The 707.Infanterie-Division held Dmitriyev-L’govsk long enough for the 78.Infanterie-Division to arrive and slow the Soviet advance. Batov’s 65th Army enjoyed success and was reinforced by General-major German F. Tarasov’s 70th Army; together, these two infantry armies pushed back XXXXVI Panzerkorps and successfully tied down elements of three German Panzer-Divisionen. However, the 2.PzAOK’s front south of Orel did not break and efforts by the Western Front to attack the 2.PzAOK’s front north of Orel came to naught, so the Stavka’s concept of crushing the Orel salient with a pincer attack proved unworkable at this time. Furthermore, the 16th Tank Corps was being misused in a positional battle as an infantry support unit, not as an exploitation force. Thus, the outcome of the offensive hinged on Rodin’s advance westward toward the Desna.
By 1 March, Rodin was advancing westward with the 11th Tank Corps, the 2GCC and four supporting rifle brigades. There were virtually no enemy forces between his vanguard and the Desna River. The important city of Sevsk was held by only a single German infantry battalion, which was driven out by Soviet tanks and cavalry. Three intact Hungarian units – the 102, 105 and 108 Light Infantry Divisions – were deployed on the approaches to the Desna, but these formations were only trained and equipped to fight partisans in the forests, not to stop a tank army. Rodin’s forces pushed into this void, against minimal resistance, but progress was slow due to rain, poor roads and limited logistical support. On 4 March, General-major Ivan G. Lazarev’s 11th Tank Corps captured the important road junction of Seredina Buda from the hapless Hungarian 108th Light Infantry Division. On 7 March, Kriukov’s cavalry reached the Desna River near Novgorod-Seversk. However, the impact of von Manstein’s success against Vatutin’s Southwest Front and the elimination of Rybalko’s 3TA caused the Stavka to reconsider Rokossovsky’s offensive just as it was on the verge of achieving a major success. Reserves and supplies that had been allocated to Rokossovsky’s offensive were instead diverted to Golikov’s tottering Voronezh Front and the Stavka directed the Central Front to change Rodin’s axis of advance from west to north, pivoting 90 degrees. Rather than going deep for Bryansk, the Stavka opted to reduce the scale of Rokossovsky’s offensive by simply chipping away at the Orel salient as much as possible.
Under the new guidance from Moscow, Lazarev’s 11th Tank Corps turned northward while Kriukov’s 2GCC screened the front along the Desna. However, von Kluge’s Heeresgruppe Mitte was reacting to the Soviet offensive now, transferring two infantry divisions to stop the Soviet 65th and 70th Armies south of Orel and 4.Panzer-Division to counter Rodin’s 2TA. Generalmajor Erich Schneider’s 4.Panzer-Division had been reinforced with five new Pz IV Ausf G, 27 Marder IIs and some assault guns and then sent to Novgorod-Seversk, where 2.AOK still had a small bridgehead over the Desna.{62} Just after Lazarev’s tank corps had left this sector, Schneider attacked with his Panzers on 8 March and began rolling up Kriukov’s over-extended cavalry. One Soviet-held village after another was softened up by artillery, then stormed by tanks and infantry. Schnieder led his division up-front, from a Sd. Kfz. 251 command track. By mid-March, 2.AOK contributed two more infantry divisions to this counter-attack and Kriukov’s corps was forced to retreat, thereby exposing Rodin’s 2TA to envelopment. On 19 March, the 4. Panzer-Division had advanced 97km eastward and re-captured Sevsk. Although Schneider’s Panzer-Division only captured 420 prisoners during the course of its counter-attack, parts of Kriukov’s 2GCC were cut off and isolated in the forests along the Desna, south of Bryansk.{63} The loss of Sevsk forced Rokossovsky to call off his sputtering offensive, unable to break the German defences south of Orel or to deal with the counter-attack of a single Panzer-Division.
