Unlike Hitler, Stalin did not tolerate engineering failure and after six months of Ginzburg’s fumbling with the SU-76 project, Stalin issued GKO Decree 3530ss on 7 June 1943, which stated that:
The State Committee of Defence [GKO] decrees that the SU-76 self-propelled guns, designed by comrade Ginzburg of the People’s Commissariat of Tank Production [NKTP], and accepted by GOKO decree No.2559 on December 2, 1942, turned out to be of unsatisfactory quality. Furthermore, the NKTP (comrade Saltzman) and GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev) did not carry out trials with due diligence before accepting the SU-76 for production. The modifications proposed by the NKTP (comrade Saltzman) and GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev), confirmed by GOKO decree #3184ss on April 14, 1943, did not result in serious improvements and did not increase the quality of the SU-76 to satisfactory levels, which also suggests that the NKTP and GAU KA trials were executed poorly.
The State Committee of Defence decrees that:
Production of SU-76 SPGs at factory #38 must cease immediately.
The People’s Commissar of Tank Production, comrade Saltzman, must be made aware of his mistakes regarding production of SU-76 SPGs at factory #38.The designer of the SU-76 SPG, comrade Ginzburg, must be removed from work at the NKTP, and not allowed to participate in NKTP projects further. He is to be transferred to the NKO for assignment to less critical work in the Acting Army. The NKTP (comrade Saltzman) and GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev) must find and punish guilty workers in the NKTP and GAU KA, which carelessly performed trials of the SU-76 SPG.
Ginzburg was removed from his position and sent to the front as deputy commander of the 32nd Tank Brigade, where he was killed in action two months later. Salzmann was forced to resign, but was reassigned as a director at Chelyabinsk. Malyshev was brought back to head the NKTP, which he remained in charge of until the end of the war. First, he resolved the problems with the SU-76, which was reissued as the SU-76M. Although still a problematic design, Malyshev ensured that it was built in great quantities and that its main faults were corrected. Next, he began lobbying Stalin and the NKO to approve an up-gunned version of the T-34 as well as a new heavy tank. The whole experience of the SU-76 program ably demonstrates the level of stress and micro-management that Soviet tank industry operated under; engineers and program managers who made mistakes would not remain in their positions. Stalin’s bullying tactics were cruel but effective in getting the desired results within the Soviet industrial system.
Chapter 2
Armoured Operations in 1943
Retreat from the Caucasus, 1 January–2 February 1943
Operation Edelweiss, the German attempt to seize the Caucasus oil fields with Heeresgruppe A, culminated in October 1942 after having only seized the sabotaged oilfields around Maikop. When Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist’s 1. Panzerarmee (PzAOK 1) entered the Caucasus in July 1942, it had over 600 tanks and assault guns and it was initially able to route the ill-equipped Soviet North Caucasus Front. However, the Soviets managed to hastily improvise a strong defensive line along the Terek River with the 9th Army, which brought von Kleist’s pursuit to a halt. Although von Kleist succeeded in conducting an assault crossing of the Terek on 2 September, Soviet reinforcements and German fuel shortages brought his panzers to a halt 85km short of the Grozny oil fields. In early November, von Kleist made one last desperate effort to achieve a breakthrough, but the 13.Panzer-Division was encircled and nearly destroyed near Ordzhonikidze.{1} Thereafter, the 1.Panzerarmee settled into a positional defence along a nearly 200km-wide front, with the III Panzerkorps in the west, three infantry divisions of the LII Armeekorps in the centre and the XXXX Panzerkorps in the east. The Kalmyk Steppe between Heeresgruppe A’s flank in the Caucasus and Heeresgruppe B’s flank along the Don was screened by small detachments. Von Kleist moved up to take command of Heeresgruppe A and General der Kavallerie Eberhard von Mackensen took over PzAOK 1.
