Through great effort by the Instandsetzungsgrupe, the 23.Panzer-Division was able to repair 15 tanks by 7 October, including some of Fechner’s Panthers.{187} General der Panzertruppe Friedrich Kirchner, commander of LVII Panzerkorps, decided to commit both the 23.Panzer-Division and Großdeutschland to a joint counter-attack at Annovka and Borodaivka, in order to threaten the Soviet bridge site. On 8 October, Fechner’s Panthers attacked Soviet infantry at Annovka and managed to knock out three T-34s and 11 anti-tank guns, without loss. However, Großdeutschland’s attack on 9 October was poorly organized and five Tigers advanced toward Borodaivka without close infantry support. On this occasion, the Tiger’s powerful main gun and thick armour did not save them; all five tanks were surrounded and picked off at close range by concealed anti-tank guns and infantry tank destroyer teams. At least two crews were captured, the rest killed – a net loss of 25 Tiger crewmen.{188} Following this disaster, the German counter-attacks diminished somewhat, which allowed Konev a breathing space to begin moving the lead elements of Rotmistrov’s 5 GTA into the Myshuryn Rog bridgehead on the night of 14–15 October.
On the morning of 15 October, the Soviet 37th Army and 7th Guards Army attacked the thinly-held German perimeter south of Myshuryn Rog with four guards airborne divisions and three rifle divisions, following a massive artillery preparation. Rotmistrov was only able to contribute the 7 MC and part of 18 TC on the afternoon of the first day of the offensive.{189} Vormann’s 23.Panzer-Division was holding this sector with the depleted Panzergrenadier-Regiment 128 and divisional pioniers, but they were quickly overrun by this avalanche of men and tanks. Vormann committed his eight remaining tanks, but lost three Pz IVs when they encountered JSU-152 self-propelled guns and a wall of anti-tank guns. The remaining five German tanks retreated and Vormann’s other Panzergrenadier-Regiment was nearly surrounded by Soviet armour, so the entire 23.Panzer-Division fell back. Although seven of Rotmistrov’s T-34s were knocked out in the opening skirmishes, the German tankers noted that Soviet tanks had learned to use dead space to manoeuvre in order to reduce their vulnerability to anti-tank fire.{190} The Red Army was learning.
On 16 October, Rotmistrov brought the rest of 18 TC and 29 TC across the Dnepr and pressed the attack, quickly forcing the 23.Panzer-Division back, which created a 10km-wide gap in the German front. A Soviet tank brigade pressed into the gap, overrunning the 23.Panzer-Division’s Flak-Bataillon, then pushing on to attack Großdeutschland’s divisional command post. Although Vormann managed to gather up three Panthers and three Pz IVs to conduct a mobile screen in the gap, they offered little serious resistance to Rotmistrov’s mass of armour. By the third day of the offensive, Rotmistrov’s armour had achieved a clear breakthrough and surged forward to overrun Vormann’s command post and support units in Popel’naste. Although the Germans claimed to have knocked out many of Rotmistrov’s tanks, the fact is that Soviet tanks were roaming in the rear areas, shooting up German support units. Both 23.Panzer-Division and Großdeutschland were forced to abandon many damaged tanks at workshops, leaving them with a combined total of about 12–15 operational tanks. Rotmistrov kept the pressure on, continuing to advance at night, in order to prevent the Germans from forming a new line. Soon, Kirchner’s LVII Panzerkorps headquarters was threatened by Soviet tanks and had to flee, causing a disruption in German C2 at a critical moment. Panic set in, as German support units fled rearward without orders – not unlike French troops in May 1940. It just got worse and worse for PzAOK 1, as Rotmistrov’s armoured fist exploited rapidly to the south. In life, there are few experiences as exhilarating as an armoured pursuit of a broken enemy and this must have been a heady moment for Rotmistrov’s tankers, as well as sweet revenge for Prokhorovka.
Vormann’s 23.Panzer-Division tried to mount a defence of the rail station at P’yatykhatky, but this effort fell apart and Soviet tanks reached the virtually undefended town at 2030 hours on 18 October. At the train station, the Soviet desant troops on the T-34s discovered flatcars loaded with 10 brand-new Tiger tanks, destined for Großdeutschland.{191} Another train in the station was discovered loaded with wounded German troops, who were unceremoniously dispatched by the victorious Soviet Desantniki with grenades and small arms. Meanwhile, a massive column with over 3,000 German vehicles was fleeing from the as yet unoccupied southern side of the town. Spotting the escaping enemy, Soviet T-34s fired high explosive rounds into the column, inciting a panic.{192} Vormann’s 23.Panzer-Division was wrecked, with only 10 tanks left, 30 men in Panzergrenadier-Regiment 126 and 29 in Panzergrenadier-Regiment 129. Having shattered the connection between PzAOK 1 and AOK 8, Konev was faced with the decision of whether to push west to Kirovograd to roll up AOK 8’s right flank or south to Krivoi Rog, to threaten PzAOK 1’s line of communications. He opted to split his forces and attempt to seize both objectives: Skvortsov’s 5 GMC and the 53rd Army would push toward Kirovograd while the 18 TC and 29 TC advanced to Krivoi Rog. The Germans were literally reeling from the Soviet armoured breakthrough and resistance was patchy, which allowed the 5 GMC to reach Novo Starodub on the Inhulets River on 22 October and the rest of Rotmistrov’s 5 GTA reached the outskirts of Krivoi Rog on 27 October. Mackensen’s PzAOK 1 was threatened with envelopment by the Soviet advance, which forced him to abandon Dnepropetrovsk on 25 October. Malinovsky’s 3rd Ukrainian Front swarmed across the Dnepr with three armies.
Time and again, the Germans proved themselves adept at recovering from tactical setbacks, just as the Soviets demonstrated great difficulty in logistically sustaining deep armoured penetrations. Fortuitously, Rotmistrov’s fuel supplies in his forward tank brigades dwindled just as the Germans received powerful armoured reinforcements from the West. Both the 14. and 24.Panzer-Divisionen had been destroyed at Stalingrad in February, but now eight months later they reappeared on the Eastern Front. These units were the first of a new breed of watered-down Panzer-Divisionen, each equipped with 49 Pz IV tanks and 44 StuG III assault guns, configured primarily for mobile defensive operations. Von Manstein directed both fresh Panzer-Divisionen to assemble in Kirovograd. Major Willing’s s.Pz.Abt.506 was sent from Zaporozhe to defend Krivoi Rog. The 11.Panzer-Division and Totenkopf were also moved to support this sector. General der Panzertruppe Sigfrid Henrici’s XXXX Panzerkorps took control over the bulk of these forces and began planning a counter-attack to cut off Rotmistrov’s spearheads. However, only a week before the German counter-offensive was to begin, Henrici was sent into the Fuhrer Reserve and the XXXX Panzerkorps was handed over to General der Gebirgstruppen Ferdinand Schörner, who was flown in from Finland. This was an amazing example of Hitler’s interference in tactical matters. Not only did Schörner have no experience with mechanized operations, but he also had no experience with combat in the main war zone in Russia. Yet Hitler had not chosen Schörner randomly. He was selected because of his fanatical command style and devotion to the Nazi regime. When the chips were down, Hitler chose political reliability over professional skill.