Surprised by the rebuff at Tirgu Fromos, Konev urged Bogdanov’s 2 TA to push toward Podu Iloaie with 3 TC, 16 TC and two rifle divisions. However, the 24.Panzer-Division mounted a series of small armoured counter-attacks on 12–13 April that completely halted Bogdanov’s advance. Likewise, the German armour concentration at Jassy fended off all efforts by Bogdanov to move in that direction as well. Further south, the XXXX Panzerkorps mounted a strong defence at Orgeev with the 3., 11. and 13.Panzer-Divisionen which slowed the 4th Guards Army’s crossing of the Dniester. By mid-April, Konev was forced to shift to the defence across his front and await replacements to restore his dulled combat capabilities. Consequently, German tactical victories at Tirgu Fromos, Podu Iloaie and Jassy prevented Konev from pushing rapidly into Romania and gave Heeresgruppe Südukraine a short, but valuable respite.
Meanwhile, Malinovsky’s 3rd Ukrainian Front succeeded in liberating Odessa on the morning of 10 April, but efforts to encircle the eastern half of AOK 6 with General-leytenant Issa A. Pliev’s tank-cavalry mobile group (4 GMC, 4 GCC) failed.{32} Instead, Malinovsky pursued Hollidt’s retreating AOK 6 to the Dniester River with four armies and managed to seize a number of small bridgeheads over the river before the Axis defence gelled. However, the Stavka pulled Pliev’s cavalry group back to refit and Malinovsky was left only with the depleted 23 TC and a few tank brigades, which were insufficient to expand the bridgeheads. Instead, Axis resistance noticeably stiffened and AOK 6 fortified high ground overlooking the tiny bridgeheads and repulsed all of Malinovsky’s attempts to break out for the next several weeks.
Embarrassed by his initial defeats at Tirgu Fromos, Konev used the last half of April to prepare for a second round. He brought up General-polkovnik Mikhail S. Shumilov’s relatively fresh 7th Guards Army (seven rifle divisions and the 27 GTB) to be the main battering ram against Wöhler’s lines to the west of Tirgu Fromos and Rotmistrov’s partly-rebuilt 5 GTA to be the exploitation force. General-leytenant Sergei G. Trofimenko’s 27th Army (seven rifle divisions and two tank regiments) would mount a supporting attack northeast of Tirgu Fromos, with Bogdanov’s 2 TA ready to exploit a breakthrough. Rotmistrov would deploy the 18 TC and 29 TC with 231 tanks (incl. 183 T-34) and 87 self-propelled guns. In addition, the RVGK reinforced Rotmistrov with the 14th and 53rd Guards Heavy Tank Regiments, each with about 20 of the new JS-2 heavy tanks. Rotmistrov had also received some of the new T-34/85 medium tanks.{33} Boganov’s 2 TA was considerably weaker, with the 3 GTC, 16 TC and 11 GTB having a total of just 98 tanks (75 T-34, 16 JS-2 heavy tanks, 5 JS-85 heavy tanks and 2 Churchills) and 23 self-propelled guns (18 SU-152 and 5 SU-85).{34} Due to the lack of combat-ready independent tank brigades, Konev was forced to use both 5 GTA and 2 TA in the infantry support role, which left him with no armoured reserve for exploitation. Nevertheless, Konev could commit nearly 500 AFVs in his two tank armies, which he believed provided him with a 4–1 or better numerical superiority in armour. Assisted by three artillery divisions, Konev expected to blast his way through Wöhler’s front and push on deep into the interior of Romania.
