Although he was on the ropes, von Manstein recognized that the Soviet advance was slowing due to a combination of casualties and supply difficulties. He believed that if he could cut off and destroy Katukov’s armoured spearheads, Vatutin’s offensive would cease. With great difficulty, von Manstein managed to assemble a considerable counter-attack force consisting of the LSSAH, 16.Panzer-Division and 101.Jager-Division under von Vormann’s XXXXVII Panzerkorps by 21 January. Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohnke’s LSSAH had 50 operational tanks and 27 assault guns left (including 1 Tiger, 22 Panthers, 25 Pz IV), but its two Panzergrendier Regiments had barely 30 per cent of their authorized strength. The 16.Panzer-Division was one of the strongest formations in PzAOK 4, with more than 60 operational tanks, including 38 Panthers and 24 Pz IV. As an experiment, von Manstein ordered the formation of Schwere Panzer-Regiment Bäke (34 Tigers and 46 Panthers), which was formed from s.Pz.Abt.503 and parts of 6.Panzer-Division; this was the first time that Tigers and Panthers had been integrated in the same unit. At 0600 hours on 24 January, von Vormann’s strike force launched a slashing attack into Katukov’s right flank east of Vinnitsa. Although Katukov was surprised by the appearance of over 200 German AFVs, he quickly shifted anti-tank guns into this sector and ordered his troops to emplace mines, which made German heavy tanks move cautiously. Due to the disruption of logistical bases, Schwere Panzer-Regiment Bäke ran out of ammunition on the second day of the operation and fuel shortages were also a recurring problem. Breith’s III Panzerkorps (6. and 17.Panzer-Divisionen) was added to the counter-offensive, now dubbed Operation Vatutin, which culminated with several small encirclents on 30 January. Von Manstein claimed to have killed or captured 13,500 Soviet troops and knocked out 701 tanks and self-propelled guns.{8} Von Manstein’s claims were slightly exaggerated; Soviet records indicate that Vatutin’s entire front lost 513 tanks and 146 self-propelled guns during the last 10 days of January, suggesting that von Manstein’s counter-attack probably accounted for 300–400 enemy AFVs.{9} Furthermore, none of Katukov’s brigade commanders from either the 8 GMC or 11 GTC were casualties during this period, which one would expect if the bulk of 1 TA had been destroyed. Schwere Panzer-Regiment Bäke claimed to have knocked out 267 tanks in return for the loss of three Tigers and four Panthers, a purported 38–1 kill ratio. In fact, the German claims were nonsense. Operation Vatutin managed to temporarily force 1 TA onto the defensive and inflicted heavy material losses, but von Manstein’s inflated claims were made in order to conceal the fact that his counter-stroke failed to alter the deteriorating situation.
While von Manstein was focused on Katukov, Vatutin was forming a new tank army for his next operation. On 20 January, General-leytenant Andrei G. Kravchenko took command of 6th Tank Army, comprised of Volkhov’s 5 MC and Alekseev’s 5 GTC; it was not a full-strength formation, totalling just 160 tanks and 50 self-propelled guns.{10} Volkhov’s 5 MC had recently been reequipped with Lend-Lease M4A2 Sherman tanks.{11} On 26 January, Vatutin attacked the German VII Armeekorps with the 40th Army but his main effort failed to achieve a breakthrough. Surprisingly, a supporting attack against the over-extended XXXXII Armeekorps achieved a minor breakthrough and Kravchenko sent a mobile group under General-major Mikhail I. Savelev from 5 MC to exploit the gap. Savelev’s mobile group consisted of the 233rd Tank Brigade (equipped with Sherman tanks), a regiment of Su-76, a motorized rifle battalion and an anti-tank battery.{12} However, Kravchenko was unable to send the rest of the 5 MC after Savelev, since Vatutin was concerned by Breith’s counter-attack against 1 TA and ordered Kravchenko to send part of the corps to reinforce Katukov. Consequently, Kravchenko’s 6 TA was reduced to barely 100 tanks just as it was achieving a major success.
