The T-34s appeared to be uncertain, turning their barrels to the left and to the right; it was good that we were on parallel to them. Every gunner already knew which enemy tank to engage. The first two belonged to the man on the left wing, those behind it to the others echeloned to the right… For a moment, the calm developed after many engagements seemed to be shaken. Then, finally, the order: All tanks… guns up… fire! A loud bang! Then, in a matter of seconds, four – eight – twelve green tracer trails, between them brief radio messages. Then the firing settled down into a few individual rounds. On the enemy side huge jets of flame and smoke. The last T-34 tried to turn around and became bogged down in the process. The crew sprang like cats from the turret, but they were mowed down by our machinegun fire. Our tank drivers waved to each other joyfully.{59}
On 18 March, the SS-Panzerkorps exploded north from Kharkov and captured Belgorod that evening. Over the next several days, the SS-Panzerkorps and Großdeutschland mopped up Soviet remnants in the area, but von Manstein’s offensive was finally brought to a halt by the spring thaw and increasing resistance. Katukov’s 1st Tank Army (1TA) finally arrived north of Belgorod on 23–24 March, along with two other fresh armies from the RVGK, which created the front-line that stabilized for the next three months until the Battle of Kursk. While von Manstein’s ‘Backhand Blow’ is rightly regarded as an operational masterpiece, it also indicated that the character of German mechanized offensives was changing as many of their traditional advantages began to wane. The German Panzertruppen still enjoyed a major edge in tactical skill, but Soviet anti-tank defences were becoming much more robust than in 1941–42 and the Red Army’s tank units were also improved. Von Manstein did succeed in mauling eight of the 20 Soviet tank corps on the Eastern Front, which temporarily deprived the Red Army of the initiative and gave Heeresgruppe Süd a valuable breathing space.
Rokossovsky’s Offensive, 25 February–28 March 1943
Although most of the action in early 1943 was occurring on the southern part of the Eastern Front, the Stavka was eager to put pressure on Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge’s Heeresgruppe Mitte as well in order to tie down German forces and to reclaim territory while the Germans were still hard-pressed. As planning for Operations Gallop and Star proceeded in late January 1943, the Stavka also began developing a plan for the Bryansk Front to attack Generaloberst Rudolf Schmidt’s 2.Panzerarmee’s (2.PzAOK) positions north of Orel and finish off General der Infanterie Walter Weiss’ 2.Armee (2.AOK), which would disrupt Heeresgruppe Mitte’s right flank and assist the advance of Golikov’s Voronezh Front. Furthermore, the Stavka decided that once the Battle of Stalingrad ended, that Rokossovsky’s five armies should redeploy by rail and form a new Central Front to supplement the Bryansk Front’s offensive. Recognizing that Rokossovsky’s armies were not equipped with a great deal of armour to spearhead a breakthrough operation, the Stavka decided to transfer General-leytenant Aleksei G. Rodin’s 2nd Tank Army from the RVGK to Rokossovsky’s new command, as well as the newly-formed 70th Army. Once Rokossovsky seized Orel, the Stavka intended to widen the offensive by including the Western Front. Zhukov optimistically hoped that the concurrent offensives of Vatutin, Golikov and Rokossovsky would prevent the Germans from forming a new front and force them to retreat to the Dnepr.
Heeresgruppe Mitte’s right flank did appear ripe for the picking. There was a thinly-covered area between 2.AOK and 2.PzAOK near Sevsk, 140km southwest of Orel. Although the face of the burgeoning Orel salient was stoutly defended by the XXXXVI Panzerkorps with the 12., 18. and 20.Panzer-Divisionen, General der Panzertruppe Joachim Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Panzerkorps was holding the extreme right flank of 2.PzAOK with just the 137. and 707.Infanterie-Divisionen; the 707.Infanterie-Division was a particularly weak formation that had only been employed in anti-partisan operations and possessed a single artillery battalion and no divisional anti-tank unit. Nor did the battered 2.Armee possess the resources to stop a concerted enemy push westward. Generalmajor Erich Schneider’s 4.Panzer-Division was sent to hold Kursk, but its armoured strength was reduced to a single tank company, plus a few assault guns. As in the winter of 1941–42, the 4.Panzer-Division had so few Panzergrenadiers left that it was forced to create an ad hoc infantry unit from dismounted tankers. The Stavka’s plan was to have the Bryansk Front strike the face of the Orel salient and fix the XXXXVI Panzerkorps, then Rodin’s 2TA and the 70th Army would crush Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Panzerkorps and envelop Orel by driving for Bryansk.
Since the Stavka was in a rush to kick off the offensive before the spring thaw began or the Germans restored their frontline, Rokossovsky was given only six days to plan his offensive. Furthermore, transportation difficulties delayed the redeployment of his troops from Stalingrad to Voronezh; the Soviets were having difficulty repairing rail lines and Rokossovsky’s armies only had one single-track line to support his new Central Front. Consequently, the Stavka decided to postpone Rokossovsky’s offensive until late February, while beginning on schedule with those forces from the Bryansk and Voronezh Fronts already in place. This approach caught the Germans off guard. General-leytenant Nikolai P. Pukhov’s 13th Army (Bryansk Front) attacked Schmidt’s 2.PzAOK and captured the important town of Fatezh on 12 February, while General-leytenant Ivan D. Cherniakhovsky’s 60th Army (Voronezh Front) pushed Schneider’s 4.Panzer-Division out of Kursk.{60} During the fighting for Kursk, the 4.Panzer-Division lost a number of veteran panzer junior officers and NCOs, fighting on foot as infantry. By mid-February, a 60km-wide gap had been created between 2.PzAOK and 2.AOK by these limited offensives, thereby providing the perfect prequel to Rokossovsky’s major offensive. Pukhov was particularly aggressive and continued attacking the XXXXVI Panzerkorps, seized Maloarkhangel’sk on 23 February and attracted German reserves to his sector.
However, the transportation difficulties severely impacted the deployment of Rokossovsky’s Central Front and he was forced to begin his offensive on 25 February with only part of his forces in place. Pre-battle preparations were minimal and the weather turned rainy, just as the operation was beginning. Initially, Rokossovsky attacked Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Panzerkorps with three rifle divisions from the 65th Army on his right flank and two rifle divisions attached to Rodin’s 2TA on his left. Rodin’s 11th and 16th Tank Corps, as well as the four cavalry divisions of General-major Vladimir V. Kriukov’s 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps (2GCC), were kept in second echelon. Lemelsen could not hold off five Soviet rifle divisions with his two divisions and conducted a tactical delay, while calling for reinforcements. The 707.Infanterie-Division fell back a bit to occupy the fortified town of Dmitriyev-L’govsk, which was located behind the marshy Svapa River and proved to be a tough nut to crack. Rokossovsky decided to split Rodin’s 2TA, sending the 11th Tank Corps and Kriukov’s 2GCC to the west into the gap between the two German armies, but he sent General-major Aleksei G. Maslov’s 16th Tank Corps to support the drive northward into the Orel salient. Rather than concentrate his armour, Rokossovsky dissipated it by sending it on two diverging axes.{61}