Von Manstein was incensed when he learned about the scale of tank losses in Operation Roland and he flew to Hollidt’s headquarters in Stalino. In just two days, Hollidt’s forces had lost 105 tanks, including 24 Totalausfalle, and gained very little ground. Von Manstein wanted to suspend the operation before II.SS-Panzerkorps was wrecked, but Hausser argued that he could accomplish his mission. In reality, the Waffen-SS was being built up by Nazi propaganda as an elite assault force and failure at the Mius River would have serious repercussions in the struggle for resources in the Third Reich. Himmler was in the process of establishing more Waffen-SS mechanized divisions and he could not afford for Hausser’s II.SS-Panzerkorps to fail to accomplish its mission twice in one month. Hausser was probably not high in von Manstein’s regard, given that he had openly disobeyed his orders twice before, but he agreed to let the operation continue for a few more days. Waffen-SS tactics on the first two days had been crude and costly and von Manstein urged a more methodical approach.
Hollidt assembled all available artillery and put it at Hausser’s disposal for an all-out attack on 1 August. By this time, the Germans knew where most of the Soviet artillery and anti-tank guns were located and thus the artillery preparation that started before dawn was far more effective. Prior to the ground assault, Nebelwerfer batteries created a thick smoke screen to conceal the advancing German infantry and tanks, thereby reducing the effectiveness of Soviet defensive fire. After much heavy fighting, Das Reich finally captured Stepanovka and then its panzers swept eastward, overrunning some of the anti-tank units blocking Totenkopf’s path. By 1600 hours, the centre of the Soviet defensive line was near collapse. However, Tolbukhin’s troops made one last desperate counter-attack with several thousand infantrymen that nearly overwhelmed Hausser’s exhausted troops before they could consolidate on the objective. SS-Unterscharführer Rolf Stettner, in another tank, once again fought for control of Hill 213.9:
…With all our power we sped toward the Pakfront… I ran over a Pak. Under our wheels and treads the metal crunched. We halted behind the enemy gun and raked every movement with the turret [coaxial] machine gun… I saw three T-34s moving to our left. ‘Turret! 11:00 o’clock, range 400 meters, Panzergranate 39, tank!’ the gunner calls out. ‘Ready! Fire!’ The shell hit the first T-34 under the turret. The turret hatch flew open but no one jumped out as white smoke rolled out of the hatch. The next round was loaded and ready. The second T-34 literally exploded into pieces. The next shell hit and penetrated the motor of the third T-34. It also caught fire and a black column of smoke rose high into the air.{149}
In the south, the XXIV Panzerkorps achieved a major breakthrough and advanced toward the Mius. By evening, the Soviet defence crumbled and the remaining units began retreating across the Mius. On 2 August, Hollidt’s forces advanced to the river and crushed the last resistance in the bridgehead. Tolbukhin’s forces had suffered a major defeat, leaving behind 17,895 prisoners, but the remnants of 2 GMC and 4 GMC escaped across the river. Although a tactical success, the Mius River fighting was extremely costly for the Germans. Overall, AOK 6 suffered 21,369 casualties in the 17-day battle. Hausser’s II.SS-Panzerkorps was virtually burnt-out: Totenkopf suffered 1,458 casualties in its four-day attack and was reduced to just 23 operational tanks, while Das Reich suffered nearly 1,000 casualties and was left with 22 tanks.{150} While many damaged tanks would be repaired in time, losses in Panzergrenadiers and pioniers were particularly crippling and not easy to replace. The 3. and 23.Panzer-Divisionen were also reduced to a very depleted condition and 16.Panzergrenadier-Division was wrecked (3,957 casualties between 17–31 July) by the Battle for the Mius Bridgehead. Tolbukhin’s short-lived Mius bridgehead succeeded in causing von Manstein to disperse his armour after Zitadelle and then crippling his strongest formation, II.SS-Panzerkorps.
