BÜHLER: The more I see of this business, it is really as you said just now, Sir, they have got their navy, but that is all. […]
Document 16
CSDIC (UK), SR REPORT, SRGG 748 [TNA, WO 208/4167]
The following is the text of a speech by:
ULRICH BOES – Major (Staff Officer to Generalleutnant von SPONECK (PW)) – Captured 9 May 43 in Tunisia.
Information received: 7 Jan. 44
(After describing duties of NCOs while on active service, Boes sums up their duties after capture.)
BOES: […] I am quite clear about it all in my own mind, and I often feel myself that the very moderation of our attitude in many respects – for instance, towards the English Camp Commandant[36] and senior English officers – is in many respects totally incompatible with my own personnal temperament, with my own personal hatred of the English, and may appear to many of the younger members, especially to all of you here, far too moderate – to put it mildly. And I can well understand how you, in your enthusiasm, in your patriotism enhanced by National Socialism, in your fanatical hatred of ENGLAND, which has been inflamed by tales of horror – by the air attacks which have burst on our families at home – that you, personally, would prefer a far more ruthless, a far less compromising, a far harsher attitude. That is a young man’s point of view, which I myself can well appreciate. But when, on the other hand, you realise that neither a Generaloberst, a full General, a Generalleutnant nor a Generalmajor, nor even an Oberst can suddenly go on hunger-strike, say, because the food has deteriorated, as a young Leutnant could – and recently did – but in this place, with all these eminent personalities, famous soldiers who have commanded divisions not only in RUSSIA and AFRICA but in other theatres of war as well – and in the last war, too – who have twice fought against ENGLAND – naturally they can’t start a hunger-strike or any naughty-schoolboy pranks of that kind – which is really what behaviour of that sort amounts to; that sort of thing is beneath the dignity of a General, who represents in his own person the German nation vis-à-vis the enemy. In the course of my talks with you I have often had the opportunity of reassuring myself on one point, namely that we are, at any rate, unanimous in our hatred of our hosts here. And so, in all external appearances we must give an example of German order and cleanliness, such as the English have always expected of the Germans, because we are a disciplined, orderly and organised nation.
Document 17
CSDIC (UK), GRGG 139
Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 3 June 44 [TNA, WO 208/4363]
NEUFFER: You can say what you like, but the highest Generals did take part in that whole business, from 1941 onwards. There were certainly plenty of Generals at the FÜHRER’s headquarters, who said: ‘Certainly, my FÜHRER,’ JODL[37] and KEITEL for a start. You can’t say that they did not share the responsibility from the way in which they let FRITSCH be treated,[38] in 1934, when BREDOW was shot and SCHLEICHER.[39] Those were serious things. That was their last opportunity, in my opinion. Isn’t that so?
KREIPE: Yes.
NEUFFER: If you look at it historically, everything points of course to the fact that at any rate in a Western European state – which we, after all, are – that form of dictatorship, which is pure terrorism, is impossible in the long run.
KREIPE: I consider too that all those ways which have been found of killing off the Jews are disgraceful. […]
Document 18
CSDIC (UK), GRGG 139
Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 1–2 and 3 June 44 [TNA, WO 208/4363]
KREIPE: […] We cannot beat the Russians. One can only hope that they may have spent themselves and will one day say: ‘If the other fools don’t want to, then we will just make a separate peace with HITLER.’ Good. I only hope that HITLER won’t be too stubborn and demand too much, but that he will be moderate. I think he will be now. That is a possibility.[40]
Document 19
CSDIC (UK), GRGG 149
Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 22–7 June 44 [TNA, WO 208/4363]
BROICH: In my opinion the only possibility is for us to make peace, and for RUNDSTEDT[41] to march eastwards with the English against the Russians. That is the only possibility. If that doesn’t happen or if chaos develops later on, we shall have pure communism. […]
KRUG: I can promise you that I’m no 110 per cent National Socialist, quite definitely not. But, I mean – I’m now talking of peace-time – we live in the State and the State has made us officers what we are. It has treated us decently and, for better or worse, that is the present Constitution.
