The foremost modification to German Bewegungskrieg was a realization that Luftwaffe close air support was no longer a given. While the Luftwaffe could still occasionally muster substantial numbers of Ju-87 Stukas and bombers for a major operation like Zitadelle in mid-1943, most relief efforts would receive modest air support at best. The declining ability of the Luftwaffe to support offensive operations meant that manoeuvre units required more organic firepower in order to blast their way through stout defences. At the beginning of the war, German Panzer-Divisionen relied upon speed to accomplish their missions, not firepower or armoured protection. The Pz II, Pz III and Pz IV had been adequate, even against the occasional T-34 or KV-1, as long as the Luftwaffe was available. Indeed, the units that normally formed the Panzer-Division’s Vorausabteilung (advance guard) were the divisional Aufklärungs-Abteilung (Reconnaissance Battalion) and Kradschützen-Abteilung, equipped primarily with armoured cars and motorcycles. However, the increase in Soviet defensive capabilities by late 1942 meant that thin-skinned German tanks and motorcycle units could no longer easily penetrate the enemy’s front line as they had in the past. Thus, due to the shortfall in close air support and improved Soviet defences, German tactics shifted from an emphasis upon speed and mobility, to tactics based upon shock effect and firepower.
Reflective of this trend, in January 1943 the organization of Panzer-Divisionen was modified and all Kradschützen-Abteilungen and the Aufklärungs-Abteilungen were supposedly merged into a new Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung, although it took most of 1943 to implement this new structure. The Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung was a powerful armoured force, authorized 122 halftracks and 18 armoured cars, which gave it the ability to ‘fight for intelligence’ rather than act merely as scouts. As this new structure was introduced, the reconnaissance battalions in German Panzer and Panzergrenadier Divisionen became de facto manoeuvre units and were often used as such. German tactical doctrine was revised to assign a variety of potential missions to these versatile units, including advance guard, rearguard and even counter-attacks.
Another major modification to German manoeuvre doctrine was an increased emphasis upon zone defence, decentralized operations and local counter-attacks. Although German doctrine preferred to maintain a Hauptkampflinie (HKL or main line of resistance) with infantry divisions and to keep Panzer-Divisionen in reserve in the rear, this was no longer possible by January 1943. By that point, most Panzer-Divisionen in Heeresgruppe A and B were forced to hold their own sector of the front, which deprived the army commander of mobile reserves. When a Soviet breakthrough in another sector occurred, local infantry corps commanders would demand that the nearest Panzer-Division respond by dispatching a Kampfgruppen to launch a counter-attack; the inevitable result was that Panzer-Divisionen in defence were parcelled out into small Kampfgruppen to support various hard-pressed infantry units, losing mass and being diluted into the ‘driblets’ that Guderian had decried in 1939–40. Rather than being used properly as an independent manoeuvre force, German panzers were increasingly likely to be used to stiffen infantry units in the defence or mount company-size counter-attacks.
Of course, German tanks and other armoured vehicles were evolving rapidly by 1943, based upon two years of combat experience on the Eastern Front. Several painful encounters with the superior Soviet T-34 and KV-1 tanks had caused the Germans to question the value of their existing tanks and to seek a technical solution that would ensure German armoured superiority. The resulting OKH Panzer Commissions of July and October 1941 began the process of defining the requirements for a new medium tank which resulted in the development of the Panther tank in 1942.{9} As 1943 began, the Pz V Panther was about to begin serial production and was expected to re-equip one tank battalion in each Panzer-Divisionen as soon as possible. While the Pz V had far superior gunnery capabilities compared to earlier German models, it was a medium tank in name only and its 44-ton bulk would be far too heavy to cross existing tactical bridges. The Panther was also a fuel-hog that used double the amount of fuel to move 100km compared to a Pz III and, like the 54-ton Tiger, it was difficult to recover on the battlefield. Taken together, the shift to reliance upon heavily-armoured and up-gunned tanks like the Panther and Tiger meant that previous German mobile tactics became impractical; these tanks could not slash cross-country, covering up to 100km in a day, and would have to rely upon shock effect rather than manoeuvre.
The introduction of so many turret-less assault guns and thin-skinned Panzerjäger like the Marder series also caused the Germans to revise their armoured doctrine. In the first two years of combat on the Eastern Front, German medium tanks – often outgunned by the T-34 – had learned to manoeuvre in close and seek the opportunity for flank shots. These aggressive tactics usually succeeded for a number of reasons and often resulted in Soviet positions being overrun. Yet while tanks could still overrun an enemy-held position in 1943, it was usually inadvisable to attempt this with assault guns or Panzerjäger, which were better suited for defensive combat. The real threat was concealed enemy anti-tank guns, which were very difficult to spot from a vehicle like a StuG-III assault gun. Instead, the Germans increasingly began to favour long-range, stand-off engagements so that their assault guns and Panzerjäger would not be put at risk from enemy anti-tank guns or infantry ambushes, but this removed a great deal of the shock effect from German armoured operations.
German Tank Training
In the first years of the Second World War, Germany was able to maintain very high standards of training for its Panzertruppen, which gave them an enormous tactical edge over their opponents. However, the edge was beginning to dull as casualties mounted in 1941–42 and the German training system could not keep pace with losses. For example, during the Caucasus Campaign in 1942, the three Panzer-Divisionen (3., 13., 23.) in von Kleist’s 1.Panzerarmee were suffering an average of 600–1,200 casualties per month, including 150–300 killed.{10} Over the course of four months from July–October 1942, this amounted to 3,000 casualties for 3.Panzer-Division, including 600 dead or missing. Throughout 1942, the 23.Panzer-Division suffered a total of 6,569 casualties, including 2,079 dead or missing; 16.8 per cent of these casualties were in Panzer-Regiment 201 (including 331 dead or missing).{11} Although Panzertruppen losses were much lower than the Panzergrenadiers, a much higher proportion of tanker casualties were officers or NCOs. Nor were losses only due to enemy action; in addition to frostbite casualties in the long winter months, diseases such as typhus inflicted significant losses on German Panzertruppen – one Panzer Kompanie in Panzer-Regiment 35 suffered 12 dead from this cause.{12} Approximately two-thirds of all wounded returned to duty with their units. Thus while losses could vary greatly depending upon the operational tempo, the average Panzer-Division on the Eastern Front required something like 400–500 replacement tankers per year in order to keep a 960-man Panzer-Regiment up to authorized strength.
Replacements for the Panzer-Divisionen on the Eastern Front came from the affiliated Panzer-Ersatz-Abteilung in their home Wehrkreis. For example, the 23.Panzer-Division received its Panzertruppen replacements from Panzer-Ersatz-Abteilung 7 in Wehrkreis V (Stuttgart). In theory, a replacement unit like this could train up to about 1,000 new enlisted recruits per year – well above the loss rates on the Eastern Front – but many fewer officers and NCOs. Yet not all recruits passed basic training (some were reassigned to other branches) and even among graduates, not all went to replace combat losses. Obergefreiter Armin Bottger spent two years in a replacement battalion along with a number of his fellow tankers, ferrying tanks to railheads and working at the OKH tank depot at Sagan, before finally going to the front.{13} By mid-war, the Heer had a long logistical tail and replacements were siphoned off to a myriad of other training and non-combat duties. When the 12 Panzer-Abteilungen were destroyed at Stalingrad, thousands of replacements were diverted to rebuild these units – at the expense of the units in the East. Consequently, the front-line Panzer-Regiments on the Eastern Front generally received 1:1 replacements for enlisted tank crewmen, but an insufficient number of junior officers and NCOs.