Operation Rumyantsev, 3–23 August 1943
After the failure of Zitadelle, von Manstein believed that the Soviets would eventually mount a major offensive to retake Kharkov, as this had consistently been an objective for them. Once Hoth’s and Kempf’s forces withdrew to their original start lines, this possibility became increasingly likely. However, von Manstein also believed that it would take Vatutin’s Voronezh Front at least a month or more to recover its strength after the Battle of Kursk. In particular, he over-estimated the amount of damage that Vatutin’s two tank armies had suffered and he underestimated the ability of Soviet field workshops to repair damaged tanks. In fact, it took Vatutin just two weeks to refit his armies and prepare his own offensive, which the Stavka had designated Operation Rumyantsev.[35]
During the two weeks following the end of Zitadelle, the balance of forces had sharply changed in the Kharkov-Belgorod sector as von Manstein sent II.SS-Panzerkorps to the Mius and von Knobelsdorff’s XXXXVIII Panzerkorps lost 3.Panzer-Division to Operation Roland as well. Soviet deception efforts (Maskirovka) by 38th Army near Sumy convinced von Manstein that Vatutin might try an attack against the boundary of Hoth’s PzAOK 4 and 2.Armee, so he shifted the 7.Panzer-Division and part of 11.Panzer-Division west to that sector.{151} In addition, Großdeutschland was sent to reinforce Model’s AOK 9 and Panzer-Regiment 39 was disbanded. By the end of July, Hoth’s PzAOK 4 was a shadow of its former self, with only Generalleutnant Gustav Schmidt’s 19.Panzer-Division and Major Karl von Siver’s Panzer-Abteilung 52 in tactical reserve near Tomarovka. Schmidt’s 19.Panzer-Division had 49 tanks and assault guns, including about 20 Pz IVs, while von Sivers only had 27 operational Panthers. Armee-Abteilung-Kempf’s sole armoured reserve was Oberst Wilhelm Crisolli’s 6.Panzer-Division, which had 28 tanks (mostly Pz III). Most of Hauptmann Clemens-Heinrich Graf von Kagenek’s s.Pz.Abt. 503 was pulled back off the line to rest in Kharkov, but the six operational Tigers were left with XI Armeekorps to defend Belgorod; the handful of Tigers remaining in this critical sector demonstrates the weakness of Zetterling’s Totalausfalle-based statistics to explain the results of Kursk. Despite the fact that the s.Pz.Abt. 503 had only lost seven of its 45 Tigers as Totalausfalle during July, it still had 32 tanks awaiting repairs when the Soviet counter-offensive began. Similarly, 106 Panthers were also still under repair. Not only was the Wehrmacht not receiving enough new Panzers, but it was having greater difficulty repairing damaged ones. Altogether, Hoth and Kempf could barely scrape together 200 tanks and assault guns in the Kharkov-Belgorod sector at the beginning of August 1943.
Vatutin had begun preparations for Rumyantsev on 24 July, but the Stavka had been planning the summer counter-offensive for months. Zhukov arrived at Vatutin’s headquarters as Stavka representative and to assist in coordination between the Voronezh, Steppe and Southwest Fronts. Although Stalin pressed hard for an immediate counter-offensive, Zhukov successfully argued for granting Vatutin 10 days to finalize preparations before commencing the operation. Even with replacements, most of the Voronezh Fronts infantry units were at 60 per cent strength, which was not enough to conduct a protracted operation. Although rushed, Rumyantsev was still much better planned and organized than previous Soviet offensives and the Stavka was generous with resources; three artillery divisions were transferred to Voronezh Front and enough tank replacements to restore all Vatutin’s tank units to combat readiness. Both Katukov’s 1 TA (6 TC, 31 TC, 3 MC) and Rotmistrov’s 5 GTA (18 TC, 29 TC, 5 GMC) were brought back up nearly to authorized strength in terms of tanks and personnel, but at least one-third would be seeing combat for the first time. As Andrei L. Getman, commander of 6 TC noted:
35
Named after Count Pyotr A. Rumyantsev-Zadonaisky (1725–96), one of Catherine the Great’s generals. The Stavka named a number of large operations after heroes from Catherine’s wars and the later Napoleonic Wars, including Rumyantsev, Kutusov, Suvorov and Bagration. The Communist ability to use the names of formerly-reviled aristocrats to add lustre to military operations was amazing, akin to Orwell’s ‘double-think’.