Document 20
CSDIC (UK), GRGG 152
Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 3 July 44 [TNA, WO 208/4363]
BASSENGE: I should be interested to know how the troops would have reacted if RUNDSTEDT had been approached (to induce him to withdraw in the West).
HERMANN: In an ordinary unit, that’s to say one which is not SS, there would probably be 60 per cent in favour of it and 40 per cent against it, for at least 40 per cent of our men are old SS and SA men, etc.
HENNECKE: The Allies are convinced that they have won the war. Why are they so friendly towards us? Apparently they shrink from the idea of letting the Bolshevists into EUROPE. It seems strange to me. Sometimes I had the impression that the BAO, with all his questions about the new weapons and so on, was trying to prevent further useless bloodshed – which is really only natural.
? SATTLER: I look on all that as a cunning Jewish trick.
HENNECKE: Yes, but how often have the British made an alliance with the country which they have just conquered, against a stronger one?[42]
KÖHN: Yes, that’s true, but I don’t believe that they feel so sure of themselves now, that they think that victory is already theirs. They will be saying to themselves: We must try to form a strong nucleus of officers here, who will to some extent act out to be a new body of leaders, and we will use that for propaganda again.
SATTLER: That is the same story as in RUSSIA.
KÖHN: Yes, exactly the same, only that there it is perhaps done by force whereas here—
HENNECKE: I have the impression, and it is a lasting one, that the people here are afraid of the idea of Bolshevism. I keep thinking of the uneasiness which we all felt when we were suddenly told that we were allying with RUSSIA. It was something so nonsensical. The alliance which they have got with the Russians is just as nonsensical, firstly from the ideological standpoint, which means a lot of them, and secondly from the standpoint of economics, and through fear of what a power she might become.
37
Generaloberst Alfred Jodl (10.5.1890–16.10.1946), from 23.8.1939 Chief of the Wehrmacht Command Staff.
38
Army C-in-C Generaloberst Werner Freiherr von Fritsch (4.8.1880–22.9.1939) was accused by the Gestapo of having been blackmailed in 1936 for a homosexual act. Replaced on 4.2.1938 by Brauchitsch, he was proven innocent by the Reich Military Court the following month. Appointed by Hitler to head Art.Reg.12, he fell on the outskirts of Warsaw during the Polish campaign. There was outrage amongst senior commanders at the Gestapo allegation, a fabrication based on false identity. The best short account with sources is Mühlheisen, ‘Fritsch’, a detailed presentation appears in Janssen/Tobias, ‘Der Sturz der Generäle’.
39
General Kurt von Schleicher (7.4.1892–30.6.1934) and Generalmajor Ferdinand von Bredow (16.5.1894–30.6.1934) were shot dead the same day by SS men during the Röhm putsch. Fallois, ‘Kalkül und Illusion’.
40
Hitler never considered the possibility of a special peace settlement. See Hildebrand, ‘Das vergangene Reich’, pp. 787–806, Martin, ‘Deutsche-sowjetische Sondierungen’.
41
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt (12.12.1875–24.2.1953) was the longest-serving Wehrmacht general of World War II. He was appointed C-in-C West on 15.3.1942; a convincing strategy to repel the Allied landings eluded him. After the Allies landed in Normandy in June 1944, Hitler transferred him to the Führer-Reserve on 2 July 1944.
42
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britain frequently took the long view by siding with former enemies against allies. An example was the difficult alliance with France following the Vienna Congress of 1815, as the result of which both fought Britain’s former ally during the Napoleonic Wars, Russia, in the Crimean War (1853–56). Historical parallels to the hope expressed here that Britain might change sides to fight alongside Germany against the Soviet Union are rare, but one occurred in 1808 during the war against Spain (1796–1808) when the latter allied with Britain against Napoleon.