Originally, the OKH had intended to give one Panther battalion each to Heeresgruppe Mitte and Heeresgruppe Süd, but in the end von Manstein received both. Indeed, the bulk of the new armour and personnel replacements went to von Manstein’s Heeresgruppe Mitte (see Table 2). None of Model’s six Panzer-Divisionen had more than a single Panzer-Abteilung, whereas five of von Manstein’s divisions had two Panzer-Abteilungen each.[17] In Model’s 9.Armee, only the 2. and 4.Panzer-Divisionen were brought back up to near authorized strength. Even after the three-month lull, many tanks were still inoperative awaiting spare parts, and the overall operational readiness rate for German tanks on the Eastern Front was 89 per cent. Of course, that meant 11 per cent, or 466 tanks, were still non-operational after months without combat.{76}
In addition to new tanks and tank destroyers, a total of 78 Wespe (10.5cm) and 54 Hummel (15cm) self-propelled howitzers were sent to reinforce the artillery regiments in the Panzer-Divisionen; this German move toward self-propelled artillery in their panzer units provided a major increase in tactical fire support. Both the Wespe and the Hummel would see their combat debut at Kursk. However, only the three Waffen-SS divisions and Großdeutschland received the full allocation of 12 Wespe and six Hummel each.{77} In AOK 9, only the 2. and 4.Panzer-Divisionen received their new howitzers. The situation was much the same with tracked and wheeled vehicles, which were essential for conducting mobile operations. The 15 mechanized divisions involved in Zitadelle had over 1,100 SPW halftracks to transport their Panzergrenadiers, but two-thirds of them belonged to von Manstein’s forces. Only three of Model’s six Panzer-Divisionen had a full Panzergrenadier Bataillon equipped with SPWs, the other three divisions either had one company or none. Losses of trucks and unarmoured halftracks during the retreats of January–March 1943 had been horrendous and not easily replaced. While the introduction of the highly-mobile Raupenschlepper Ost (RSO) tracked vehicles was a welcome addition, a number of Panzer-Divisionen were beginning to use Panje horses and carts for moving supplies; for example, the 18.Panzer-Division only had 68 per cent of its authorized motor vehicles, so it was given 1,900 horses to make up the transport deficit. The demotorization of the German forces in the East was beginning.
Von Manstein intended to mount his part of Zitadelle with Hoth’s 4.PzAOK (II. SS-Panzerkorps and XXXXVIII. Panzerkorps) and Armeeabteilung Kempf (III. Panzerkorps), which were already in place near Belgorod. His concept was essentially to blast a path through the Voronezh Front with three broad panzer wedges, supported by copious amounts of artillery and air support; it was more Verdun 1916 than Blitzkrieg 1940–41. Conscious that the Red Army might launch a spoiling attack on the Mius River to distract him from Zitadelle, von Manstein decided to leave von Mackensen’s 1.PzAOK to cover that sector with the XXIV. and XXXX. Panzerkorps, but he gave it an on-order mission to provide one of its Panzerkorps to support Hoth, if necessary. In the wake of Rokossovsky’s failed February–March offensive, von Kluge had difficulty stitching together a new front between 2.PzAOK and 2.AOK and had no forces left to mount a major offensive toward Kursk. Consequently, the OKH directed Model’s 9.AOK, which had just evacuated the Rzhev salient, to move to the southern side of the Orel salient and prepare to mount the northern pincer of Zitadelle. Model quickly recognized the difficulty of conducting a deliberate breakthrough offensive against Rokossovsky’s Central Front with his depleted units and he only fielded one relatively full-strength Panzerkorps – Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Panzerkorps). Instead, Model decided to rely heavily upon infantry and assault guns to break through Rokossovsky’s front, while keeping most of his panzers in reserve. Consequently, von Manstein and Model intended to conduct Zitadelle with very different tactics, one relying upon an armour-heavy approach and the other upon an infantry-support approach.
Although Zitadelle was to be the first deliberate German offensive in a year, neither army group was able to assemble the logistical resources to maintain a protracted offensive as in 1941–42. According to the OKH Zitadelle plan, both AOK 9 and Hoth’s PzAOK 4 were supposed to have enough supplies to enable 18 days of sustained operations. Yet even by 4 July, Model’s AOK 9 never had more than 20 per cent of the required fuel and 40 per cent of the required ammunition, and PzAOK 4 was only moderately better supplied. Most panzer units had 2–3 basic loads of ammunition and 5 V.S. of fuel, essentially enough for one week of fighting. After that, both army groups would be unable to operate with more than a few mobile divisions at a time.
While the Germans were preparing for their offensive, the Red Army was also busy preparing a warm welcome for them in the Kursk salient. At the beginning of April, Rokossovsky had Rodin’s 2TA with about 200 tanks left and a number of tank brigades, but his total armoured strength was no more than about 300–400 tanks. Despite the arrival of several tank corps from the RVGK to stop von Manstein’s final push into Belgorod, General Nikolai F. Vatutin’s Voronezh Front was in even worse shape with only a few hundred operational tanks.[18] Katukov’s 1st Tank Army (1TA) arrived during the lull, raising strength up to about 500 tanks. Initially, Stalin wanted to resume the offensive to recover Belgorod and Kharkov as soon as the weather improved, but the Stavka – chastened by von Manstein’s ‘Backhand Blow’ – urged caution. Zhukov and Vasilevsky advised Stalin that the Germans were likely to attempt a pincer attack against the Kursk salient and they recommended that the best course of action was to create a very strong anti-tank defence in the salient to break the German Panzer-Divisionen, then follow up with major counter-offensives against Heeresgruppe Mitte and Heeresgruppe Süd. Intelligence from both the Lucy spy ring in Switzerland and Allied-provided signals intelligence reports supported the Stavka’s assessment of German intentions for their summer 1943 offensive. For once, Stalin allowed himself to be persuaded and directed both the Voronezh and Central Fronts to create an impregnable defence around the Kursk salient, while a large operational reserve would be concentrated in the vicinity to conduct the counter-offensive once the German attacks had been defeated.
During the lull, the Red Army emplaced 503,663 anti-tank and 439,348 anti-personnel mines in the most likely sectors where the Germans would attack and dug three layers of entrenchments for their infantry.{78} For the first time in the war, the Red Army was able to emplace up to 1,600 mines per kilometre in the expected enemy armoured mobility corridors.{79} The Soviets also took the time to train their guards rifle units to withstand tank attacks through drills where T-34s ran over or near trenches filled with infantrymen; this time, the appearance of German tanks was not going to panic the front-line troops. Live-fire training was also conducted to improve tank-infantry cooperation.{80} In April 1943, NKO Order 0063 re-created Anti-Tank Brigades, each to be equipped with 20 45mm and 40 76.2mm anti-tank guns. These brigades provided the Red Army with the ability to mass anti-tank fire on a much larger scale than it had achieved in 1941–42.{81} Anti-tank gunners were trained to refrain from firing until approaching enemy tanks were very close, in order to improve the probability of a first-round hit and to increase penetration at point-blank range. The amount of anti-tank firepower deployed in the Kursk salient was intended to ensure that all obstacle belts were covered by fire and that wherever the German armour moved, it would be hit by flanking shots from hidden AT guns.
17
On 1 May 1943 the SS-Panzerkorps sent two of its six Panzer-Abteilungen (I./SS-Pz. Rgt. 1 from
18
Vatutin took command of the Voronezh Front on 28 March after Golikov was relieved by Stalin.