Document 8
CSDIC (UK), SR REPORT, SRGG 5 [TNA, WO 208/4165]
LUDWIG CRÜWELL – General der Panzertruppe – Captured 29 May 42 in North Africa.
HANS CRAMER – General der Panzertruppe (G.O.C. German Afrikakorps) – Captured 12 May 43 in Tunisia.
Information received: 16 May 43
CRAMER: When we older men who have experienced the last war follow this whole business, it makes us think. I can draw such a terrible number of parallels myself, that I always say: ‘It is impossible for it to turn out well, but for Heaven’s sake don’t let’s think….’ Herr General, everything has turned out just as last time… but very gradually. If you examine the situation – AMERICA is becoming more and more powerful. I would like to be optimistic, but I don’t know – and the worst part is that I have just come back from the collapse at KHARKOV; I was present at the collapse of the Rumanians, the Italians and the Hungarians, I was with the Hungarian Army as GOC(?) and now I have been through this business, so I have been retreating since… autumn(?).[11]
CRÜWELL: I don’t look on the position as hopeless. It is critical but—
CRAMER: No, but hopeless. I keep on saying, one is far too apt to judge by what we remember of 1918.[12]
CRÜWELL: Yes, certainly, and it is on that that the others are counting.
CRAMER: Yes, it is really extraordinary that there should be two such wars after having really sworn after the Great War that we would never again fight the English, we all said that we wouldn’t do that again. We both had the same ideas… these ‘two white nations’ etc., etc.
CRÜWELL: The English say the same.
CRAMER: But if you talk to an Englishman he doesn’t quite come out into the open. I still believe that the FÜHRER honestly made proposals to the English, perhaps not quite far-reaching enough but—[13]
CRÜWELL: Well that’s a question of laying the blame.
CRAMER: In my opinion there is only one possibility: we should guarantee the British Empire.
CRÜWELL: I can’t imagine that the fortress of EUROPE will be overrun, I don’t believe it. At any rate, if they were to try it it would be an extremely difficult job.
CRAMER: Yes, in my opinion, we have only one chance, and that is: in contrast to the Great War… the air force. If they were to form a bridgehead in SALONIKA it probably wouldn’t matter much as we could probably hold them there or even throw them out again. But we can’t hold the RAF and the RAF will attack RUMANIA and smash everything there to bits, and then we should lose the oil.
CRÜWELL: The English and American show in NORTH AFRICA was badly muddled.
CRAMER: Yes, with their overwhelming equipment, but their tactics were very bad.
CRÜWELL: But do you think, disregarding the possibility of an offensive, that the Russians—
CRAMER: We can hold that. But then comes the time, with the arrival of winter when the Russians will start again.
CRÜWELL: I believe, however, if we wee to say that we would do nothing this summer, except straighten the line… and build everything up and make everything ready, then they certainly wouldn’t get through in the winter. For, if one looks back, their greatest successes have always been there where no preparations had been made.
CRAMER: Yes. Their successes were merely because of their numbers… infantry and tanks… But I’m afraid that the FÜHRER will do something… somewhere.
CRÜWELL: What is our position regarding personnel?
CRAMER: Not too bad. The Operations Staff Officer of the 10th Panzer Division… he had this… whole manpower business,[14] he said: ‘It’s not too bad.’ …They seem to be getting more men again now, but we can’t live on that for ever. Ever since the CAUCASUS affair went badly for us, TURKEY has completely turned against us.[15] Damnation, we must…
CRÜWELL: If we lose, then it’s all up.
CRAMER: Completely finished. A short time ago I was in ITALY[16] – these completely unreliable Italians… but they are having a great many difficulties over the BALKANS.
CRÜWELL: What is the position in YUGOSLAVIA?
CRAMER: There is still trouble in CROATIA and we are always having a lot of trouble with the guerrillas there.[17]
CRÜWELL: If you listen to the English radio, they make up a terrific story.
CRAMER: Yes, but it’s not as bad as that. We had about one to two divisions, well, let us say three divisions on a war footing…[18]
CRÜWELL: What’s your opinion of the CHANNEL coast?
CRAMER: Perfect. They won’t get in there.
CRÜWELL: All I can say is that if they land in SALONIKA, even if they have a bridgehead—
CRAMER: Yes, they’ll land at… because we haven’t got anything there.
CRÜWELL: Yes, but surely we must be in a position to send anything there.
CRAMER: We’ve got nothing, literally nothing. We’ve got as many (troops) as possible in the West and some behind the Eastern Front and that’s all we’ve got… and the remainder(?) are in ITALY. We’ve still got very good divisions and we’re getting tanks now too including the new ‘Panthers’.[19] […]
CRÜWELL: Is the FÜHRER still really all right?
CRAMER: Yes, yes!
CRÜWELL: His speech especially on Heroes day – his voice sounded very – not at all so—[20]
CRAMER: Yes, but he is a man, who succeeds through his own pertinacity, who believes in his own mission, indeed he has to. Unfortunately he has somewhat… amongst the people… because he always makes the mistake of appearing only as the FÜHRER, as the great military leader – perhaps it is just tactlessness. If we are perfectly honest and judge it from the purely military point of view… things have gone badly ever since he took command.
CRÜWELL: Yes, we’ve learnt our lesson!
CRAMER: Yes.
CRÜWELL: But one doesn’t know, the cause of it – but I am – there’s so much time to brood over things.
CRAMER: Yes, yes!
