Schmidt’s 19.Panzer-Division and the LII Armeekorps fared poorly during the retreat and lacked the firepower of Siver’s Panthers. They had to run a gauntlet with the 27th Army on one side and the 5 GA on the other, making it a shooting gallery for the Soviets. Schmidt’s headquarters was ambushed on 7 August and he and his aid opted to commit suicide near Borisovka.{154} The remnants of the 19.Panzer-Division that reached Akhtyrka were so combat ineffective that they could not even contribute to the defence of the town. The 255.Infanterie-Division was so demolished in the retreat that it was disbanded and the 332.Infanterie-Division simply disappeared from a German Lage Ost situation maps, with the survivors sent rearward to reorganize. German accounts tend to emphasize Soviet tank losses during this phase of Rumyantsev, while skimming over the fact that Heeresgruppe Süd’s infantry was being eviscerated by one hammer blow after another.
Once the scale of the Soviet breakthrough became apparent, von Manstein immediately requested the return of Großdeutschland from Heeresgruppe Mitte and moved the 7. and 11.Panzer-Divisionen from the quiet Sumy sector to reinforce the battered LII Armeekorps. He also managed to get the 18.Panzer-Division from Heeresgruppe Mitte and placed it under Breith’s III. Panzerkorps, which he intended to use to plug the growing gap between Hoth’s PzAOK 4 and Kempf’s forces. However, Katukov’s and Rotmistov’s armour had already created a deep, 50km-wide penetration by the time that these additional forces began to arrive. Kravchenko’s 5 GTC had advanced the furthest. German Panzer units were forced to move straight into combat from their rail unloading sites, with little knowledge of enemy strength or dispositions. In fact, enemy pressure was constantly increasing during Rumyantsev since Vatutin deliberately chose to commit his armies in echelon, meaning that additional formations kept joining the offensive to sustain operational momentum and keep the Germans off balance.
On the morning of 6 August, the 18th Tank Corps from 5 GTA fought its way into the town of Zolochev against negligible resistance.[36] Later that day, General-major Andrei L. Getman’s 6th Tank Corps from 1 TA fought its way into Bogodukhov; the loss of 700 tons of fuel in the supply depot was a major blow for Breith’s III. Panzerkorps. One of the first Soviet T-34s that fought its way into Bogodukhov was commanded by Leytenant Ivan M. Ivchenko, who had lived in this town before the war. When Ivchenko drove down the street, his wife recognized him and came running out of the house with his young son; Westerners often forget that this war was one of liberation for the Red Army, with troops having a personal stake in the outcome.{155} The loss of both these towns also threatened the German lines of communications to Kharkov. However, when Katukov and Rotmistrov began advancing south of the Merla River, they had unexpected meeting engagements with the first major reinforcements arriving for Hoth’s PzAOK 4. The 18 TC ran into the 3.Panzer-Division south of Zolochev and General-major Semyon M. Krivoshein’s 3rd Mechanized Corps ran into the lead elements of SS-Gruppenführer Walter Krüger’s Das Reich (the reconnaissance battalion, two Panzergrenadier-Bataillonen and 20 assault guns). In both cases, the meeting engagements did not go well for the Soviet armoured units and the entire corps needed to deploy and prepare for a hasty attack. Rotmistrov reinforced 18 TC with the Skvortsov’s 5 GMC and launched several attacks against 3. Panzer-Division on 7–8 August; the Germans were forced to give up some ground, but inflicted significant losses on Rotmistrov’s two corps. Likewise, Katukov sent General-major Dmitry Kh. Chernienko’s 31st Tank Corps to reinforce Krivoshein and together they were able to push Das Reich back on 7–8 August. Neither side had much in the way of infantry or artillery support during these actions, which devolved into a series of company and battalion-size engagements. Hoth had no infantry in this sector and he was forced to use his precious motorized forces as blocking detachments, which was not the way that Panzer-Divisionen were supposed to be employed. On the other hand, Vatutin had to divert considerable forces from the 6 GA and 27th Army to deal with German hedgehogs at Borisovka and Grayvoron, which severely limited infantry support to Katukov during this critical moment of the exploitation phase.