In fact, Konev’s offensive planning was based upon faulty intelligence. Kirchner’s LVII Panzerkorps used the Großdeutschland to anchor the defence at Tirgu Fromos, but had to rely upon Romanian units to cover both flanks. The Romanian infantry was poorly equipped and suffered from poor morale, but Brigadier-General Radu Korne’s 1st Armoured Division still had some fight left in it. In September 1943 Germany had begun to provide Romania with Pz IV tanks and Korne’s division had several dozen Pz IVs and a dozen StuG-III assault guns, as well as some SPWs for its infantry. Von Manteuffel’s Großdeutschland had 36–39 operational tanks (22 Pz IV, 6–7 Tigers and 8–10 Panthers) in Oberst Willy Langkeit’s Panzer-Regiment, and the division still had a number of assault guns.{35} Generalleutnant Maximilian Freiherr von Edelsheim’s 24.Panzer-Division, deployed at Podul-Iloaie, was also available to support Kirchner with 15 Pz IVs and nine StuG-IIIs.[44] Although Totenkopf had lost all its tanks and many of its vehicles during the retreat to the Dniester, it had just received some replacements and Wöhler ordered it to form a mobile Kampfgruppe as an operational reserve for LVII Panzerkorps; by evening of 1 May SS-Sturmbannführer Fritz Beiermeier formed a group consisting of 24 Pz IV tanks, II.SS-Pz.Gr.Rgt.6 and a battery of assault guns. The German troops had used the three weeks at Tirgu Fromos wisely, digging in deeply and laying minefields. For once, the Germans had something like a defence in depth and adequate mobile reserves. Furthermore, German intelligence knew where the enemy was about to strike.
At 0515 hours on 2 May, Konev began his offensive with a massive 60-minute artillery barrage that laid waste to some of the enemy’s front-line positions. Then at 0615 hours, Shumilov’s 7 GA attacked with eight reinforced rifle divisions, followed by waves of tanks from General-major Evgeny I. Fominykh’s 29 TC. The Grenadier-Regiment Großdeutschland was hard hit and partly overrun, with at least one company nearly destroyed. Interestingly, even in an elite unit like Großdeutschland, Panzergrenadiers still relied upon the hand-delivered Hafthohlladung (hollow charge magnetic mine) for close-combat with tanks since the new Panzerfaust was not yet available in quantity.
However, Fominykh’s tankers failed to spot a battery of concealed assault guns, which blasted the lead Soviet tank battalion from the point-blank range of 300 metres. Then von Manteuffel committed Langkeit’s Panzer-Regiment Großdeutschland in an expertly-executed counter-attack, which virtually slaughtered the remainder of Fominykh’s T-34s. As the Soviet attack ebbed, Langkeit’s Panzers came under long-range fire from 13 JS-2 heavy tanks from the 14th Guards Separate Heavy Tank Regiment.{36} Langkeit brought up Oberleutnant Fritz Stadler’s eight Tigers and the first battle between the latest Soviet and German heavy tanks began at a range of over 2,000 metres. Technically, the Soviet 122mm D-25T gun had better penetration than the German 8.8cm KwK 36 at this kind of range, but the Soviet tankers lacked the training to achieve accuracy over this distance. Von Manteuffel saw rounds from the Tigers strike the enemy heavy tanks, but they ‘all bounced off.’ The IS-2 had a much lower rate of fire than the Tiger and only eight BR-471 APHE rounds each, so they fired sparingly. Stadler decided to move in closer and probably told his crews to switch to Panzergranate 40 APCR with tungsten cores.[45] This time, from a range of about 1,800 metres, the Tigers were able to destroy four IS-2, which caused the rest to retreat. Langkeit aggressively ordered a company of Pz IVs to pursue the retreating enemy heavy tanks and they were able to close within 1,000 metres and knock out a few more with shots into the rear armour.
While von Manteuffel was focused on his left flank, two more Soviet rifle divisions and General-major Ivan A. Vovchenko’s 3 GTC tried to overrun his Füsilier-Regiment. Langkeit sent his other company of Pz IVs to this sector and von Edelsheim also sent part of an armoured Kampfgruppe, which resulted in Vovchenko’s tankers being hit on both flanks and losing more than 30 tanks in a one-sided action. Ironically, Shumilov’s 7 GA achieved some success west of Tirgu Fromos, where the 8th Guards Airborne Division and the 18 TC succeeded in routing the Romanian 6th Infantry Division. However, Korne moved a battlegroup of his armoured division to prevent a complete collapse in this sector and Konev failed to reinforce his success here.
44
Von Edelsheim commanded Panzergrenadier-Regiment 26 in the original 24.Panzer-Division at Stalingrad but was flown out of the pocket in November 1942.
45
Most of the tungsten core ammunition had been withdrawn from service after Kursk due to shortage of this vital metal, but Tiger units still received some APCR rounds.