General-leytenant Ivan A. Maslennikov, an NKVD officer, commanded the Northern Group of the North Caucasus Front, which consisted of the 9th, 37th and 44th Armies. As soon as Maslennikov realized that von Kleist had shifted to the defensive, he began probing actions to find weak spots in the German line and the most dangerous area for the Germans was the area north of the Terek River held by General der Panzertruppen Sigfrid Henrici’s XXXX Panzerkorps. Here, Generalmajor Franz Westhoven’s 3.Panzer-Division held an extended 30km-wide front from Stoderevskaya on the Terek River to Aga Batyr on the Kalmyk Steppe.{2} On Westhoven’s left flank, Korps z.b.V. Felmy, an improvised brigade-size formation led by Luftwaffe General der Flieger Hellmuth Felmy screened PzAOK 1’s open northern flank. By doctrine, Panzer-Divisionen were offensive formations and unsuited for protracted defence, but von Kleist had no alternative and the situation grew even worse after the Soviet offensive at Stalingrad threatened Heeresgruppe B. On 21 November 1942 the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) ordered von Kleist to transfer his strongest formation, the 23.Panzer-Division, to Heeresgruppe Don in order to participate in Operation Wintergewitter, the attempt to relieve the trapped 6.Armee at Stalingrad.{3} In mid-December, the SS-Panzergrenadier-Division Wiking was also transferred to Heeresgruppe Don, leaving PzAOK 1 badly outnumbered by Maslennikov’s northern group.
Beginning in early December 1942, General-major Vasiliy A. Khomenko’s 44th Army began mounting regular attacks with infantry and tanks all across the front of the 3.Panzer-Division. Khomenko was another NKVD officer with limited field experience and he had only a few small tank units, but the Soviet attacks were relentless and began to wear down the German defences. In three weeks of heavy defensive combat, the 3.Panzer-Division’s Panzer-Regiment 6 lost a battalion commander and two veteran company commanders, while the commander of the SPW-equipped I./Panzergrenadier-Regiment 3 was also killed. Overall, PzAOK 1 suffered more than 5,000 casualties in December 1942. Khomenko’s 44th Army also paid a heavy price for its aggressiveness, including 8,037 troops captured and 68 tanks lost, but its combat capabilities were actually increasing. Although Hitler was reluctant to cede territory since he believed that he could restart his Caucasus offensive in 1943, he finally agreed to let von Kleist pull back the XXXX Panzerkorps’ most exposed positions and to create a straighter front line.
Nevertheless, by the end of December 1942 Westhoven’s 3.Panzer-Division was in very poor condition. Due to the shortage of spare parts, the division only had about 30 operational tanks and a similar number of SPWs. Worn-out track and engines could not be replaced. Repeated enemy artillery bombardments damaged the rubber jacket on tank road wheels, which then led to ‘chunking’ when the vehicle moved, often resulting in track pins becoming bent or broken. However, there were no replacement road wheels or track pins en route. Thus, even the tanks that were declared operational had numerous mechanical faults, which degraded their performance. Panzer-Regiment 6 had started the campaign with three Panzer-Abteilungen, but was now forced to consolidate all of its remaining tanks into Panzer-Abteilung Stockmann. The surplus crews of the III./Pz.Regt. 6 were put into the line as infantrymen. Ammunition was in very short supply, as were radio batteries, which forced the Germans to limit their use of tactical radios. However, the worst deficiency was the crippling lack of fuel; the OKH gave priority of fuel to Generalfeldmarschall’s Erich von Manstein’s Heeresgruppe Don and Heeresgruppe A was told in late November to expect no more fuel deliveries for the time being. The supply situation became so critical that 3.Panzer-Division’s logistic troops shifted entirely to Russian Panje carts for resupply of forward areas.{4} Consequently, the 3.Panzer-Division could not conduct a mobile defence and was forced to disperse its combat power into company-and battalion-size stützpunkt (strongpoints). By Christmas, it was obvious even to Hitler that PzAOK 1 could not remain in place and had to pull back or face gradual destruction. On 30 December, Hitler authorized PzAOK 1 to withdraw 100km to a line from Pyatigorsk to the Kuma River, to begin at dusk on 2 January 1943.