In order to mount a major attack on the scale of Zitadelle, the Panzer-Divisionen needed to be refitted with new equipment and personnel replacements. In particular, Hausser’s SS-Panzerkorps had suffered over 11,000 casualties during von Manstein’s counter-offensive and had barely one-third of its armour still operational.[15] The four other German Panzerkorps in the Kursk sector were in far worse shape. As noted earlier, Hitler assigned Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, in his new role as Inspekteur der Panzertruppen, the daunting task of rebuilding his depleted Panzertruppen on the Eastern Front in preparation for Zitadelle. Guderian was faced with both shepherding the introduction of multiple new types of AFVs (Panther, Ferdinand, Hornisse and Sturmpanzer), while also ensuring that significant numbers of existing models reached the front-line units. Guderian’s preference was to get as many Pz IVs to the front as possible, since he did not believe that the Panther was ready for combat and he knew that the Tiger was only available in token numbers. The latest model, the Pz IV Ausf H, was just entering production at the end of May and its 7.5cm KwK 40 L/48 gun was greatly superior to the T-34’s 76.2mm F-34 gun; the KwK 40 L/48 could penetrate the T-34’s armour out to 2,000 metres, while the F-34 could only penetrate the Pz IV Ausf H’s 80mm thick frontal armour from 500 metres. However, even the Ausf H had thinner side armour than the T-34 Model 1943 and was still inferior in terms of mobility and fuel economy.
In just three months, Guderian worked with the OKH to increase German tank strength on the Eastern Front by almost 900 tanks and 400 assault guns; by 1 July there were 2,398 tanks and 1,086 assault guns (including 862 Pz IV equipped with long 7.5cm guns). Guderian ensured that every Panzer-Division received at least some of the new Pz IV models in order to try and raise the capabilities of the entire Panzertruppen, not just a few elite units. Indeed, the influx of so many late-model Pz IV Ausf G and the new Ausf H models, brought great joy to the hard-pressed Panzertruppen. As one Gefreiter in the 4.Panzer-Division stated, ‘Once we received the Panzer IV with the long main gun, the golden age of tanking started for us.’{73} A good number of the tanks were not new but repaired tanks, which the Panzer-Werkstatt (tank workshop) units at battalion and regiment level restored during the lengthy lull. One of the biggest benefits of the lull was the time that it provided for a large influx of spare parts and replacement track, engines and transmissions, which brought many inoperative tanks ‘back to life.’{74} Furthermore, army-level maintenance units began installing Schürzen (side skirts) on Pz IIIs and Pz IVs in mid-March to protect them from Soviet anti-tank rifles and HEAT ammunition, although both were only modest threats.
When Hitler talked about using the ‘best weapons’ in Zitadelle, he was particularly thinking about the Tiger and Panther tanks. Hitler was mesmerized by both of these tanks and decided that Zitadelle would not begin until adequate numbers of both were at the front. On 1 April, there were just 31 operational Tiger tanks on the entire Eastern Front. By 1 July, this number had increased to 153 operational Tigers, of which 117 were committed to Zitadelle (the rest were at Leningrad). It is also important to note that while a total of 156 Tigers were built during this three-month lull, only 113 were delivered; the rest were provided to new heavy tank battalions being formed. Furthermore, the Tigers were not distributed as fairly as the Pz III and Pz IV medium tanks; von Manstein’s Heeresgruppe Süd was given 90 Tigers whereas Model’s 9.Armee received only the s. Pz.-Abt. 505 with 27 Tigers. In compensation, Model was given schwere Panzerjäger Regiment 656 with all 90 Ferdinand tank destroyers.
Of course, everyone wanted the new Panther medium tank, but June ended and not one had yet arrived. Where were they? After three prototypes were delivered on 11 January, limited production of the Panther Ausf D model began at MAN in Nurnberg, Daimler-Benz in Berlin and MNH in Hannover. Once preparations for Zitadelle began, Hitler ordered that at least 250 Panthers would be combat-ready by 12 May. However, the first prototype Panthers had barely begun testing at Grafenwöhr when it became clear that the design was riddled with serious defects. The main problem with the Panther design was caused by Hitler’s decision in 1942 to increase its armour protection to 80mm, which raised the tank’s weight from 36 to 45 tons. MAN had not designed the transmission and final drives for a 45-ton vehicle and the rush to production had not left time to correct this defect; the early production models proved sluggish and tended to sheer teeth off the drive sprocket. Nor could the Panther move in reverse with its under-powered final drive. Nevertheless, two battalions – Panzer-Abteilungen 51 and 52 – began converting to the Panther at Erlangen, near Grafenwöhr.[16] Speer came to watch the Panzer-Abteilung 51 in manoeuvre training at Grafenwöhr on 22 February and was stunned when six of the 13 Panthers involved suffered mechanical break-downs. German tankers quickly noticed significant faults in the Panther’s turret and fuel pumps, as well as the engine’s tendency to overheat and then catch fire. Speer concluded that the poorly-engineered Panther needed significant redesign and in April the initial production batch of 250 Ausf D models went back to the MAN factory for reconstruction. Speer’s decision ultimately saved the Panther project, but the two battalions at Erlangen were left with no Panthers to train on for some time. Prior to Zitadelle, neither battalion conducted collective training with the Panther above the platoon level, nor had most crews progressed beyond familiarization before they were sent to the Eastern Front. Nor were any training materials, like the famous Panther-Fibel, yet available. With the pressure building from Hitler and the OKH to get the Panthers to the front as soon as possible, the technical fixes were rushed and the crews were only partly trained. When the rebuilt Panthers were issued in June, Guderian inspected them and found that, ‘the track suspension and drive were not right, and the optics were also not yet satisfactory.’{75} Guderian informed Hitler on 16 June that the Panther was not ready for combat, but his sound technical analysis of the Panther’s faults was rejected by Speer’s assistant, Karl-Otto Saur. Many of the recommended improvements would go into the next version of the Panther, the Ausf A model, but that would not be available until well after Zitadelle. In the meantime, the Heer was stuck with the problematic Panther Ausf D. Both battalions were rail-loaded at Erlangen in late June and spent a week heading eastward, before arriving near Borisovka the day before Zitadelle began. Ominously, the two battalions suffered 10 per cent mechanical losses just in the short road march from the rail head to their tactical assembly areas, including two Panthers burnt out. Even worse, Major Karl von Sivers, an experienced tanker who was supposed to command Panzer-Abteilung 52, fell ill just before the unit went east, forcing a last-minute substitution.
16
Panzer-Abteilung 51 was formed from the II./Pz. Regt. 33 (9.Panzer-Division) and Panzer-Abteilung 52 was formed from the I./Pz, Regt. 15 (11.Panzer-Division).