22The most extreme statement of this thesis remains Bernd F. Schulte, Die deutsche Armee 1900–1914. Zwischen Beharren und Verändern (Düsseldorf, 1977). But cf. Manfred Messerschmidt, “Preussens Militär in seinem gesellschaftlichen Umfeld,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Sonderheft 6, Preussen im Rückblick, ed. H-J Pühle, H-U Wehler (Göttingen, 1980), 43–88.
23Von Tschischwitz, “Die dreigliedrige Division ais taktischer Körper,” E. V. Eisenhardt-Rothe, Deutsche Infanterie. Das Ehrenmal der vordestern Front (Zeulenroda, 1929), 200–201, is a good summary. But cf. W. Balck, Development of Tactics—World War, tr. M. H. Bell (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans., 1922), 21–22. Details of the German organization in 1914 can be found in Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. Kriegsrüstung und Kriegswirtschaft, Anlageband, ed. Reichsarchiv (Berlin, 1930).
24Jenö von Egon-Krieger, Die deutsche Kavallerie im Krieg und Frieden (Karlsruhe, 1928), surveys prewar doctrine and training. Cf. inter alia Friedrich von Bernhardi, Reiterdienst (Berlin, 1910); G. von Pelet-Narbonne, “Die Massen-attacken der Kavallerie bei unseren grossen Uebungen gegen die anderen Waffen,” JAM 123 (1902), 476–483; and “Mehr Kavallerie,” ibid., 124 (1903), 137–164.
25For a more detailed treatment see Dennis E. Showalter, “Prussia, Technology and War: Artillery from 1815 to 1918,” Men, Machines and War, ed. R. Haycock, K. Nelson (Waterloo, Ontario, 1988), 113–151.
26Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918 (New York, 1989).
27Cf. inter alia “Prüfungsschiessen und Königsabzeichen,” MW 1896, 102–103; and Reisner Frh. v. Lilienstern, “Kriegsmassiges Schiessen,” JAM 125 (1903), 325–338.
28Cf. Beckmann, “Zur Maschinengewehrfrage,” JAM 134 (1908), 384–407, 463–473, 571–587; “Zur Frage der Verteilung und Verwendung der Maschinengewehr,” Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift VIII (1905), 26–35; “Die Notwendigkeit der Maschinengewehre,” ibid., VII (1904), 530–537; A. Fleck, Maschinengewehre, ihre Technik und Taktik (Berlin, 1914); and Krieger, Das Gefecht der Maschinengewehr-Kompagnien (Oldenburg, 1913).
29Cf. Steven T. Ross, From Flintlock to Rifle: Infantry Tactics 1740–1866 (Rutherford, N.J., 1979); and Dennis E. Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology and the Unification of Germany (Hamden, Conn., 1975).
30Peter Stearns, Lives of Labor: Work in a Maturing Industrial Society (New York: 1975), is a useful survey of this development. His Be a Man! Males in Modern Society (New York, 1979), 59 ff., focusses more sharply on the development of new male bonding and coping patterns in industrial Europe.
31Hermann Müller, Die Erziehung der Truppe zum moralischen Wert in Deutschland, Russland und Japan (Berlin, n.d.); “Zum Infanterieangriff,” JAM 130 (1906), 170–188; Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie von 29 Mai 1906, rev. ed. Berlin (1909), esp. pars. 265, 327, 347; Balck, “Das Exerzierreglement für die Infanterie von 29. May 1906,” JAM 131 (1906), 111–135; Wold, “Die Infanterie der Zukunft,” ibid., 136 (1909), 35–38.
32Schlieffen’s 1912 recommendation of amalgamating reserve and active units in the same corps owed less to his faith in reservists than his conviction that active corps were too weak in infantry and reserve corps too weak in artillery to be balanced fighting units. Schlieffen to Freytag-Loringhoven, Aug. 14, 1912, in Generalfeldmarschall Graf Alfred Schlieffen. Briefe, ed. E. Kessel (Göttingen, 1958), 317–318.
33Cf. Eric Leed, No Man’s Land (New York, 1979); Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1979); and Roland N. Stromberg, Redemption by War: The Intellectuals and 1914 (Lawrence, Kans., 1982).
34The Russian army’s problems of professionalism and integration are presented in Dietrich Beyrau, Militär und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland (Cologne, 1984), which focusses on the period before 1870; William C. Fuller, Jr., Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881–1914 (Princeton, N.J., 1985); and Hans-Peter Stein, “Der Offizier des Russischen Heeres im Zeitabschnitt zwischen Reform und Revolution (1861–1905),” Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte, N. F, XIII (1967), 346–504.
35The most detailed presentation of Russian war plans remains A. M. Zaionchovski, Plany voiny (Moscow, 1926). This may be supplemented by Pertti Luntinen, French Information on the Russian War Plans 1880–1914 (Helsinki, 1984); and Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive. Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984), 157 ff. Peter von Wahlde, “Military Thought in Imperial Russia” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1966); and Walter T. Wilfong, “Rebuilding the Russian Army, 1905–1914: The Question of a Comprehensive Plan for National Defense” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1977); incorporate excellent bibliographies. William C. Fuller, Jr., “The Russian Empire,” in Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars, (Princeton, N.J., 1984), 98–126, focuses on intelligence aspects of Russian planning.
36Mikhnevich’s concepts are best expressed in Strategia, 3rd ed. (St. Petersburg, 1911). Their impact is summarized in Jacob W. Kipp, “The Beginning: Imperial Russia and Soviet Mobile Warfare to 1920,” in Historical Analysis of the Use of Mobile Forces by Russia and the USSR, ed. J. W. Kipp et. al. (College Station, Tex., 1985), 50–51.
37Col. Wyndham to Nicolson, May 31, 1909 and Apr. 6, 1910, in British Documents in Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Series A, Russia, 1851–1914, ed. D. Lieven, 6 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1983), V, Nr. 78; VI, Nr. 14; Matton to ministry of war, Mar. 1909, in France, Ministére des Affaires Étrangerés, Documents Diplomatiques Français (1871–1914), 41 vols. (Paris, 1929–59), 2nd series, XII, Nr. 88 (hereafter cited as DDF); Pelle to Buirn, Mar. 6 and 24, 1910, ibid., Nrs. 453, 467.
38N. N. Sukhotin, Voina v istorii russkogo mira (St. Petersburg, 1989), 13–14; cit. Richard Pipes, “How to Cope with the Soviet Threat,” Commentary LXXVIII (Aug., 1985, 13).
39“Procès-verbal des entretiens du mois août 1913 entre les chefs d’état-major des armées française et russe,” DDF 3, VIII, Nr. 79. Recent analyses of Russian prewar planning include Bruce Menning’s forthcoming Bayonets before Bullets, Chapter 7; and Jacob W. Kipp, Fromn Foresight to Forecasting: The Russian and Soviet Military Experience (College Station, Tex., 1988), 31 ff.