CRÜWELL: Perhaps it was, because HALDER[21] and BRAUCHITSCH[22] couldn’t get on with him properly, or was it possibly because the Russians put up a greater resistance against us than we had expected?
CRAMER: Then there’s RIBBENTROP[23] with his politics.
CRÜWELL: In my opinion we had to decide either to carry on to the end with the BRÜNING system or to make a second war inevitable.
CRAMER: Yes, but I have the feelings, that… a bit less grasping.
CRÜWELL: …the Eastern campaign may last for another ten years!
CRAMER: Yes.
Document 9
CSDIC (UK), SR REPORT, SRGG 126 [TNA, WO 208/4165]
FRIEDRICH FREIHERR VON BROICH – General-major (G.O.C. 10th Panzer Division) – Captured 12 May 43 in Tunisia.
DR CARIUS – Hauptmann (ADC to M180[24]) – Captured 11 May 43 in Tunisia.
BOCK – Leutnant (ADC to BROICH) – Captured 12 May 43 in Tunisia.
Information received: 11 June 43
BROICH: After the last war it was said: ‘If GERMANY wins the war, the Hohenzollern system will remain and life will be impossible.’ Now we say: ‘If GERMANY wins the war, the National Socialist system will remain and life will be impossible.’ Our position is hopeless, there is no sense in carrying on the war any longer. It’s just the same wherever we attack, we can no longer advance, and we win nothing. The quality of our troops in RUSSIA is not what it was at the beginning of the offensive. What has been lost is irreplaceable. Even if they do push forward somewhere today – drive in a deep wedge, then they are there and say to themselves: ‘Our fate will be just the same as all the others; we shall be left in the lurch when things get a bit worse.’[25] […]
11
On 20.11.1942 Hans Cramer was given command of Generalleutnant Heim’s weak XXXXVIII.Pz.Korps which, together with 1st Rumanian and 22nd German tank divisions, lay behind the front line held by the 3rd Rumanian Army. The previous day the Soviets had begun their pincer-offensive on Stalingrad, after which the Don Front collapsed. Later, while commanding ‘Gruppe Cramer’ near Kharkov, he witnessed another great Soviet offensive. He did not participate in von Manstein’s counter-offensive, which succeeded in recapturing Kharkov, because he had been transferred to the Führer-Reserve on 10.2.1943. On 13.3.1943 he arrived in Tunisia as Commanding General, Deutsches Afrika Korps, where he experienced the defeat of Heeresgruppe Afrika. The experience of two devastating defeats apparently lay behind his pessimism as to the future course of the war. SRGG 59, 22.5.1943, TNA WO 208/4165.
12
Thoma often drew this comparison with 1918 (see for example SRX 1644, 11.3.1943, TNA WO 208/4162).
13
Cramer means the two peace offers made by Hitler in the autumn of 1939 and summer of 1940 in which he proposed to guarantee the security of the British Empire in exchange for a free hand in the East. For further literature on this theme see Weinberg, ‘Welt in Waffen’, pp. 106–12, 173f. For Hitler’s speech of 19.7.1940 see also Lukacs, ‘Churchill und Hitler’, pp. 223, 277. The speech is reproduced in Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 2, p. 1540ff.
14
Oberstleutnant Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg (15.11.1907–20.7.1944) was transferred to 10.Pz.Div. as 1a (No. 1 General Staff Officer) in February 1943 and was seriously wounded on 7.4.1943. Active from May 1940 in the OKH organisational divisions, he had insight into the tense personnel situation in the Army, but had no involvement in personnel administration. Hoffmann, ‘Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg’, pp. 242f, 245, 253.
15
After the German defeats in the winter of 1942, Turkey became increasingly pro-British. Krecker, ‘Deutschland und die Türkei im Zweiten Weltkrieg’. For the political consequences of the defeat at Stalingrad for the Axis partners see also Förster, ‘Stalingrad’.
16
Cramer had no command in Italy. He must be speaking here of his journey to North Africa, during which, in Rome in March 1943 he very probably held several conversations at Italian High Command, although no details are known.
17
In the spring of 1943 Tito’s Communist partisans became stronger militarily. In the winter of 1942 the Wehrmacht failed to wipe them out in a major offensive, ‘Weiss’. The Italian 2nd Army had long been incapable of controlling its appointed zone of occupation in southern Croatia. Schmider, ‘Partisanenkrieg’, pp. 193–261.
18
On 9.4.1943 in Yugoslavia there were five German divisions (114, 117 and 118.Jäger-Div., 187.Res.-Div. and SS-Gebirgs-Div. ‘Prinz Eugen’) and 369th Croatian Infantry Division. Although able to fight, they would have had only limited value in the major offensives on the Eastern Front on account of their obsolete equipment. KTB OKW 1943, p. 261. For the usefulness of these units in battle, see Schmider, ‘Partisanenkrieg’, pp. 535–41.
19
The new ‘Panther’ tanks were used for the first time in battle in Operation ‘Zitadelle’ in July 1943, Schmider, ‘Partisanenkrieg’, pp. 535–41.
20
Hitler’s speech on
21
Generaloberst Franz Halder (30.6.1884–2.4.1972) Chief of Army General Staff, 1.9.1938–24.9.1942.
22
Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Brauchitsch (4.10.1881–18.10.1948) C-in-C Army (ObdH), 4.2.1938–19.12.1940.
25
This gloomy appraisal of the situation, very close to the reality, is noteworthy because Broich was not present at the devastating Soviet winter offensive of 1942/43. He commanded a rifle brigade of 24.Pz.Div. until 31.10.1942, when he was transferred to Tunisia.