The poor performance of Rodin’s 2TA in Rokossovsky’s offensive was particularly evident. In three weeks of fighting, neither of his two tank corps advanced more than 45km, captured a significant objective or destroyed any Axis units. Given the large Soviet armoured superiority in this sector and the vulnerability of third-string German formations like the 707.Infanterie-Division, as well as the Hungarian light infantry divisions, this is remarkable. In this operation, numerical superiority did not equate to victory for Rokossovsky. While Rodin’s 2TA survived the operation more or less intact, it also failed to accomplish anything worthy of a tank army.
The Soviet Offensive in the Kuban, 4 April–7 June 1943
Once the German 17.Armee (AOK 17) had retreated into the Kuban bridgehead in February 1943, General-polkovnik Ivan I. Maslennikov’s Soviet North Caucasus Front wasted little time in planning an offensive to drive the Germans from their last toehold in the Caucasus. However, Maslennikov had counted on the amphibious landing south of Novorossiysk unhinging the German defence, but instead, an 8,000-man landing force was contained in the ‘Malaia Zemlya’ (‘Little Land’) bridgehead and a battle of attrition ensued for seven months. By March, the AOK 17 was able to create a very strong defensive front known as the Blue Line (Blau Stellung), holding the approaches into the Kuban. The centrepiece of this defence was the Krymskaya sector, held by Generalleutnant Ernst Rupp’s 97.Jäger-Division. In mobile reserve, AOK 17 relied upon Generalmajor Wilhelm Crisolli’s 13.Panzer-Division and Hauptmann Alfred Müller’s Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 191 (21 StuG-IIIs) to counter-attack any Soviet breaches of the Blue Line. The Germans also had two batteries of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 249 providing direct support to Rupp’s infantry and the adjoining 5.Luftwaffen-Feld-Division had its own attached battery of assault guns. Rupp’s defence was situated behind a small stream and German pioneers had emplaced minefields and obstacles to their front – it was a strong position. Furthermore, since the Eastern Front was relatively quiet after the culmination of von Manstein’s counter-offensive, the Luftwaffe was able to shift significant aircraft into the Crimea to support AOK 17 in the Kuban bridgehead. The Soviet VVS did likewise, committing almost 1,000 aircraft from the 4th and 5th Air armies (4VA, 5VA).{64}
General-leytenant Andrei A. Grechko’s 56th Army was assigned the mission of breaking through Rupp’s defences, seizing Krymskaya and then pushing westward to link up with the Soviet naval infantry in the Malaia Zemlya bridgehead. Grechko was provided with five rifle divisions to conduct his breakthrough, but relatively little armour and artillery. He had no large armoured units and his 150–200 tanks were spread across three tank brigades (63, 92, 151), one tank regiment (257) and six OTBs, with a very eclectic mix of tanks. The 151st Tank Brigade was entirely equipped with captured German tanks, abandoned during von Kleist’s retreat from the Terek River. Grechko’s armour also included a large amount of Lend-Lease M3 Lees and Mark III Valentines, but few T-34s. One unit, the 63rd Tank Brigade, had just received 12 M4A2 Sherman medium tanks and was one of the first armour units in the Red Army to employ this new American-built tank in combat on the Eastern Front.{65}
At 0900 hours on 4 April the 56th Army attacked Rupp’s division, but the offensive failed to penetrate the German HKL. Maslennikov temporarily suspended the offensive and made preparations for the 9th and 37th Armies to launch supporting attacks on other parts of the Blue Line to assist Grechko in making a penetration. Additional armour, artillery and air support was also provided. On 14 April, Grechko committed three rifle divisions, each led by a tank battalion (OTB) against the 97.Jäger-Division and succeeded in making a 3km-deep penetration in Rupp’s HKL. Crisolli’s 13.Panzer-Division immediately committed Kampfgruppe Brux to seal the breach but this was not successful. Consequently, Rupp was forced to abandon his forward line and withdraw to his secondary positions. When Grechko’s armour-infantry shock groups rolled forward to occupy the vacated German positions on 16 April, Rupp mounted a spirited counter-attack with a battery of assault guns, supported by Stukas; the Soviets had 48 tanks knocked out, which halted their advance.{66}