54Geyer, Der russische Imperialisms, 71 ff., 143 ff., summarizes Russia’s Asian expansion. Otto Hoetzsch, Russland in Asien (Stuttgart, 1966), and A. M. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881–1904 (Berkeley, 1958), provide the details. Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (London, 1985), stresses that conflict’s “Russian dimension,” as opposed to external factors.
55Bülow to Holstein, 16.1.04, in GP XIX, 1, Nr. 5943; and Holstein Papers IV, Nr. 818. Winzen, Bülows Weltmachtkonzept, argues strongly and convincingly for the primacy of foreign policy in determining the chancellor’s approach to international relations. Barbara Vogel, Deutsche Russlandpolitik. Das Scheitern des deutschen Weltpolitik unter Bülow 1900–1906 (Düsseldorf, 1973), stresses economic factors. For German policies toward France cf. H. Raulff, Zwischen Machtpolitik und Imperialisms. Die deutsche Frankreichpolitik 1904–05 (Düsseldorf, 1976); and P. Guillen, Uallemagne et le Maroc 1870–1905 (Paris, 1967).
56James W. Long, “The Economics of the Franco-Russian Alliance, 1904–06” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1968) is a mine of information on the financial underpinning of Russian diplomacy in this period. For Russia’s behavior at Algeciras see Bernard F. Oppel, “The Waning of a Traditional Alliance. Russia and Germany after the Portsmouth Peace Conference,” Central European History V (1972), 318–329. For Austria’s, see F. Fellner, “Die Haltung Oesterreich-Ungarns während der Konferenz von Algeciras 1906,” Mitteilung des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung LXXI (1963), 462–477.
57On the process of decision making in 1905, Albrecht Moritz, Das Problem des Präventivkrieges in der deutschen Politik während der ersten Marokkokrise (Bern, 1974); and Raulff, Machtpolitik, 127 ff., are the most recent treatments. For German military thought cf. inter alia Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984), pp. 107 passim; and more generally Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security IX (1984), 58–107.
58The evolution of German military intentions towards the Low Countries can be traced in Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, RM 5/1666, “Angriffspläne gegen Holland und Belgien von 19.Juni 1885 bis Jan. 1902,” and RM 5/1667, “Angriffspläne gegen Holland und Belgien vom Mai 1905 bis Dez. 1912.” For Schlieffen’s concern with Belgium as an invasion route see his memoranda of May 1 and June 7, 1905, RM 5/1667. The general staff request of Nov. 27, 1909, is in ibid. General accounts include Ivo N. Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862–1914 (Boston, 1984), esp. 90 passim; Folkert Krieger, “Deutsch-dänische Beziehungen 1901–1914” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Bonn, 1974), 157 passim; and Horst Lademacher, Die belgische Neutralität als Problem der europäischen Politik 1830–1914 (Bonn, 1971), esp. 427 ff.
59“Der Aufmarsch gegen Russland,” Jan., 1894, Mohs, Waldersee II, 343 ff.
60Lothar Höbelt, “Schlieffen, Beck, Potiorek und das Ende der gemeinsa-men deutsch-österreichischen-ungarischen Aufmarschpläne im Osten,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen XXXVI (1984), 7–30, demonstrates that this anxiety was shared by the Austrians, and was a major factor in their ready acceptance of the revised German strategy.
61Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth, tr. E. Wilson (London, 1958); and Jehuda Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation (Westport Conn.: 1986). Both minimize Schlieffen’s concern for the east as a factor in his planning. Cf. L. C. F. Turner, “The Significance of the Schlieffen Plan,” Australian Journal of Politics and History XIII (1967), 49–66.
62Allan Mitchell, Victors and Vanquished: The German Influence on Army and Church in France after 1870 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1984), presents this process in detail.
63The Anglo-French entente of 1904 also generated the “hostage theory,” by which in case of war with England, decisive pressure was to be exerted on an otherwise inaccessible enemy by overrunning France, and arguably the Low Countries as well. Cf. Einem to Bülow, Oct. 17, 1904, with Schlieffen’s enclosure of Oct. 7, in PAAA, Deutschland 138, Geheim/6; and Bülow to Holstein, Dec. 15, 1904, in Holstein Papers IV, Nr. 869.
64Schlieffen to his sister Marie, November 13, 1892, in Eberhard Kessel, ed., Generalfeldmarschall Graf Alfred Schlieffen. Briefe (Göttingen, 1958), 295–298.
65The evolution of Schlieffen’s thought can be traced in the Aufgaben for 1903 and 1904 in Generalstab des Heeres, Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung (ed.), Dienstschriften des Chefs des Generalstabes der Armee Generalfeldmarschalls Graf von Schlieffen, Vol. I, Die taktisch-strategischen Aufgaben aus den jahren 1891–1905 (Berlin, 1937), 103 passim; and the “Staff Rides East” for 1901 and 1903, in ibid., Vol. II, Die Grossen Generalstabsreisen-Ost aus den jahren 1891–1905 (Berlin, 1937), 222 ff. and 300 ff.
66“Operationsstudie gegen Russland,” Mar. 1898, Mohs, Waldersee II, 348 ff.
67Cf. in particular Aufgaben of 1891, 1898, 1899 and 1904; and the Staff Rides East for 1897, 1899, 1901, and 1903, in Dienstschriften I and II. The anecdote is from Hermann von François, Marneschlacht und Tannenberg (Berlin, 1920), 126.
68Schlieffen’s growing pessimism is described in Gerhard Ritter, Sword and Scepter, tr. Heinz Norden, 4 vols. (Coral Gables, Fla., 1969–73), II, 199 ff. Hans Delbrück’s 1896 critique of Bloch, “Zukunftskriege und Zukunftsfriede,” is reprinted in Erinnerungen, Aufsätze und Reden (Berlin, 1902), 498–525. Cf. for purposes of comparison T. E. H. Travers, “Technology, Tactics, and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory 1900–1914,” Journal of Modern History LI (1979) 264–286.
69John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 273.
70Holstein to Brauer, Dec. 23, 1905, Holstein Papers IV, 376 ff.
71For the entente see particularly J. J. Williams, “The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August, 1907,” Historical Journal IX (1966), 360–373; and G. Monge, Ursachen und Entstehung der englisch-französischen-russischen Entente 1900–1907 (Seeheim, 1969). Barbara Jelavich, “British Means of Offense against Russia in the Nineteenth Century,” Russian History I (1974), 119–135, legitimates Russia’s strategic concerns. Keith Neilson, “Wishful Thinking: The Foreign Office and Russia, 1907–1917,” in Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy 1895–1939. Memorial Essays Honouring C. V. Lowe (Edmonton, Alberta, 1984), 151–180, stresses Britain’s need for an arrangement with Russia.