45Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariety, Les relations franco-allemandes 1815–1975 (Paris, 1977), 191 ff., is a brief general survey. John Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War (New York, 1983); and “Jules Cambon and Franco-German Détente, 1907–1914,” Historical Journal XXVI (1983), 641–659, cover the relationship’s diplomatic aspects; Poidevin, “Wirtschaftlicher und fin-anzieller Nationalismus in Frankreich und Deutschland, 1907–1914,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht (1974), incorporates a useful bibliography.
46Cf. the general staff reports of July 13 and Sept. 2, 1912 in DDF, 3rd Series, III, Nrs. 200, 359. Samuel R. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904–1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 205 passim, develops the British influence on French planning.
47Izvolsky to Sazonov, Sept. 12, 1912, in Un Livre Noir. Diplomatie d’avant-guerre d’apres les documents des archives russes, 1910–1917, 3 vols, in 6 (Paris, 1922–34), I, 323 ff. Robert H. Allshouse, “Aleksander Izvolskii and Russian Foreign Policy, 1910–1914” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Case Western Reserve University, 1977) presents Izvolsky’s ambassadorial career without exaggerating its impact.
48Louis Garros, “En Marge de l’Alliance Franco-Russe,” Revue Historique de e’Armee VI (June, 1950), pp. 29–30, 36.
49Raymond Poincaré, Au service de la France. Neuf années de souvenirs, 10 vols. (Paris, 1926–33), II, 336 ff.
50Pourtalès to Bethmann, Dec. 1, 1912, PAAA, Deutschland 131/34.
51Kiderlin to Bethmann, Sept. 2, 1912, ibid.
52R. J. Cramp ton, The Hollow Détente: Anglo-German Relations in the Balkans, 1911–1914 (London, 1979), passim.
53Minute by Sir Edward Grey, Apr. 18, 1910, BD VI, Nr. 344. Cf. Keith M. Wilson, “The British Démarche of 3 and 4 December, 1912: H.A. Gwynne’s Note on Britain, Russia and the First Balkan War,” in Empire and Continent (London, 1987), 141–148.
54For Bethmann’s speech see Verhandlungen des Reichstages, Stenografische Berichte, Vol. 286, 2471–2472. A copy of Kiderlin’s is in Kiderlin Papers 10/185.
55Grey to Bertie, Dec. 3, 1912; and Nicholson to Buchanan, Dec. 3, 1912, in BD, IX, 2, Nos. 321, 322; and Prince Karl Max von Lichnowsky, Heading for the Abyss, tr. S. Delmer (London, 1928), passim.
56William’s comments, on an article of Oct. 1, 1912, in the Täglichen Rundschau, are in Kiderlin Papers 10/176.
57The best examples of the first approach in John G. Röhl, whose most recent version of his case is “Der Militärpolitische Entscheidungsprozess in Deutschland am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges,” Kaiser, Hof und Staat. Wilhelm II und die deutsche Politik. (Munich, 1987), pp. 175–202. For the second, cf. especially Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy before 1914,” Central European History VI (1973), 12–14; and Egmont Zechlin, “Die Adriakrise und der ‘Kriegsrat’ von 8. Dezember 1912,” in Krieg und Kriegsrisiko (Düsseldorf, 1979), 115–159.
58Kiderlin to Lichnowski, Dec. 6, 1912, PAAA, Deutschland 131/34.
59Immanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy, 1871–1914 (London, 1976), 123–124; and Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967), 19, are familiar statements of this position.
60Ann Taylor Allen, Satire and Society in Wilhelmine Germany. Kladderadatsch and Simplicissmus, 1890–1914 (Lexington, Ky., 1984), pp. 131–132; Moltke to Bethmann, June 19, 1914, in Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, ed. W. Schücking, M. Montgelas, rev. ed., 5 vols. (Berlin, 1927), II, Nr. 349.
61Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1985), 45–46. The quotation is from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and the Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washington, D.C., 1914), 151.
62Djordje Mikić “The Albanians and Serbia During the Balkan Wars,” in East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars, 165–196.
63Joachim Remak, “1914—The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered,” Journal of Modern History XLIII (1971), 353–366; Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1983), II, 108 ff.
64Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, 1986).
65Alfred Cobban, National Self-Determination (London, 1945), 45–46; and Anthony Hartley, “The ‘Cold War’ for Beginners,” Encounter LXXII (Feb. 1988), 13; H. R. Trevor-Roper and George Urban, “Aftermaths of Empire: The Lessons of Upheavals and Destabilisation,” ibid., LXXIII (Dec. 1989), 13; On the evolution of self-determination as a political concept during World War I see particularly Harold Nelson, Land and Power: British and Allied Policy on Germany’s Frontiers, 1916–1919 (Toronto, 1963).
66Crampton, Hollow Détente, stresses the short-term aspects of the German initiative. J. M. Miller, Jr., “The Concert of Europe in the First Balkan War, 1912–1913” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Clark University, 1969), is a more general treatment.
67Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany and Peacemaking, 1918–1919. Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power, tr. M. R. and R. Kimber (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), p. 69.
68Cf. Roland Stromberg, Redemption by War: The Intellectuals and 1914 (Lawrence, Kans., 1982); and Michael Howard, “Men Against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914,” International Security IX (Summer, 1984), 41–57.
69The respect accorded these men in German military circles reflected their status as experts on tactical and operational issues—a fact giving their opinions on broader questions a more polite hearing than might otherwise have been the case. Cf. Dennis E. Showalter, “Goltz and Bernhardi: The Institutionalization of Originality in the Imperial German Army,” Defense Analysis III (1987), 305–318.
70“Memorandum of December 28, 1912, on a War with France and Russia,” in Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth, M. A. and E. Wilson (New York, 1958), 168 ff.; and A. Bohm-Tettelbach, Der Böhmische Feldzug Friedrichs des Grossen 1757 im Lichte Schlieffensche Kritik (Berlin, 1934).
71“Die Militärpolitische Lage Deutschlands,” Dec. 2, 1911, in Kriegsrüstung und Kriegswirtschaft, ed. Reichsarchiv, Anlageband (Berlin, 1930), 126 ff.; “Die wichtigste Veränderungen im Heerwesen Russlands im Jahre 1911,” BA-MA, RM5/1946, Russland Militärisches, Apr. 1892-Apr. 1914.
72Paul M. Kennedy, “The First World War and the International Power System,” in International Security IX (Summer, 1984), 28–29. Parallel critiques of the Russian army are John Bushnell, “The Tsarist Army after the Russo-Japanese War: The View from the Field,” and W. C. Fuller, “The Tsarist Army after the Russo-Japanese War: The View from the War Ministry,” in The Impact of Unsuccessful Military Campaigns on Military Institutions, 1860–1980, ed. Lt.-Col. C. E. Shrader (Washington, D.C., 1984), 77–99, 100–119. Walter T. Wilfong, “Rebuilding the Russian Army, 1905–1914: The Question of a Comprehensive Plan for National Defense” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1977), is a bit more optimistic, but remains negative.