Operation Torch was a hurriedly organized affair. American and British political and military leaders did not reach agreement to pursue the project until late July 1942, and substantial differences between the Allies over where the landings should occur continued through August. Eisenhower was named overall commander on 26 July, leaving him a mere three months to pull together the until-then largest amphibious operation in American history.9 Torch required a complete reorientation for staffs that had been working on the plans for landings in France. Improvisation was the imperative as they scrambled to train troops and supply the necessary sea-lift capacity amidst heavy shipping losses to German U-boats.10 The tools of later amphibious operations, such as Landing Ships, Tanks (LSTs), were not yet at hand. Amphibious training for the naval and ground forces was inadequate, a fact recognized by commanders but deemed an acceptable risk.
Oran is situated in the middle of three bays that form a large bight between Cape Falcon on the west and Pointe de l’Aiguille to the east. Arzew, a secondary port, lies 20 miles farther east on the shore of a hilly and wide promontory. Hill masses behind the shoreline offered defenders advantageous terrain and channeled movement. The French defenses boasted forty-five fortified coastal guns at Oran and another six at Arzew. The Oran Division had nearly 17,000 men to defend the approaches to the city.11
The invasion plan called for simultaneous landings at three major beaches—labeled Beaches X, Y, and Z—and one minor beach. One armored task force, designated Green and including the men of Company C, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, would land at Mersa bou Zedjar. A second, designated Red and including Company B, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, would land near Arzew, where the reconnaissance troops of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion would also come ashore. “Flying columns” from the assault force were to push inland in a double-envelopment maneuver and initially seize airfields and approaches to Oran while other units captured shore batteries. Airborne troops flying all the way from England were to drop at two crucial airstrips, La Sénia and Tafaraoui, and link up with armored columns advancing from the beaches. The French Army airfield at La Sénia lay about six miles south-southeast of Oran, while the Navy airfield at Tafaraoui was located twelve miles southeast of the city.12
The landings around Oran began as scheduled between 0100 and 0130 hours on 8 November and achieved complete surprise.13 The 1st Infantry Division cleared the way for Combat Command B to begin landing its men and tanks from Maracaibo transport ships (converted tankers).14 The Maracaibos required seven feet of draft, so pontoon bridges were constructed—a task requiring three hours—over which vehicles drove to shore. This was hardly a viable solution for any future assault landing under fire.15
Lieutenant Robert Whitsit and his 3d Platoon, Company B, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Lt John Eggleton’s 2d Platoon from Company C disembarked at about 0600 hours in their respective landing areas. The remainder of both companies would unload at a frustratingly slow pace—one vehicle at a time ferried in landing craft—over the next two days. As corps assets began landing, Capt Michael Paulick and his recon men from the 601st clambered down rope nets from the deck of the SS Latita to small assault boats waiting below. Inexperienced and confronted with the slap-dash arrangement, many of them became entangled in the nets.16 Nevertheless, they were soon ashore.
The tankers of the 1st Armored Division de-waterproofed their vehicles. West of Oran, Task Force Green—built around one armored and one armored-infantry battalion from Combat Command B— deployed a small task force dubbed a flying column to spearhead the advance. The column set off from Merza bou Zedjar for Misshergin about 0900 hours.17 Lieutenant Eggleton’s tank destroyers took the point, an order completely at odds with tank destroyer doctrine. Racing down the highway between Oran and Sidi bel Abbes, the Americans came under fire from emplaced French 75mm guns. Sergeant Mitchell’s M3 crewmen replied with their own—a copy of the very guns firing on them—and destroyed two of the French weapons. The tank destroyer force’s first engagement had been a success but had nothing to do with fighting tanks. Doctrine was taking a beating, and it was not even noon yet.
On the other side of Oran, Task Force Red—built around two CCB armored and one armored-infantry battalions—advanced to Tafaraoui Airfield. Lieutenant Colonel John Waters, a son-in-law of Patton, commanded a second flying column that consisted of the platoon from the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, two light tank companies, and one company of armored infantry. As in Task Force Green, Lieutenant Whitsit’s M3 tank destroyers were put at the point.
About 1100 hours, the flying column reached the airfield. The arriving troops found no sign of the paratroopers from the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment who were supposed to have landed there. The American forces quickly overcame light resistance and took three hundred prisoners.18
The missing airborne unit, it transpired, had been thoroughly dispersed during the long flight from England, and several of the aircraft had set down in a dry lake bed near Oran. American tanks found the paratroopers, and Waters requested by radio that they relieve his command so that he could pursue the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Edson Raff, commanding the airborne expedition, agreed. At 1400 hours the paratroopers and American-piloted Spitfire fighter aircraft that were to operate out of Tafaraoui were ordered to the airfield. As the C-47s carrying the paratroopers approached some fifteen miles from the landing strip, French fighters and bombers struck the American aircraft and the flying column. A 500-pound bomb demolished one of Lieutenant Whitsit’s M3s, wounding three enlisted men. The C-47s were forced down, and the airborne had to walk the rest of the way to Tafaraoui.19
Shortly before sundown, Whitsit’s platoon engaged with long-range fire a mixed French battery of seven guns that had been shooting into the area of the airfield from the northeast. The French guns fell silent.
French aircraft and artillery again struck Tafaraoui the morning of 9 November. After Spitfires had driven off the enemy aircraft, Lt Whitsit’s platoon accompanied a company of light tanks southward to deal with a French tank concentration reportedly in the vicinity of St. Barbe du Tlelat. The American force engaged the French at a range in excess of two thousand yards. As the TDs laid down a base of fire, the American light tanks advanced in two V’s abreast, followed by a third V five hundred yards behind. The Americans destroyed fourteen Renault AMC35 light tanks armed with 47mm gun. Two were officially credited to the guns of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Waters later attributed all of the kills to the TDs, while one of the now bona fide tank killers suggested that an honest guess would be six. Waters commented, “It was a shame to shoot at these French tanks as we could almost see the shells go right through their thin armor. It gave our men lots of confidence.”20
Task Force Green overran the La Sénia airfield the morning of 9 November and captured five hundred prisoners and ninety aircraft. At the beachhead, meanwhile, a new column under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bruck was formed consisting of two medium tanks, five light tanks, and the M3s of Lt Arthur Edson’s 2d Platoon, Company B, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion. Once again, the tank destroyers were put in the lead. After several changes in orders, the column—now less two M3s detached to provide security in La Mecta—was directed toward La Sénia.21