General Ramcke stated that he had completely demolished Brest (Document 112); General Spang was uncomfortable with having signed a number of death warrants during actions against partisans in Brittany (Document 101).[223] General von Choltitz told von Thoma that the heaviest burden which he had to discharge was ‘the liquidation of Jews’ (Document 106). His involvement was unknown to researchers before this protocol came to light. The executions must have taken place in the Crimea. Unfortunately nothing further is known due to the poor documentary source.
The mixture of crimes, guilt, denials of responsibility and explanations is especially clear in conversations about the Commissar Order. Thoma alleged that Brauchitsch and Halder had raised strong protests against it, but the files show the opposite.[224] He also swore on oath that no Commissars had been shot by his units (Document 6). In Halder’s War Diary this attitude appears confirmed initially. On 21 September 1941 he wrote: ‘General von Thoma: Report about the engagements of 17.Pz.Div. on the Desna. Interesting here […] (d) attitude of the unit towards Commissars (are not being shot)’.[225]
The files of 2.Pz.Gr. and XXXXVII Pz.Korps show however that shootings did occur in Thoma’s unit. It is certain that on 27 and 28 August 1941 respectively a Commissar was tried by Ic (No. 3 Staff Officer) at Divisional HQ and executed.[226] It is hardly likely that Thoma as divisional commander could have remained ignorant of this. Also on 21 September 1941 the files contain execution reports which cannot be doubted. On 27 September 1941 17.Pz.Div. reported having shot nine Commissars and Politruks over the previous five days.[227]
On 30 September 1941 Thoma left 17.Pz.Div. and took over 20.Pz.Div. a fortnight later. On 20 October he arrived at divisional HQ and took up his duties next day. The Ic delivered his situation report to Thoma, and it seems unlikely that the execution of a Commissar on 19 October would have been glossed over. On 23 October, the Ic’s interpreter executed the next Commissar to be captured.[228] It is therefore certain that the Commissar Order was at least occasionally carried out within Thoma’s jurisdiction, but Thoma’s statement at Trent Park that he advised Commissars to remove their insignia to prevent identification and execution is not necessarily false (Document 6). He was no more than half truthful on the whole, however.[229]
General Crüwell was equally economic with his powers of recall. He alleged that his 11.Pz.Div. had only executed a single Commissar, which he thought was not bad going (Document 88), whereas a report by his Ic dated 14.7.1941 indicates that the figure at that time was 10.[230]
Undoubtedly the majority of Trent Park inmates had knowledge of war crimes but kept the actual extent of their own involvement to themselves.[231] The nature of the war being fought was obvious to the group around von Thoma at the latest by the time they entered captivity. Georg Neuffer was already aware of the extent of the Holocaust and by the end of 1943 was estimating the number of murdered Jews at between three to five million (Documents 94, 95). Others doubted the reports of atrocities and attempted to create some kind of perspective. One reason for not wanting to admit them was one’s own war experience. A man like Crüwell, who by August 1941 had been transferred out of Russia, obviously knew far less about war crimes than many of his compatriots who remained there. That he refused absolutely to accept the reports of atrocities as true[232] and drew the corresponding conclusion was the result of his loyalty to the National Socialist State and his belief in the allegedly ‘clean’ Wehrmacht. Therefore he saw nothing indecent in the current practice of executing innocent hostages as a reprisal for the murders of German soldiers, and even argued that the practice was allowed under international law.[233] Major Boes reacted similarly. When von Broich confronted him with the information in October 1943 that the Germans had attempted ‘to exterminate whole communities’, he squirmed like an eel to avoid having to recognise this unpalatable fact.[234]
3.3 The Insurrection of Conscience. Reactions to 20 July 1944
