would provide telephone wire, survey, fire direction, and observation. Three days later, the men attempted to move their guns into firing positions. Most were winched through the muck, but bulldozers and tractors had to be brought in to move others. Usually, the vehicle sank in the mud. Because of the lack of experience with the 3-inch guns in both the battalion and the artillery, and because of the lack of space, the firing positions selected were poor. Company C’s guns were lined up hub-to-hub.
Second Corps—which, with the 3d and 36th Infantry divisions under command, was just moving into the line between VI Corps and British 10 Corps—informed the 805th that it would have no antitank mission and would fire solely as artillery. On 1 December, the guns finally did so, firing some twelve hundred rounds in support of a planned attack by British 10 Corps. The attack was scrubbed.
By the next day, the crews had learned that trail shifts—or manually swinging the entire piece to point in a new direction—were necessary between practically all fire missions. Unless the guns could be positioned on the reverse slope of a hill, moreover, the crews had to dig trenches under the trails in order to obtain sufficient elevation for the guns. Sometimes, the prime movers (2-1/2-ton trucks at this time) had to be winched into position from which to winch the guns. It was going to be a tiring business.