On the night of 8–9 August, the lead elements of Katukov’s 1 TA, Getman’s 6 TC, reached the Merchyk River, which put them within striking distance of severing the main east-west rail line to Kharkov. There were virtually no German forces in this wide gap between Breith’s III Panzerkorps and the remnants of the LII Armeekorps and XXXXVIII Panzerkorps concentrated near Akhtyrka. However, the lead elements of SS-Brigadeführer Hermann Priess’ Totenkopf were rushing to establish blocking positions along the Merchyk. When Morgunov’s 200th Tank Brigade attacked the town of Murafa on 9 August, he was able to seize the town and a crossing over the river without much trouble, but then ran into the SS-Totenkopf-Aufklärungs-Abteilung, which was screening on the other side. Polkovnik Mikhail T. Leonov’s 112th Tank Brigade had an even ruder surprise when it tried to seize another crossing at Oleksandrivka and ran into two battalions from the SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 3. Leonov’s initial attack on the town failed.
While Katukov and Rotmistrov was struggling to push south and envelop Kharkov, the 27th and 40th Armies were pushing westward toward Akhtyrka with the help of three tank corps (2 TC, 10 TC, 4 GTC) to expand the Voronezh Front’s breakthrough. The LII Armeekorps and XXXXVIII Panzerkorps had established a thin line between Akhtyrka and Trostyanets with the Großdeutschland, 7. and 11.Panzer-Divisionen to try and prevent the Soviet advance from demolishing any link between Hoth’s PzAOK 4 and 2.Armee. By the morning of 9 August, General-major Vasily M. Alekseev’s 10th Tank Corps, acting as the mobile group for 40th Army, was threatening the rail junction at Trostyanets. Most of Großdeutschland’s armour was still en route, but a small Kampfgruppe with four Tigers from 13.Panzer-Regiment Großdeutschland and seven Panthers from 4.Panzer-Abteilung 51 were assembled and sent to stop Alekseev’s tanks.[37] On paper, this small Kampfgruppe should have been a formidable force, but it lacked any kind of support or information about enemy dispositions. En route to Trostyanets, one Panther’s engine caught fire and burnt out. Approaching the town, the Kampfgruppe was engaged by numerous anti-tank guns and T-34s concealed in a wooded area; the Panther’s long 7.5cm gun claimed several victims but when the tanks imprudently moved into the town, they were engaged at point-blank range. Here, Aleekseev’s tankers were fighting as a combined arms team, with infantry, anti-tank guns and tanks working together, whereas the Germans were disadvantaged as an armour-pure force. Two Tigers and five Panthers were knocked out and abandoned, with the remaining three tanks beating a hasty retreat.{156}
On 10 August, General-major Pavel P. Poluboyarov’s 4 GTC tried to rush Akhtyrka with two of his tank brigades before Großdeutschland arrived in strength, but the rest of Panzer-Abteilung 51’s Panthers detrained in the town just before they arrived. A screen of Panthers met Poluboyarov’s T-34s outside Akhtyrka and repelled their attack, but the lack of pre-battle preparation was costly for the Germans. A total of 11 Panthers were knocked out against 16 T-34s, which was not a very favorable exchange ratio. After this rebuff, Poluboyarov tried to envelop Akhtyrka, since there was a large gap with no German forces to the south of the town. Kravchenko’s 5 GTC was sent into this gap, advancing against negligible opposition.
36
General-major Boris S. Bakharov was relieved of command after Prokhorovka – one of the few heads to roll for that disaster. Thereafter, the 18 TC was commanded by his deputy for a time.
37
Panzer-Abteilung 51 had been sent to Bryansk to refit after