The protocols provide new information about the German Resistance Movement.[235] The close links between General Choltitz and the conspirators was not known previously (Documents 151, 153). The most important are undoubtedly those statements about Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel. Researchers continue the debate on whether Rommel knew about the planned assassination and whether he considered the murder necessary. David Irving, David Fraser and latterly Ralf Georg Reuth share the view that Rommel was not a party to the plans of the conspirators nor did he advocate killing Hitler, since he was opposed to political assassination. Although they vary on the details, all three agree that Rommel’s aim was an armistice in the West in pursuit of which he was prepared if necessary to abandon his duty and throw open the Western Front.[236] Maurice Remy argues to the contrary in his book that Cäsar Hofacker informed Rommel on 9.7.1944 about the intended asassination and that Rommel was in agreement with it.[237] This conversation doubtless had a key function in the assessment of Rommel’s knowledge and conduct with regard to 20 July, yet the transmission is problematic and leaves no unequivocal conclusion. The British protocols (Documents 37, 155 and 157), ignored until the present, supply indications but no final proof, although they tend to support Remy. General Heinrich Eberbach mentioned on several occasions in captivity his conversations with Rommel on the 16th, and in particular on 17 July 1944 when the latter came out strongly against Hitler and said in conclusion that the Führer had to be ‘umgelegt’. The separable verb ‘umlegen’ has several meanings, e.g. transferred, re-allocated etc., but is often a euphemism for ‘killed’.[238]
After the war, Eberbach referred frequently to this conversation but toned down the verb.[239] What he said at Trent Park is more authentic: he was speaking only weeks after the event. His remarks about Rommel are confirmed from other documents: on 30 January 1945 von Thoma wrote in his diary a long passage about Rommel’s citicisms of Hitler and the way the war was going. He mentioned that Rommel had said ‘The Führer must be beseitigt.’[240] The verb beseitigen can mean ‘eliminate’, ‘dispose of’ but also ‘remove’ and ‘set aside’, a way of putting things which must have come from Eberbach, with whom Thoma shared very long conversations at Trent Park. Thoma’s version seems to indicate that Rommel preferred that Hitler be assassinated rather than arrested. A further indication is found in the memoirs of Ferdinand Heim, completed in May 1945, in which the author quotes Eberbach as saying that Rommel knew of the planned assassination.[241]
Even Feldmarschall von Rundstedt appears in a new light in the protocols. As the most senior of Hitler’s generals he had always been thought of as the best man to lead the peace negotiations.[242] Broich stated that Rundstedt confided to him as early as May 1942 that a German victory was out of the question.[243] Eberbach had been of the opinion that Rundstedt intended to conclude an armistice with the Western Allies (Document 37). Since it appears unlikely that Eberbach and Rundstedt could have met in Normandy, the statement is probably hearsay. Moreover it seems improbable that the 69-year-old field marshal, a lack-lustre personality to judge by the source material, wanted the job of bringing the war to an end all by himself. Eberbach’s observations suggest of Rundstedt an attitude much more critical than that assumed hitherto. It now seems possible that his reported answer to Keitel’s question, what else should one do besides hold the front – ‘Give up the war, you idiots’ – was actually what he said.[244]
223
He reported on the anti-partisan war at GRGG 172, 8–12.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4363. The 266.Inf.Div. War Diary has no valuable information about engagements between the Division and partisans. BA/MA RH26-266-9 (June – July 1944).
229
Oberleutnant Filster, adjutant, I/SR.59 of 20.Pz.Div. on 20.4.1942 drafted a memorandum on the Soviets in which he said, ‘To destroy them requires the harshest, most ruthless methods with all the physically and morally destructive weapons available…’ His 1a, Major Stoecker approved the clarity and style of the documented but then regretted that the racial differences had been underplayed. Thoma noted on the covering sheet ‘For the War Diary’, but his opinion is not recorded. BA/MA RH27/20–108.
231
The protocols provide no definite indication as to which of the Trent Park inmates were involved in which war crimes. For the problem of proof, see note 329 to documents, below.
235
For the most recent study on the military resistance see Heinemann, ‘Der militärische Widerstand’.
238
Irving and Fraser both rely on GRGG 1347, report of 19.8.1945 in TNA WO 208/4170, where Eberbach quoted Rommel as having said that Hitler ‘must be got rid of [
239
On 14.10.1952 Eberbach wrote to historian Percy Schramm, ‘It was not Rommel’s intention to murder Hitler, but to put him on trial.’ BA/MA MSg 1/1079. On 15.5.1979 in a memorandum regarding his conversation with Rommel on 17.7.1944, Eberbach insisted he could only recall Rommel saying ‘Hitler must go’, BA/MA 15.5.1979 MSg 1/1079.
244
Researchers doubt whether Blumentritt, Rundstedt’s Chief of Staff, and his 1a, Bodo Zimmermann, answered in this form. Ose, ‘Entscheidung im Westen’, p. 157; Ziemke, ‘Des Führers gehorsamer Diener’, p. 489; see also Messenger, ‘The Last Prussian’, p. 197f.