Meanwhile, Konev renewed his offensive against Wöhler’s AOK 8 on 25 January and overwhelmed the over-extended 389.Infanterie-Division, then quickly committed Rotmistrov’s 5 GTA (20 TC, 29 TC) with 323 tanks. Rotmistrov’s armoured wedge also forced the burnt-out 14.Panzer-Division to retreat. After 24 hours of fighting, Rotmistrov was able to squeeze the 20 TC and 29 TC through a gap in the German lines and they pushed west against negligible resistance. Wöhler mounted a quick counter-attack with the 11.Panzer-Division (15 tanks and 15 assault guns) which temporarily succeeded in severing the line of communications behind the two advancing Soviet tank corps, but lacked the strength to do any more.{13} By 27 January, Rotmistrov’s armour was rapidly pushing west and close to linking up with Savelev’s mobile goup. The only hope to reverse this dangerous situation was Major Glässgen’s I.Pz.Rgt.26 which had only arrived from Germany two weeks before, and it was quickly attached to XXXXVII Panzerkorps to cut off Rotmistrov’s spearheads. Although the battalion had not yet seen combat, it already lost a dozen tanks disabled with mechanical problems and the 75km march to its assembly area cost it another Panther destroyed by engine fire and four broken down.{14} Clearly, the ‘teething problems’ associated with Zitadelle were still not resolved.
At 0600 hours on 28 January, the I.Pz.Rgt.26 attacked northward with 61 Panthers to Kapitanovka to link up with Major von Siver’s Panthers from 11.Panzer-Division. In complete disregard for combined arms tactics, the attack was begun without infantry, artillery, air support or even reconnaissance, so Glässgen’s inexperienced Panther crews moved blindly into a meeting engagement with an enemy of unknown strength. As it turned out, Konev had moved strong anti-tank units into this sector and General-major Vasily I. Polozkov’s 18 TC was in the process of reopening the road. The German attack was a four-star fiasco, with the Panthers being engaged repeatedly in flank by anti-tank ambushes; Major Glässgen and two of his company commanders were killed, 10 Panthers were destroyed and 18 damaged. Another 16 Panthers broke-down from engine defects, leaving I.Pz.Rgt.26 with just 17 operational Panthers. While Polozkov’s 18 TC lost 29 T-34s in the action, he succeeded in reopening the road to Rotmistrov’s two tank corps that were driving west.{15}
On 28 January, Podpolkovnik Ivan I. Proshin was pushing his 155th Tank Brigade forward as fast as possible, as the advance guard of 20 TC. By the afternoon, his lead tanks had reached the town of Zvenigorodka, which was a German supply base. After scattering rear area troops, Proshin secured the town and around 1800 hours the lead Sherman tanks from Savelev’s mobile group arrived, which created a link-up between 6 TA and 5 GTA.{16} A total of 59,000 German troops from the VII and XXXXII Armeekorps were now isolated in the Korsun pocket, comprising SS-Wiking, four infantry divisions (57, 72, 88 and 389) and two Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen (228, 239). The German forces within the Korsun pocket were quickly redeployed for all-around defence and were redesignated as Gruppe Stemmerman, after General der Artillerie Wilhelm Stemmermann, commander of XXXXII Armeekorps. Amazingly, Hitler refused to allow Gruppe Stemmermann to conduct a breakout and ordered the Luftwaffe to begin an airlift and von Manstein to mount a ground rescue operation. It was Stalingrad all over again, on a somewhat smaller scale. Von Manstein was determined not to repeat the mistakes of Stalingrad, but it would take several days to organize a relief effort and, in the meantime, he had to create a new frontline in the vacuum south of the Soviet encirclement. Both Konev and Vatutin began pushing infantry units into the corridor to hold the ring around Gruppe Stemmermann, while the 29 TC advanced to expand the ring before the Germans could rush units to the new front.