The report, little more than a warmed-over version of prewar information, nevertheless confirmed Moltke’s decision to override the commander on the spot. From his first peacetime months as chief of staff Moltke had proven himself a tinkerer, a man unable to leave situations alone. It was fully in character for him to be eager to move troops from a theater where events seemed to be well under German control to a front where war was still the province of uncertainty.
Ludendorff for his part faced what seemed a no-lose situation. Since the reinforcements could not arrive in time to influence the ongoing battle, he could well afford to enhance his budding reputation outside his own headquarters for iron nerves in a crisis by denying any need at all for them. On the other hand if Moltke was in fact determined to begin building German strength in the east, the two corps he proposed to send would be a welcome addition to 8th Army’s order of battle. These were no improvised formations of family men, no untested collections of middle-aged reservists. The XI Corps was part of the active army. If its Thuringian regiments had not quite the reputation of their Pomeranian or Brandenburg comrades, they were generally regarded as well up to the Imperial army’s average. The Guard Reserve Corps had been formed on mobilization, but one of its divisions included three active regiments plus a fourth raised from cadres and students of the musketry and NCO schools in the Berlin region. It was a crack formation by any standards. And a second cavalry division would be a welcome relief for 8th Army’s overworked horsemen.
Ludendorff maintained his sanguine mood through the evening of the 28th despite the continuing absence of information on the whereabouts and circumstances of Below’s and Mackensen’s corps. At 9:30 p.m. he cheerfully informed OHL that everything was fine, with at least two Russian corps safely in 8th Army’s bag.21 Thirty minutes later, however, an army liaison officer, Major Drechsel, arrived by auto from I Reserve Corps headquarters. He brought bad news. Ludendorff and Hindenburg learned at first hand that not only had Below’s corps still not caught up with Kluyev, but that the Russians in that sector were far from destroyed. If Drechsel’s report was accurate, the positions of the two northern corps meant the 2nd Russian Army could retire eastward without much risk of being cut off by François’s already overextended troops. Worse yet, to the best of Drechsel’s knowledge XVII Corps was still somewhere on the road to Allenstein instead of advancing south. The army staff had the classic bad quarter of an hour assimilating this information—not least because its chief had only minutes earlier informed OHL that everything was rolling on wheels. The orders issued at 5:30 p.m. were cancelled. Instead, at 10:00 p.m. I Reserve Corps was told to continue attacking south and east on the 29th, this time with one division advancing directly on Hohenstein to assist in Kluyev’s defeat, and the other towards Jedwabno with the hope that it would be able to cut off the Russian retreat. The exact position of Mackensen’s corps was still a mystery, and it received orders accordingly: to remain in its bivouac areas and be ready to move against either Rennenkampf or Samsonov as circumstances demanded.
Hindenburg read the document, then scrawled an addendum at the bottom. “I expect,” he said, “my orders to be followed exactly. This is doubly urgent in the present complicated situation.” It was the first overt sign of stress this consciously unflappable man had shown since his arrival in East Prussia. Neither Below nor Mackensen had demonstrated the kind of insubordinate independence characteristic of François. Both generals could have argued that the “complicated situation” in Ostgruppe’s sector had been caused by their attempts to obey too many orders not fitting the tactical situation. But a man of sixty-seven who saw his battle slipping away from him could be forgiven if his Olympian detachment slipped a bit as well.22
An army staff desperately looking for troops to close roads that suddenly yawned open also turned to the cavalry. At midnight Brecht was ordered to send one of his brigades to Ortelsburg as a blocking force, and literally enjoined not to spare the horses.23 This left only two cavalry brigades directly facing the Russian 1st Army. But the risks of being taken in the rear by Rennenkampf seemed far less certain than the consequences of reporting to OHL that the promised enemy corps would not be delivered after all.
Shortly after midnight 8th Army’s chief of staff telephoned OHL to inform them of the changes in the general situation, and to pass the buck. Ludendorff expressed his disappointment that part of the enemy would now probably escape due to the failures of individual corps commanders. He described 8th Army as “highly nervous” and badly in need of rest.24 Apart from the question of “loyalty downwards,” just whose nerves were by this time on the edge of breaking is a question for debate. Anything less than overwhelming success meant Ludendorff’s stock was not likely to be very high among colleagues whose unspoken motto was, “Be more than you seem,” and who had not forgotten prewar controversies in which this rising star had been all too prominent.
Eighth Army’s chief of staff had another surprise for breakfast next morning. Ludendorff had counted on having XVII Corps ready for immediate service against Rennenkampf. At 6:30 a.m. on August 29, however, he learned that Mackensen had not received the 10:00 p.m. order to halt and camp, that instead his vanguards were in Ortelsburg. Ludendorff made the best of the situation. Ordering Mackensen’s men on still another countermarch after their previous exertions might well mean rendering the corps entirely useless from exhaustion. The XVII Corps would therefore continue south—but no farther than Passenheim. To replace it in the blocking role against Rennenkampf, one of Below’s divisions was to disengage as rapidly as possible from the fighting around Hohenstein and face front to the north. Unger’s troops and elements of Goltz’s Landwehr were ordered to concentrate in support of the reservists. And the governor of Königsberg was instructed to mount strong sorties to engage as many Russians as possible. Even if he had only second line troops available to open the battle, Ludendorff subsequently declared, he was determined to commence operations as soon as possible against the 1st Army, “whether it advanced or stood still.” For the moment he had little choice in his order of battle, and less in whether to accept action if Rennenkampf decided to force the issue by marching south.25
II
Ludendorff’s immediate opponents had also made some uncomfortable decisions. Samsonov reached XV Corps headquarters around 11:00 a.m. on August 28. He found a disturbed Martos who complained that his corps was fought out. It could not hold its positions much longer, to say nothing of advancing, unless it received reinforcements somewhat more substantial than an army commander and his staff. Throughout the afternoon Samsonov kept encouraging Martos to wait for XIII Corps to arrive from the north. But Kluyev was fighting his own battle, described above, against Below, Goltz, and Morgen. Instead of Russian guns shelling the German flank, instead of flat caps and khaki tunics becoming visible through the trees, instead of victorious shouts of “Urrah” the men of XV Corps only saw individual stragglers, then companies and battalions shaken by the increasing German pressure. Martos, according to his own account, told Samsonov the time had come to expect the worst. Samsonov was less pessimistic. The army commander informed Martos that he intended to fall back on Neidenburg with the XV and XIII Corps and the 2nd Division. Martos was instructed to issue appropriate orders to his divisions, then report to Neidenburg and organize the defense of the town. As long as Neidenburg was in Russian hands, Samsonov declared, it was still possible to avert disaster. As Samsonov expressed his hope, Neidenburg was on the point of falling, undefended, to the Germans.